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SUMMARY 
Societies are imaginative when setting up non-marl\et responses to deal v1ith insecurity and deprivation. The 
result is that there are many different services (such as income support, personal welfare services, education, 
health care and housing) catering for the very general objective of providing security. In addition, a variety of 
institutions can, and do, provide these services. While the traditional theory of public goods and e::...1ernalities 
does not provide clear justification for increased state provision of these services (in contrast to market, family, 
community and employer provision), increased state provision and coordination do seem to be a clear trend 
both from historical and comparative perspectives. Furthermore, this increased role of the state can be 
interpreted as representing a reassignment of the traditional roles of other institutions (noted above) to the state. 
The above trend can be rationalized on economic grounds as being the result of the changing nature of 
societies which affects the viability of different institutions In the provision of social services. Economic 
devt~lopment affects the cost of production of social services by different institutions differently. Taking a more 
in depth view of the costs of production, there are grounds to believe that the comparative advantage of the 
state in the provision of these_ services grows as economic development takes place. "Nationalization" of the 
-- - -- - . 
provision of services providing social security as economic development takes place can thus be seen as a 
stylized fact of economic development, and as representing an adjustment which can be efficiency enhancing. 
lt is from this perspective that the issue of the affordabiiity of increased social provision in developing countries 
should be approached. 
The South African experience provides further evidence of the increasing pressures, over time, for greater state 
provision of social security. The experience also, how . .:wer, furnishes examples of how in a specific situation 
these forces can be obstructed by speciric political institutions and how social policy can fail to adjust to 
changing circumstances. This resulted in the current unequal access to social services, the inequality of benefit 
levels and the incomplete coverage of risks faced by people in the South African economy. 
In spite of the incompleteness of the South African social safety net and the inequality which it reflects, fiscal 
and macroeconomic constraints seem to limit the possibilities for eAtending the safety net and for making it 
more just These constraints imply, and have resultoo in, the lowering of benefits to the previously privileged _;-( 
and an adjustment in the nature of benefits, leading to a focus on lower cost services which offer high rates 
of return. Current demands and envisaged changes in the spht?re of social policy, especially those surrounding 
a national pension system with universal coverage and G:·.tensive speci31 employm.3nt programmes, however, 
indicate the strength of the forces making for increase:d "nationali:ation" of income support and other social 
services. How the perceived fiscal constraints can be reconciled with the alleged rationality of a growing role 
for the South African state in social provision remains a question. The very general response of this study 
needs to be evaluated by looking in more d.:.tail at specific programmes and specific aspects of insecurity. 
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OPSOMMING 
Samelewings Is verbeeldingryk met die daarstelllng van nla-markgeorlanteerde lnstalllngs am armoede en 'n 
gebrek aan bestaanssekerheid die hoof te bi~d. Daarom is daar 'n verskeidenheid dienste (soos inkomstever-
sekering, persoonlih:e welsynsdienste, gesondheid, onderwys en bE:huising) am die baie algemene behoefte aan 
bestaanssel\erheid aan te spreek. Daar is dan ook 'n hele versl\eidenheid instellings wat hierdie dienste 
voorsien, en kan voorsien. Alhoewel die tradisionele teorie van publieke goedere en ekstemaliteite nie 
voldoende regverdiging vir groeiende staatsvoorsiening van hierdia dlenste (in teenstelllng met verskafflng deur 
marlo.te, families, gemeensh:appe en werh:gewers) daarstel nie, blyk dit dat toenemende staatsvoorslening uit 'n 
historiese sowel as vergelykende perspektief 'n duid&like tendens verteenwoordlg. Verder kan die groeiende 
rol van die staat in hierdle steer oak gesit:m word .:ts die gevolg van die hertoewysing van tradisionele rolle van 
ander instellings (soos hierbo genoem) aan die staat. 
Hierdie tend ens kan op ekonomiese gronde gerasionaliseer word as die gevolg van die veranderende aard van 
samelewlngs wat die ekono~lese lewensvatbaarheid van lnstellings In die voorsiening van soslale dlenste 
be"invloed. Eh:onomiese ontwil\1\eling affehteerverskillende lnstellings, en daarom die produksiekoste van sosiale 
dienste deur die instellings voorsien, op uiteenlopende maniere. lndien 'n bree konsep van produksiekoste 
gebruik word is dit moontlik am te argumenteer dat die ataat se vergelykende voordeel in die voorsiening van 
hierdie dienste toeneem soos 'n land ekonomies ontwiH el. "Nasionalisering" van die dienste wat sosiale 
sekuriteit daarstel kan dan gesien word as •.::en van die basiese neigings wat met ekonomiese ontwikkeling 
geassosieer kan .,.,ord. sowel as 'n aanpassing wat ~konomiese doe.ltreffendheid verbeter. Hierdle perspehtief 
Is die gewensde een wanneer die kwessie van die bekostigbaarheid van toenemende sosiale voorsiening in 
ontwil\1\elende lande aangespreek word. 
Die Suid-Afrih:aanse ondervlnding in hierdie verband Vo?.rskaf verdere getuienis van toenemende kragte, oar tyd, 
wat groeiende staatsvoorsiening van sosiale sekuriteit (sekerheid) In die hand werk. Die ondervinding voorsien 
egter oak voorbeelde van hoe hierdie 1\ragte deur spesifleke politieh:e instellings omvorm kan word en hoe 
soslale beleid 1\an agterbly by veranderende omstandighooe. Hierdie faktore het aanleiding gegee tot die 
huidige ongelyke toegang tot sosiale dienste, ongely~·e voordelo?. en onvoldoende dekking teen die rlsiko's wat 
die Suid-Afrikaanse ekonomie inhou. 
Ten spyte van die tekortkominge van die Suid-Afrik3.anse stelsel van bestaansbeveiliging en die ongelyh:heid 
daarin gereflehteer, kom dit voor asof fiskale en makro-ekonomiese beperkinge die moontlikhede am die stelsel 
te omvorm streng beperk: Hierdie beperkinge impli=3eer, en het aanleiding gegee tot, 'n ver1aging van die 
voordele van die bevoorregte groepe en 'n aanpassing van die aard van voordele, veral in die rigting van 
goedl\oper dienste met stet:.ds hoe opbrengskoerse. Huidige eise en voorsit3ne veranderinge in die sfeer van 
sosiale beleid. veral ten opsigte van 'n univo3rsele sto::l3o:.l van 3osiale pensioene en spesiale werkskep-
pingsprogramme, dui egter op die sterkte van die kragte wat to8n8m-:mde "nasionalisering" van sosiale dienste 
in die hand werk. Hoe die k1aarblyklike fish:ale bep.:.rl\ings ta versoen is met die beW•3erde rasionaliteit van 'n 
grater rol vir die Suid-Afrikaanse staat in sosiale voorsi8ning bly 'n vraag. Dit is nodig am die bree perspehtief 
van hierdie studie te evalueer deur in meer detail te kyh: na sp•:.sifial\e programme en spesiflel\e oorsah:e van 
'n gebrek aan bestaanssel\erheid. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a recent survey of patterns of structural change accompanying the process of economic 
development, Syrquin remarked that "(t)he importance of institutions and institutional change 
for modern economic growth is increasingly being recognized". He concluded the survey 
by saying that "(t)he time may be ripe for trying to establish the stylized facts of institutional 
change and their role in the structural transformation (of an economy)".1 
A number of other economists working in the field of development have also recently 
emphasized the importance of institutions2 in explaining development and underdevelop-
ment. Stiglitz argues that disparities in levels of living and growth rates between rich and 
poor countries "can be attributed ... to how individuals (factors of production) interact, and 
to the institutions which mediate these interactions".3 He then continues by focusing on the 
market as one of these institutions. Toye states that " ... development economists must 
locate themselves by four bearings - economic behaviour, technology, institutions and 
politics". Specifically, he maintains that the possible effect of technological progress and the 
likelihood of its implementation to eradicate poverty is dependent on, or is constrained by, 
the specific types of institutions found in a society.4 This view is echoed by Bruton: "A 
broader approach to understanding an economy recognizes that the non-market social 
institutions constrain or, more generally, affect how the market works, ... ". A specific 
example which he notes, is the fact that the extended family as an institution serves as a 
form of income support in traditional poor societies. As such, the institution provides "utility". 
The disruption of this system is an important cost of development and, except for the fact 
that it might lead to hardship, could have an effect on incentives and resistance to change. 5 
On a more general level Sen has argued that a person's entitlement to goods and services 
is not only dependent on market exchange, but also on entitlements which derive from the 
1Syrquin (1988:267-268). 
21nstitutions can be defined as mechanisms through which people interact. 
3Stiglitz (1989:197). 
4Toye (1985:9 and 11). 
5Bruton (1985:1105-1106). 
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specific "mode of production" in action (eg. capitalist or socialist) and from goods and 
services which are provided by the state.6 He specifically maintains that the institution of 
modern social security, rather than the high level of average income, is to a large extent re-
sponsible for the absence of regular famines in developed countries. 7 Elsewhere he views 
the problems of developing countries, and the high levels of poverty, as resulting from the 
complete dependence of people on markets, because the process of capitalist development 
in its early stages destroys traditional systems of income support (institutions such as the 
extended family) without immediately putting something else (eg. modern social security) in 
its place.8 
Following from these leads, this study analyzes some of the interrelationships, and the 
complexities of the interrelationships, between economic development and the growth of 
state provision of social security. The relative importance of such state provision of social 
security in developed societies and the urgency of the search for instruments to alleviate 
poverty in poor countries, serve as a first motivation for this study. 
In addition to focusing on conceptual, comparative and theoretical issues related to the role 
of the state in this sphere, the history and current situation with regard to such provision in 
South Africa are also analyzed extensively. Because of the inequalities and inadequacies 
in terms of access to social services and the extent of deprivation in South Africa, the trans-
formation of institutions providing social services is of significant importance. The analysis 
of the South African situation in the light of international experience and theoretical principles 
makes a clearer assessment of possibilities and constraints in this regard possible. 
Besides establishing some interrelationships between the different institutions providing 
social security and economic development and confronting some of the issues related to 
state provision of social security in South Africa, this study also touches on a number of 
more general issues. These relate to : 
6Sen (1981 :4-6). 
7Sen (1981 :6). 
8Sen (1980:31). 
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the conceptualization of the provision of social security and social services in the 
development process; 
the reality of the alleged trade-off between growth and distribution, equity and 
efficiency; and 
the proper role of the state, and the justification of this role, in social policy and the 
economy. 
The study is divided into two parts. Part 1 deals with conceptual and theoretical matters and 
provides a comparative perspective on state provision of social security. Chapter 1 explains 
what is meant by social security. The focus is on the economic characteristics of the goods 
and services providing social security and the diversity of institutions and mechanism 
responsible for its provision. The chapter concludes with a hypothesis about the relationship 
between the level of economic development of a country and the role of the state, as one 
of these diverse institutions, in the provision of social security. 
Chapter 2 attempts to establish the accuracy of the postulated relationship by looking at 
different sets of information. As a result of the non-availability of direct evidence indirect ap-
proaches have to be used. Although there is not conclusive evidence, the information on 
changing sources of transfers, changing state expenditures, and institutional change is in 
line with the offered hypothesis. Chapter 3 offers an explanation of the observed tendency. 
The explanation in terms of changing supply and demand forces also permits an 
assessment of the rationality of the trend. 
Part 2 consists of an analysis and appraisal of state provision of social security in South 
Africa. This is related to Part 1 in two ways. Firstly, it provides further illustrations of some 
of the aspects of social provision identified in earlier parts of the study. Secondly, the 
conclusions from the comparative and theoretical sections are used to inform the appraisal 
of South African provision and envisaged future trends. 
Chapter 4, the first in Part 2, provides a historical perspective on selected aspects of social 
provision of social security in South Africa before 1910. Some of the early systems of 
provision are described and some of the pressures influencing the role of the state are 
discussed. Chapter 5 evaluates social expenditure in South Africa after 1910 by looking at 
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the unfolding of state expenditure in different economic and functional categories. In 
contrast to the focus on aggregate expenditures in Chapter 5, Chapters 6 and 7 provide a 
historical overview of the origin and development of the different programmes and an 
appraisal of these programmes in the light of common characteristics of advanced welfare 
states. Some historical patterns and salient characteristics of social provision are identified. 
In Chapter 8 the appropriate and likely policy directions with regard to social provision in 
South Africa are examined. 
Chapter 9, the conclusion, provides an outline of the central arguments of the study and 
notes some of the more general implications of the argumentation. In closing, a few areas 
worthy of further research are identified. 
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CHAPTER 1 CONCEPTUAL ISSUES AND HYPOTHESIS 
1.1 Defining social security 
One of the main problems involved in addressing the issue of changing state provision of 
social security is that it is difficult to find an appropriate definition of social security. This diffi-
culty results from the fact that a great number of meanings have been attached to the 
term.1 Some of these definitions are inadequate when analysing the historical evolution of 
state provision of social services. 
lt is customary to view social security as programmes for the provision of certain goods, 
services and transfers, managed by the state for its citizens. Such a definition then focuses 
on the instruments used (the type of programmes) and the agency responsible for managing 
and financing the programme. Within this conventional and narrow framework a typical 
dictionary definition of social security is "government provisions for helping people who are 
unemployed, disabled, etcetera".2 The International Labour Office requires of a social 
security scheme to "have been set up by legislation" and to be concerned with the provision 
of income maintenance, income supplements or medical care and to be administered by "a 
public, semi-public or autonomous body". 3 Barr limits the concept even further by using 
it to refer only to cash payments in terms of the British national insurance system and certain 
other non-contributory cash benefits financed from general government revenue. 4 In the 
United States of America social security is ordinarily used in the narrow sense as pertaining 
to the state-run pension system financing retirement. 5 
When used in this narrow sense the concept "social security" refers to certain programmes 
which are associated with the Western European welfare state and is seen as part of a wider 
set of social and welfare policies. Social security, as part of the machinery of the welfare 
1See Kaim-Caudle (1973:6-9). 
20xford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English (1974). 
3lnternational Labour Office (1988: 1 ). 
48arr (1987:5-7). 
5See Diamond (1977:275) and Kotlikoff (1989:231). 
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state, is then taken to refer to "a specific set of policies in a limited set of nations". 6 In this 
context the compulsory systems of social insurance to protect against unemployment, illness 
and loss of income after retirement, found in Western European states are the best known. 
This restricted view of social security can probably be attributed to the extensive for-
malization and visibility of government provision of related services in the Western European 
economies. The considerable role of governments in these countries in the provision of 
social services, relative to the role of other institutions in this field, tends to make other 
systems of provision appear insignificant. 
In this study a wider definition of social security is adopted. The term is not defined with 
reference to the instruments used and government participation but in terms of the objective 
of the provision and the nature of the entitlements arising from the schemes. Because many 
non-government initiatives share the same objective as government provision of services 
providing social security, these should also be included in the definition of social security. 
Social security is then taken to refer to "an objective pursued through public means" and not 
"a narrowly defined set of strategies". 7 
Three aspects of such a wider definition in terms of objectives need to be clarified. These 
are: 
what is meant with security as an objective; 
what can be understood as being "public" or social means; 
what the types of entitlements are which these social security measures give 
rise to. 
Providing security can in this context be understood as protecting people from "deprivations 
and vulnerability". 8 The objectives of the relevant measur~s are then to ensure that people 
have access to a minimum set of commodities which would keep them out of poverty and 
6Ringen (1987:4). 
7Dreze and Sen (1989:16). 
8Dreze and Sen (1989:15). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3 
shield them from the impoverishing effect of certain eventualities. In terms of Sen's entitle-
ment approach!! social security measures aim to protect people from sudden shifts in their 
trade and production entitlements (e.g. as a result of floods, unemployment, recession and 
inflation) and to stave off poverty in the cases of inadequate resource endowments, 
especially the inability to labour or labour "adequately". (e.g. being mentally retarded or 
otherwise incapacitated for work, or not being able to earn adequately from work). 
lt is important to note that deprivation and poverty, as elements of a definition of social 
security, need not be defined in absolute terms. This is important because defining poverty 
in relative terms makes it possible to accommodate the views of those who see equality (or 
fairness) as the most important objective of the welfare state and, by implication, also of 
social security provision.10 
Many links have been established between absolute and relative poverty, most notably in 
the work of Amartya Sen. Sen has argued that "there is an irreducible core of absolute 
deprivation in our idea of poverty which translates reports of starvation into a diagnosis of 
poverty without having to ascertain first the relative picture".11 lt should, however, be 
realized, as Sen has argued, that such absolute deprivation must be defined in the sphf?re 
of capabilities (that is in terms of what a person can do or attain, such as not to be hungry), 
and not in the sphere of income or goods and services. If it is realized that absolute depri-
vation in the sphere of capabilities is related to relative deprivation in the commodity 
sphere12, the absolute/relative distinction need not give rise to alternative approaches. 
Alternatively, absolute poverty and relative deprivation can be linked through Ringen's 
interpretations of the concept of "fairness/inequality", or through the Weberian concept of 
"life chances". Fairness, as Ringen points out, can be defined in different ways with a focus 
on and concern with absolute deprivation implying a "weak interpretation" of fairness.13 
9Sen (1981:1-8) and Dreze and Sen (1989:10-11). 
1
°Fiora (1986:xv) and Ringen (1987:7). 
11Sen (1981 :17). 
12Sen (1983) and Dilnot (1989:243). 
13Ringen (1987:8). 
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Alternatively, it should be remembered that people's life chances, and therefore also their 
insecurity, consist of different aspects or components. The relative importance of these 
aspects might change as society or people change. Three aspects of people's life chances 
have been identified, namely 
having (which is the opposite of poverty and thus refers to being above some 
"poverty line"); 
being (the opposite of alienation); and 
loving (the opposite of anomie). 14 
At low levels of living (in poor societies) equalizing life chances may lead to a focus on 
having, for example, ensuring adequate food supplies and medical care. With this aspect 
increasingly catered for, "more modern" ailments such as alienation and anomie need to be 
addressed. As a result of these possible links between the two concepts of poverty it is not 
necessary to be overly insistent on which one is relevant in the context of social security 
provision. Under some conditions absolute deprivation may be the concern and under 
others relative poverty. If it is then stated that the provision of social security takes place 
to prevent deprivation, this can refer to the provision of food to the malnourished in devel-
oping countries as well as to the provision of home visits to the elderly in more developed 
societies. 
With "security" defined as an objective, it is necessary to explain what is understood by 
social in "social security". In the definition of Dreze and Sen (above) "social" is taken as 
referring to the provision of security through social or public means, thus defining the 
agency responsible for provision. "Public means" is taken, however, to refer to more than 
government action and to include the actions of certain other groupings in society. Private 
action can be seen as the "pursuit of a better life for oneself and one's family", or action 
which "aims directly at the production and accumulation of private wealth" .15 Public action 
14Fiora (1986:xv). He explains as follows: "having" basically refers to the "level of living", 
"being" points to potential for "self-actualization" and "loving" is related to "solidarity" and 
"belongingness". 
15Hirschman (1982:7). 
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refers to collective behaviour or action by, and in the interest of, some group or commun-
ity.113 Normally the state is regarded as the agent of provision in public action and firms as 
the agents in markets. There are, however, a large number of agencies intermediate to the 
state and firms. These organizations, such as families, cultural, religious and community 
groupings, can also provide security in the sense defined above. As a result of the collective 
nature of such provision the resulting security must also be called social security. Together 
with a wide definition of security, the focus should furthermore be on a large number of 
institutions and social actors which can conceivably provide security.17 This point is taken 
further in Chapter 2. 
In order to keep the concept social security from becoming too wide (and thus useless), and 
to further distinguish between public and private means, it is useful to look at the type of 
entitlements 113 which social security measures give rise to. An acceptable way of limiting 
the meaning of the concept of social security is by using it to refer to security resulting from 
entitlements that are not trade or production based (i.e. the entitlements are not legal rights 
of ownership acquired through market exchange)19. Social security is then viewed as 
encompassing security derived from "extended entitlements"20, or as resulting from entitle-
ments provided by the state or other non-profit organizations. Social security is distin-
guished from economic security with economic security referring to security derived from 
market exchange and based on "legal rights". 21 Instruments of social security are, in this 
113See Hirschman (1982:6), whose definition focuses more on motivation than on who or what 
organisation is responsible for the action. 
17See Dreze and Sen (1989:17-19). 
1~e "entitlement approach" is derived from Sen. The basic concepts related to the 
approach used here are discussed in San (1981) and Dreze and Sen (1989). 
1~hese types of "transactions" are probably what Scott (1976:6) has in mind when he refers 
to "social exchanges". 
~ose are entitlements based on socially sanctioned rights or well-established conventions 
such as parents looking after their children and vice versa at other stages. See Dreze and 
Sen (1989:10-11) who define such entitlements as "sanctioned by accepted notions of 
legitimacy". 
21 Dreze and Sen (1989:10). Here the present analysis seems to differ from that of Dreze and 
Sen. They refer to the market as a "public institution" (1989:18, my italics). This wide 
definition of "social" and "public" makes social security as a concept useless because it is 
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definition, closely related to transfer payments or transfers in kind ("free" goods).22 
Transfers can be defined as the receipt of income without a contribution to current output. 
Turning to the instruments of social security it should be clear that the wide definition of the 
concept, in terms of objective and a large number of possible suppliers, brings a large 
number of social practices within our ambit. Two broad types of instruments can be 
distinguished, namely those aimed at "protection" and those aimed at "promotion".23 
Protection refers to the prevention of a drop in the level of well-being while promotion aims 
at the expansion of "basic capabilities" and can be viewed as more forward-looking than 
protection.24 Providing an income (or accommodation and food) during a period of 
unemployment is a form of protection, while compulsory free education can be seen as 
promotion as it advances future economic security. Health services, housing and personal 
social services can also be seen as services which are relevant to people's social security 
and which are often provided through public or social means. Health services will then also 
be promotional as they ensure future productivity, while housing and welfare services 
provide examples of a complex mixture of protection and promotion. 
An intricate relationship exists between these two types of instruments. Under some 
conditions they can be seen as complementary services. Protecting children from hunger 
through school-feeding schemes may in addition to its impact on nutritional status (pro-
tection from hunger or low consumption), have an effect on the success of schooling and 
difficult to see what can then be classified as "non-public" means. Social security would then 
have to be seen as security resulting from any (inter-)action. The definition offered here is 
more in line with that of Alber, et al., who view the welfare state or social security as "a 
measure which encompasses the replacement of commodified resources" or which 
succeeds in "replacing market and employer authority" (1987:461). This aspect of social 
security, as attempting to circumscribe the impact of marh:et forces, can also be found in the 
often quoted definition of the welfare state by Asa Briggs [quoted in Gough (1989:276)]: "A 
'welfare state' is a state in which organized power is deliberately used in an effort to modify 
the play of market forces ... ". 
~Lampman and Smeeding (1983:48) give a useful definition of transfers as a "receipt of 
money for which a less than reciprocal specific good or service is exchanged". The 
definition can also be broadened, as they indicate, to include the receipt of goods and 
services without paying the "full value". 
23Dreze and Sen (1989:16). 
24Dreze and Sen (1989:16). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
7 
thus future productivity and security. Unemployment insurance, which protects against 
unforseen contingencies, promotes future security through protecting human capital and 
allowing other family activities such as the production of food and educational services to 
continue during a spell of unemployment. Educational inputs may, for example, make an 
impact on nutritional and health care programmes, which are aspects which can also be 
addressed more directly and have an important bearing on social security.25 
In spite of this complementary relationship certain cases seem to indicate that the one type 
of instrument might act as a substitute for the other, or make the other less necessary. This 
is one way in which the difference in the nature of social expenditure in the Unites States 
and Western Europe can be explained. Such an interpretation is possible in the light of 
Heidenheimer's generalization that "public social insurance schemes and some other income 
maintenance schemes were introduced in the United States with about a generation lag 
behind Europe" while "with regard to public education, the broadening of the United States 
post primary school opportunities occurred a generation earlier than in Europe". 26 
Education (promotion) and income support (protection) can thus, to some extent, be seen 
as the "cores of alternative strategies"27 aimed at a similar objective. The relationship 
between traditional unemployment insurance benefits, providing income support, and active 
labour market policy, aimed at retraining and providing suitable jobs, can also be viewed in 
this light. 
lt is thus to be expected that the objective of security can be achieved through many 
different instruments and different combinations of instruments in different countries. In ad-
dition to the three characteristics of social security instruments already mentioned (nature 
of entitlement, controlling agency and whether it deals with protection or promotion), such 
instruments can also be classified according to: 
the rules of eligibility; 
25See Van der Berg (1989e:138) and Sen (1984b:510-511). 
26Heidenheimer (1981 :261 ). 
27Heidenheimer (1981 :261). 
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the types of benefits; 
the means of financing the benefits; 
the degree of coercion involved; 
the formality of the institution; and 
the contingency which is catered for, such as old age or unemployment. 
lt is an important argument of this study that differing levels of formality or bureaucratization 
should not lead to a neglect of the similarities between different institutions which fulfil the 
same functions. In the case of state social security measures in Western European 
countries the rules of eligibility, contribution requirements and the nature of benefits are 
normally clearly spelled out. These aspects are not so clearly stipulated in the case of other 
less formal institutions in these societies nor in the case of instruments used in other 
societies. Provision for the period of retirement is an example. While modern pension 
schemes entail clearly spelled out rules with regard to contributions and the calculation of 
benefits, family provision of such income support in traditional and modernized societies can 
fulfil the same function without such clear rules about contributions and the level and nature 
of benefits. Less formal methods can provide promotion and protection falling within the 
wide definition of social security given above. These less formal methods should therefore 
be viewed as instruments of social security. 
The different types of benefits which can provide security can be divided into cash benefits 
and goods and services in kind. Goods and services can be provided either at a zero price 
or at a reduced price. Purchasing power over goods and services (vouchers) and indirect 
benefits through tax deductions and credits fulfil the same functions as cash and goods and 
services. Certain regulations (e.g. health regulations) and social conventions might also be 
said to enhance security through improvements in the quality of the environment. Such 
regulations, however, often have more direct objectives and are difficult to analyz.e within the 
sphere of social security because of the difficulty of imputing a value to the benefits. 
Benefits can further be divided into three types with regard to eligibility conditions. Some 
benefits are available universally to people with certain responsibilities (e.g. child benefit in 
the United Kingdom) or with certain needs (National Health Service in the United Kingdom, 
and primary education in most countries). Demonstration of belonging to a specific category 
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of people (not level of income) or specific responsibilities will qualify a person for these 
benefits. These benefits are normally referred to as categorical or universal benefits. In other 
cases access to benefits can be restricted by requiring a means test (with benefits then 
referred to as social assistance), or by requiring prior contributions to a reserve fund (social 
insurance). As mentioned before, rules of eligibility in less bureaucratized societies will be 
more informal and not as clear to outsiders. This will, however, also be the case with the 
provision of social security through certain institutions in wealthier countries such as the 
nuclear family and religious organizations. In spite of the informality of the rules it is to be 
expected that certain traditional mechanisms will be accessed first while others will exhibit 
more elaborate eligibility requirements, especially with regard to reciprocity or future 
"indebtedness". 28 
Another instrument of social policy is income support through public employment. Such 
employment creation by the state lies somewhere between social security provision and 
labour market policy. These schemes can be classified as instruments of social security 
because the labour services required in return for cash are more in the nature of an eligibility 
requirement or targeting mechanism than it is normal labour services. The motives for such 
public work programmes will however always exhibit a mixture of considerations. In some 
cases this will include infrastructural development and the use of appropriate technology in 
addition to providing security.29 
Another aspect in terms of which social security measures differ is how they are financed 
and produced. Programmes can be completely financed from general government (tax) 
revenue or can be financed from contributions by members. Furthermore, the state can be 
involved to differing degrees in the actual production of goods and services. In the case of 
the British Health Service provision is not only financed from tax revenues but the state is 
also the dominant producer with personnel actually in the employment of the state. A similar 
situation exists with regard to the provision of primary and secondary education in most 
countries. In the case of Germany the role of the state is restricted to the statutory 
enforcement of compulsory medical insurance and its regulation. The actual health care 
28See, for example, Colson (1979) for some implicit evidence of this. 
29See Dreze and Sen (1989), chapter 7, for a discussion of public works programmes in the 
context of poverty alleviation in developing countries. ~,,ur~· ... 1~ ~ ~....-
::! ~ 
z: ,..., 
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services in Germany are produced by private organizations and paid for by autonomous 
health insurance bodies financed from the contributions of members. Participation in social 
security arrangements can also be compulsory (retirement insurance in the United Kingdom) 
or voluntary (retirement insurance in many less developed countries). 
lt should be clear that the very general objective of social security, as defined here, can be 
approached using many instruments and innumerable different combinations of instruments. 
Which instruments will be selected and which will be efficient under specific circumstances, 
will depend on many factors which are not clearly understood. Later sections will attempt 
to address this question more directly. For the moment it is, however, important to note that 
social security should not only be associated with the social policies in the developed 
countries where an extreme "deliberateness and rational matching of ends and means" in 
social policy is found. 30 Although the causes may differ between societies and over time, 
insecurity is a general problem and needs to be confronted by all types of societies. 
Therefore, social security should not be confused with one or other formal programme 
advancing social security (for example, social insurance). 
This is also the motivation for adopting a wide definition of social security. As Dreze and 
Sen argue, "there is some obvious advantage in considering all the relevant forms of 
intervention in a common framework".31 In analysing the growth and rationality of govern- ,..l 
ment intervention in the field of social security it is important to keep track of the historical 
antecedents and the possible substitutes and complementary policies. In the words of 
Alber, et al., ''the interplay of public and private institutions around issues of soda! protection 
has become so complex that the isolation of state welfare expenditures as the object of 
study makes little sense theoretically". 32 This interplay has always been intricate. Therefore 
focusing only on what has been called "formal social security"33 will be too narrow if the aim 
is to get clarity about the relationship between state provision of social security and 
economic development. 
30Mishra (1977:x). 
31 Dreze and Sen (1989:16). 
32Aiber, et al. (1987:461). 
33Ahmad, et al. (1991 :viii). 
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In this study the focus is therefore on social security as an objective and the role of state 
provision of services in attaining this objective. lt is clear that this objective can be advanced 
in many ways. The concern in what follows is mostly with income support and supplements, 
education, health and housing as services providing security. The next section inquires 
whether a priori reasons, based on the established theory of market failures, can be found 
to explain and justify extensive state provision of these services. 
1.2 The assumption that .. goods are goods .. 
In the previous section it was argued that social security should be seen as a general 
objective or "need" of society rather than a "catchword" for "selected [government] 
policies".:\4 This approach, it is submitted, will make possible a more accurate and useful 
study of the different instruments providing social security and their historical evolution. In 
this section this viewpoint is expanded and motivated further. This is done by arguing that 
the state is not the only agency which can or should provide services which advance social 
security. 
Because of the seeming dominance of the state in the provision of social security in the 
advanced capitalist countries, it is a common perception that social protection can only, or 
can best, be provided by the state. This empirical "generalization" is sometimes further 
strengthened by certain theoretical views on "market failures" which often lead to the view 
that some goods can broadly be classified as government goods (or "public goods") and 
others as private goods. In this section this view is analyzed. lt is concluded that the 
empirical case is not conclusive and that the theory of market failure does not imply a 
fundamental theoretical distinction between government goods and private goods. There 
can then not be a presumption in favour of state provision based on an analysis of market 
failure. Rather, with Breton~5 it is argued that governments compete with other institutions 
in the provision of certain services and that the eventual source of supply must be seen as 
the result of changing comparative advantage. As circumstances change it can be expected 
that the comparative advantage and the relative involvement of different institutions in the 
34Ringen (1987:4). 
358reton (1989). 
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provision of certain services will change. 
1.2.1 The empirical case for viewing certain goods and services as government 
goods 
There seems to be some similarity in the type of activities which governments in different 
countries undertake or do not undertake. Mueller, for example, points out that governments 
are typically involved in the provision of defence, police and postal and telephone services, 
but not in the provision of clothing, furniture and other household items.36 Mayer, using 
figures for 1985, indicates that in each of the eleven Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) countries the state owns more than 75 per cent of postal services 
with further high public ownership in airlines, electricity, gas, railways and telecommunica-
tions.37 In the last-mentioned industries more than 50 per cent of the industry is publicly 
owned on average for the OECD countries as a group. These examples would seem to 
indicate that a clear demarcation can be made between government goods and market 
goods, or goods provided by the state and goods procured through the market. 
A closer look at historical and contemporary reality will, however, indicate the inaccuracy of 
such a view. From an historical perspective, it is clear that many goods and services that 
are provided by governments in developed countries today have been provided by non-go-
vernment institutions in the past; while goods which are privately produced today have been 
provided by governments in the past.38 Under the first heading (earlier associated with "pri-
vate" production), Breton mentions "national defence, lighthouses, mail delivery, police, fire 
protection, roadways and parks". As part of the second group he mentions "bread, 
circuses, parks, baking ovens, milk and orange juice". 39 Furthermore a lot of goods and 
services are currently provided by both government organizations and private organizations. 
Examples, in the South African case, are e;..:press parcel services, road transport and 
long-haul bus services, television, radio, air travel and nature conservation. 
36Mueller (1989:39). 
37Mayer (1989:265). 
38Breton (1989:721 ). 
398reton (1989:721). 
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Supply of a specific service by more than one type of institution is also found in the sphere 
of social security. Not only have sources of supply changed over time but currently different 
institutions provide services fulfilling the same need or objective. This is the case in most 
of the fields providing social security, such as income support, health, education, housing 
and personal welfare services. Two situations related to insecurity will be looked at in order 
to illustrate this point. 
One important source of insecurity for most people is the uncertainty of income after 
retirement. A number of factors, such as the inability to predict length of life and a lack of 
information, make planning for this contingency problematic. In order to fulfil this need a 
number of supply sources have evolved. A few of these are mentioned in order to illustrate 
the reality of competing supply sources. 
Firstly, it is clear that "families can [and do] self insure against uncertain dates of death 
through implicit or explicit agreements with respect to consumption and inter-family trans-
fers". 40 The existence of such implicit insurance contracts is one convincing explanation 
for the prevalence of large families with a stable demographic structure in many developing 
countries. 41 But even in the developed world the family is perhaps underestimated as a 
source of security in old age. Zapf finds that for Germany "(m)any more old, sick and 
handicapped persons are tah:en care of in households than can ever be admitted to institu-
tions".42 Ringen seems to hold that this is also true for Sweden.43 Secondly, religious 
organizations have also been, and are, involved in the care of the aged through the 
provision and financing (subsidizing) of housing and other services in kind.44 Thirdly, 
employers often provide access to post-retirement cash income through occupational 
pension schemes to which employees must subscribe. These schemes can be voluntary 
efforts by employers or be mandated by the state, and are normally financed through 
40Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981 :372). 
41 See Bech:er (1981 :233-239); Rosen::weig (1983:1167) and Deaton (1939:64) and on Africa, 
lliffe(1987:72). 
4:!Zapf (1984:271-2), quoted in Ringen (1987:125). 
43Ringen (1987:134). 
41South Africa (1940:15); Breton (1989:726-727). 
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contributions by employers and employees. In the fourth place, governments, in addition 
to providing "occupational" schemes to their employees, provide programmes through which 
old people without sufficient alternative income are provided with a cash income. These 
come in the form of social insurance (eligibility depending on contributions) or in the form 
of social assistance (with eligibility depending on means). The state also often provides, or 
finances partly, services such as housing, care of the frail and other services for the elderly. 
In addition to the family, religious bodies, employers and the state playing a role in creating 
security for the elderly, individuals can, and do, also make provision for themselves through 
private saving, contractual savings and/or "private" pension funds. The·diversity of possible 
supply sources should be clear in spite of the fact that this list is not exhaustive. lt further 
shows not only the variety of sources, but also the different degrees to which, and ways 
whereby, governments can intervene. Governments do not only intervene through making 
cash transfers, but can also be involved by producing a more traditional service, regulating 
total production or individual consumption and financing (subsidies to private organizations, 
"free" access, vouchers). 
The same diversity of sources is evident in the services associated with child-rearing. The 
normal assumption seems to be that the household or family is the ideal institution for raising 
children and that the cost of these activities must be borne by the family circle.45 Obvious 
exceptions do however exist. Specialized aspects of child-rearing such as education and 
health services are commonly financed and produced by governments. Tax allowances 
based on the number of dependants are subsidies for child-rearing. The existence of these 
subsidies give an indication of a social judgement that people with children need special 
assistance. Most Western European governments go further than tax deductions and pay 
cash transfers to families based on the number of children in the household. The state may 
also provide housing and specialized care for destitute children in government institutions 
or in subsidized private institutions. Allowances for students at tertiary educational institu-
tions are widespread and education allowances for pupils from poor families can also be 
45For a general discussion see Seeker and Murphy (1988:3-5), where the advantages of 
bringing up children within the family are attributed to the importance of altruism in trans-
actions between family members. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
15 
found (e.g. in Germany).46 Private welfare organizations, often subsidized by the state, 
provide many services related to child care as do many private employers (e.g. creches for 
the children of employees and scholarships). Churches also play an important role in cer-
tain aspects of child care, for example the provision of educational services, although this 
role has declined over time. 
The above examples of the provision of two services related to social security and the other 
general examples of government provision indicate the impossibility of distinguishing, on em-
pirical grounds, between goods and services which are normally government or public 
goods and others which are private goods. 
1.2.2 The theoretical case for viewing certain goods as government goods 
The theoretical case for state intervention in the market economy can be based on an 
instrumental argument as well as on arguments about values. The instrumental case would 
be that given the objective of efficiency, freely working markets cannot attain this. 
Additionally, or alternatively, it can be argued that efficiency, which the market serves 
reasonably well, is not the only important objective of a society. Other objectives, such as 
income distribution and social justice, are possibly also viewed as important and the market 
cannot advance these adequately. 47 
Following from these two arguments the state can be seen as having a distributive function 
and an allocation function. The distributive function entails bringing the distribution of well-
being into line with the preferences of society in this regard. The allocation function justifies 
state interference on the grounds of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. 48 The 
motivation for giving the state a role in the allocation of resources will be discussed first, 
whereafter the case for income redistribution by the state will be evaluated. 
46See further Atkinson and Hills (1991 :96) for a classification of the different types of "child 
support" by the state in France, Britain and the United States. 
47See Helm (1989:12-13). 
413See Musgrave and Musgrave (1980:3-16). 
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(a) Government intervention to promote efficiency 
The grounds for government intervention to ensure efficiency are normally derived by 
identifying the conditions under which decentrali:::ed markets will ensure efficiency, and then 
indicating how these conditions are not fulfilled in the real world. Efficiency is defined in the 
Pareto-sense, i.e., as a situation where it is impossible to improve the position of one person 
without harming someone else. The absence of conditions necessary to ensure Pareto-effi-
ciency are normally referred to as causes of market failure.49 
The conditions for a competitive equilibrium to produce a Pareto-efficient outcome can be 
reduced to two. Firstly, households and firms must be price takers, and secondly, there 
must be a complete set of smoothly adjusting markets. 50 In the absence of these 
conditions market failure results. These market failures can be discussed under three 
general headings: 
the existence of monopoly power or market power, 
public goods and 
externalities. 51 
4gSee Helm (1989:14-15); Atkinson and Stiglitz (1930:5-6) and Helm and Smith (1989:277). 
EI)Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980:343) add a third condition, namely the existence of "perfect 
information". lt is, however, arguable that information is a commodity which can ideally be 
traded in perfectly competitive markets. This third condition can then be seen as additional, 
and unnecessary, to the condition that there must be a complete set of markets. Helm and 
Smith e.g. (1989:277) give an even longer list of conditions, namely full information; absence 
of monopoly power, externalities and public goods; the existence of perfectly defined and 
costlessly enforceable property rights; and perfect mobility of factors of production. lt can, 
however, be argued that some of these conditions are repetitive. For example, incomplete 
markets result from unspecified property rights, while externalities can be seen as resulting 
from incomplete markets. 
51The list of market failures given in most texts are normally longer. Kay (1989:221) notes 
public goods, externalities, problems related to information, paternalism, undefined property 
rights and the existence of monopolies. For a very similar list see Atkinson and Stiglit::: 
(1980:8). These longer lists seem to flow from a failure to distinguish between the cause of 
the market failure and the market failure itself. Mueller (1989:27 and 35) and Friedman 
(1990:517) give brief comments on the interrelationships between the different types of exter-
nalities and public goods. 
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Market power and, to an extent, public goods result from "indivisibilities or peculiarities of 
the production function"52 while e:·:ternalities and, to an eA-tent, public goods, result from 
"non-market interdependence".~ Tile case of market power is ignored here and the focus 
directed towards public goods and externalities. 
Looking in general at the causes of public goods and externalities, it is possible to argue 
that they are rooted in the absence of markets for certain goods and services. This absence 
of markets can again be traced to the incomplete specification of property rights. Because, 
under normal conditions, nobody in a neighbourhood has the exclusive right to "quiet in the 
neighbourhood", no trade is possible and no smoothly working market can solve the 
problems. As a result of this some inhabitants can affect the utility of others negatively 
without paying the real (or social) cost of their activity and will thus produce an excessive 
amount of, for example, noise. This is then an example of a negative externality. This 
negative externality can also be seen as resulting from the impossibility of excluding the 
quiet neighbours from the noise. The negative externality is the same thing as a negative 
public good or a "public bad". Too little effort to remove the source of the noise will be 
forthcoming, contrary to the excessive production of noise, because it is a public good. This 
implies that neighbour A will not be prepared to confront the noisy neighbours because he 
will have to take the direct consequences (costs) while the other neighbours will reap some 
of the benefits of the increased silence without making a contribution to costs. 54 At the root 
of this market failure is the inability to solve interdependencies through the market. This 
failure can then be seen as a result of incompletely specified property rights which make 
exclusion impossible. 
Although public goods and externalities will be treated separately, it should be kept in mind 
that externalities and public goods are really different ways of describing the same problem. 
A positive externality is a public good while a negative externality is a "public bad". 
Refraining from producing negative externalities are public goods. 55 The exact effects of, 
52Arrow and Scitovsky (1969:183). 
53Arrow and Scitovsky (1969:183). 
54The above example is based on Farrel (1987:113). 
55See Friedman (1990:517). 
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and the "solutions" to, the problems might however differ in some circumstances so that it 
is helpful to discuss them separately. 
(i) Public goods 
Public goods are characterized by jointness of supply (non-rival consumption) and the 
technical impossibility or prohibitive costliness of excluding extra consumers once the good 
has been provided to some. 515 Jointness of supply implies that, in the extreme case, the 
only costs of production are fixed costs, so that the cost of providing it to one more person, 
once it has been produced, is zero. This makes it irrational to exclude people from usage 
and creates an incentive for people to cooperate in the provision of the product and share 
the (fixed) costs. The impossibility of exclusion, however, makes people reluctant to reveal 
their preference for the public good because failure to reveal will not lead to exclusion. 
There is thus also an incentive not to cooperate, i.e. to "free-ride". A typical example of a 
public good due to non-rival consumption is radio broadcasting, while lighthouses can be 
used as an example of a public good as a result of the difficulty of excluding users. 
Because of the jointness of supply and exclusion characteristics of public goods, individual 
maximisation would lead to less than the Pareto-optimal quantity of the public good being 
produced.57 The reason is that people cannot be excluded, and thus cannot be forced to 
reveal their preference by offering to pay a price. The market has difficulty in allocating 
these goods because consumption is not contingent on first paying a price. One option is 
for the political process to substitute for the market process by getting people to reveal their 
preferences through voting and to finance the activity through forced payment. 
In addition to the general efficiency losses resulting from too few public goods being 
produced, the fact that less than the optimal amount of information is produced can lead to 
several further "demand failures". 58 Because of a lack of information people might choose 
inconsistently or against their own best interests. One possible example, in the field of social 
security, is that "many individuals will not save enough for retirement if left to their own 
56Mueller (1989:11). The classic article is Samuelson (1954). 
57For a formal derivation see Mueller (1989:13-19) and Samuelson (1954). 
55Helm (1989:15). 
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devices" because of the "difficulty of obtaining suitable information for informed judge-
ment..".59 
A special case of information failure which might lead to either demand failures or under-pro-
vision, is the case of asymmetric information. 61) If the producer knows more than the client, 
the client cannot really make a rational choice. Examples of such cases are second-hand 
motor cars and medical services. In other cases the consumer might be able to withhold 
information from the producer. This can be identified in the life-insurance markets where the 
insurer cannot distinguish between high risks and low risks and therefore needs to charge 
an average price. This average price benefits high-risks clients but discriminates against 
low-risk clients. The number of policies sold to low-risk clients will then be less than the 
optimal quantity, while the high-risk clients will overinsure relative to the efficiency norm. 
This is normally referred to as the problem of adverse selection. In extreme cases the 
service in question will not be provided at all. 61 
In addition to social provision being non-rival to some extent, incomplete information or 
asymmetric information might lead to "wrong" choices about private purchases of social 
services. The existence of imperfect and asymmetrical information has serious implications 
for the working of capital and insurance markets. This is of relevance for the provision of 
social security because many aspects of social security present problems of intertemporal 
allocation of resources. Such intertemporal allocation of resources requires smoothly 
adjusting capital markets. This is the case with the financing of education where children 
need a loan in order to postpone productive activity. In the case of retirement pensions 
provision has to be made for a lack of productive contribution in the future. Other aspects 
of social security require insurance markets. This is the case with health services and 
aspects of income support such as health insurance and disability pensions. 
In many cases these characteristics of services related to social security are seen as 
arguments for government intervention. The government is then seen as an institution which 
59Diamond (1977:281). 
tlo:oFriedman (1990:528). The classic article is Akerlof (1970). 
61 Barr (1987:63-64). 
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can provide the efficient amount of public goods. In effect the government serves to reveal 
demand and enforce payment. An evaluation of this conclusion will follow after externalities 
as a source of market failure have been discussed. 
(ii) Externalities 
Externalities or external effects are said to exist where "an act of agent A imposes costs or 
confers benefits on agent 8 for which no compensation for A to 8 or payment from 8 to A 
takes place".~ Examples of e;..iernal effects in production is the factory's smog harming 
the laundry (negative externality) or the apple farmer assisting the bee-farmer (positive 
externality). In consumption, negative externalities might resultfrom the consumption of loud 
music, while positive externalities to society might result from consuming goods improving 
a person's health and education. 
The existence of externalities will once again lead to individual maximisation not ensuring 
Pareto-efficiency.t:3 Activities having negative, uncompensated effects on others will be 
overproduced because the perpetrator is not forced to carry the whole (social) cost of the 
activity. On the other hand, activities having positive effects will be produced in insufficient 
quantities because the benefits accruing to the wider society are not considered in the 
process of individual maximisation. 
While insecurity and poverty in a society can be seen as producing negative externalities, 
many of the activities to promote and protect social security can be seen as producing 
positive externalities. Unemployment does not only inflict hardship on the individual, but 
might also damage society by leading to the wasting away of the skills of the person64 and 
the person's ability to provide for the education and sustenance of his children. The failure 
of someone to accumulate sufficient savings will lead to a cost on society if it is viewed as 
the responsibility of society to care for old people "if all else fails". Vulnerability to illnesses 
and pests because of not receiving health care might not only inflict costs on the person, 
628arr (1987:83). 
63For a formal derivation of the result see Mueller (1989:25-27). 
64Rimlinger (1971). 
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but also on society in the form of the spread of contagious diseases. The absence of basic 
facilities, like sewerage or education, might impact negatively on the health and stability of 
whole societies, not only on the person directly involved. 
(iii) An evaluation of the theoretical case 
Many examples of public goods and external effects can be identified in the sphere of social 
security provision, as has been done above. The question is whether the predominance of 
market failures in certain areas implies that the pertinent goods and services should be 
provided by governments. In other words, should public goods and the internalization of 
externalities be "government goods"? A number of reasons exist why this question should 
be answered in the negative and why Breton's motivation for the view that "goods are goods 
and services are services" or "that there are no goods and services which, on a priori 
grounds, are always and everywhere exclusively government or public goods and services" 
should be accepted. 65 
In the case of externalities, it is normally argued that a system of taxes on the perpetrators 
of negative externalities and subsidies to activities generating positive externalities could 
"internalize the externalities" and so enhance efficiency. In the case of public goods 
government provision and financing through forced payments (taxation) could eradicate 
underproduction. 
However, a number of reasons indicate the need for scepticism about the possibility of 
government intervention to establish efficient outcomes. These then also weaken the welfare 
economic case for state intervention. 
A first important reason for scepticism about government intervention is that it was realized, 
in the light of substantial inefficiency related to government intervention especially in 
developing countries over the last number of decades, that governments can also "fail". 66 
658reton (1989:720-1 and 745). 
~he notion of "government failure" has become part of conventional wisdom in the 1980's. 
For a discussion see Stern (1989:615-618). The basic idea, free from its current partisan 
overtones, has been expressed much earlier. See, e.g., Hirschman (1953:54 and 65). 
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Such government failure can result from a number of causes. Firstly, in order to provide 
public goods and determine the optimal taxes and subsidies, the government will need infor-
mation which is not freely available and not easily found, such as the preferences of 
individuals and the conditions of production. Governments might have an even bigger 
problem than markets have to elicit and process such information. 67 Often informational 
requirements are substantial and government might thus fail to institute the "correct" or 
efficiency-enhancing measures. Secondly, because of the impossibility of levying lump-sum 
taxes to finance provision, government actions will distort the decision making of economic 
actors. This leads to a situation where the costs to society can exceed the value of gov-
ernment revenue earned, resulting in excess costs or dead-weight losses associated with 
taxation.158 Furthermore, it is also possible that instead of aiming to maintain efficiency, 
bureaucrats might act in their individual interests and try to ma:-:imize their own utility to the 
cost of society. 
Related to the above causes of government failure is the fact that government intervention 
leads to "resource-using activities" in order to influence the nature and benefits to different 
groups of such intervention. This takes place "through lobbying and corruption - often called 
rent-seeking or directly unproductive activities in the literature".69 Together the above 
problems of government provision may result in greater costs to society than the efficiency 
loss associated with the initial market failure. 
In addition to government failure as a reason for not relying on government provision or 
taxation, there is also the fact that a pure public good, satisfying the non-excludability and 
joint-supply characteristics, is an extreme case and likely to be a rarity. Many goods can 
be described as mixed goods, in that they possess some of the characteristics of both 
public and private goods. lt might, for example, be possible to exclude people although 
consumption might be non-rival up to a certain point. In this case private provision might 
157This is in fact the great advantage of the market in Austrian/Hayekian terms. See Helm 
(1989:18-19). 
e.ssee Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980:367-370). 
69Stern (1989:616). 
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be effective. 70 This is related to the point that although externalities might be identified, that 
is not to say that they are "relevant" or "Pareto-relevant".71 An externality is "irrelevant" if 
it does not induce the externally affected to take action. "Pareto-irrelevance" refers to those 
cases where the externally affected cannot be compensated without making the perpetrator 
of the externality worse off. The implication is "that externalities may remain even in full 
Pareto-equilibrium". 72 This ties up with one of the important implications of the Coase 
theorem7:l which states that because an externality is created by the presence of two 
parties, levying a Pigouvian tax on one party might not ensure efficiency. Efficiency will only 
be ensured if the person who can take action at the lowest cost undertakes the appropriate 
action.74 
These views about the reality and relevance of public goods and eA1ernalities lead to two 
important implications. Firstly, many institutions other than governments can, at least to an 
extent, deal with public goods and externalities. Secondly, public goods and externalities 
should be associated with a specific economic environment and not with specific goods and 
services. These implications are dealt with next. 
A number of different ways have been found to deal with public goods and externalities 
other than through government provision. Goods with joint supply characteristics (i.e. 
non-rivalry in consumption) but where exclusion is possible can be provided by "clubs".75 
Decentralized decision making can then, under some (rather restrictive) conditions, lead to 
efficient outcomes. This will also be the case for public type goods where the optimal size 
of the sharing group (those who collaborate to reduce costs) is smaller than the entire 
nation. In the case of public goods where e:.:clusion can take place on spatial or geo-
708eckerman (1989:78). 
71 Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962:200-205). 
72Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962:208). 
73Coase (1960). 
74See Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962:209-210), and for more informal treatments 
Buchanan (1984:159) and Friedman (1990:522-523). 
75Buchanan (1965) and Mueller (1989:150-154). 
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graphical grounds (local public goods) government provision might not be justified either.76 
In these cases the conclusion on pure public goods, namely that allocation through political 
mechanisms is necessary, does not necessarily hold. Market-type or decentralized solutions 
do exist.n 
In the case of local public goods people will reveal their preferences through moving 
between local authorities (voting with their feet) "to that community which satisfies their set 
of preferences. Spatial mobility provides the local public goods counterpart to the private 
market's shopping trip" and "(t)he greater the number of communities and the greater the 
variance among them, the closer the consumer will come to fully realizing his preference 
position". 78 
The possibility of decentralized decision making, bargaining in this case, leading to an 
efficient outcome in the presence of externalities also flows from the analysis of Coase. 
Following from the realization that there are two people involved in any interdependence, 
Coase argued that the only government involvement needed is "initial definition of rights and 
enforcement of contracts". In the absence of transaction costs this will ensure that the 
parties bargain the!r way to an efficient solution.79 
The models of clubs, local public goods and bargaining will of course only ensure optimal 
outcomes under extreme circumstances.130 More specifically, positive bargaining costs 
might stand in the way of parties reaching an efficient outcome because the cost of 
bargaining might exceed the benefit from transacting. 51 In spite of this the realization that 
all so-called public goods are not pure public goods and that there are many institutions 
intermediate to the state and the market indicates that there might be a whole range of types 
7&nebout (1956) and Mueller (1989:159-163). 
nTiebout ( 1956: 416-417). 
78Tiebout (1956:418 and 422). 
79Buchanan (1984). 
B/)For a discussion of the Tiebout model see Buchanan and Goetz (1972). The limitations 
of the "Coase theorem" is briefly discussed in Graaff (1989:255). 
81 Graaff (1989:255). 
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of institutions to deal with public goods and externalities. This theoretical illustration coupled 
with the empirical case that public goods are in fact provided by a range of organizations 
makes government failure an incomplete argument for government intervention. 
A second implication of a more realistic view of public goods and e;..ternalities is that 
"publicness is an attribute of institutions, not of abstract economic goods"82 The general 
economic environment might then determine the nature of publicness. In this way increased 
population growth through congestion might make certain public goods (schools, roads) 
more akin to private goods because the congestion might lead to rival consumption and 
rationality of exclusion. Technological change over time might also, through enabling 
exclusion, allow private provision of goods previously viewed as public.83 The existence 
of externalities might also be linked to the current state and level of development of property 
rights. The refinement of private property rights into areas of "communal" ownership might 
then also over time lead to the possibility of efficient market or decentralized allocation 
increasing. 
Alternatively, increased specialization and urbanization might lead to increased interdepen-
dencies between people, and perhaps new types of interdependencies, so that the 
seriousness or nature of ei\ternal effects might change. A larger population might also 
provide increased opportunities of sharing (collaboration) and economies of scale in the 
production of certain public goods. Changing circumstances will then determine whether 
collective action will become necessary or beneficial, or whether private action will become 
more predominant. 
A general conclusion at this stage should then be that the theory of public goods and 
externalities does not provide sufficient grounds for government intervention in the sphere 
82Cowen (1985:62). 
133Cowen (1985:62-63) gives the following "institutional features" (which are really closer to 
economic characteristics) which might affect "publicness": "intensity of demand for the good, 
the amount of the good that has been produced, the current state of technology, the 
manner of distributing the good, the manner of consuming the good, and the manner of 
charging for the goods used". Buchanan (198-t174) distinguishes between two factors 
determining the publicness, namely the degree of divisibility of the product and the size of 
the interacting group. 
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of social security. This is because it is impossible to identify relevant public goods and 
externalities without reference to the concrete circumstances of each case. Changing 
circumstances (which change the nature of goods and services) and the existence of a 
whole range of institutions which can deal with these changing circumstances argue against 
general conclusions. 
(b) Government intervention to redistribute income 
Government intervention in the provision of social security is often justified on grounds of 
equity and redistribution. lt is widely acknowledged that perfectly functioning markets, in 
spite of being able to attain efficiency, will most probably not provide an income distribution 
"in line with what society considers fair or just". 84 Because of this, it is argued that the state 
has a "distribution function". lt is normally assumed that the distribution function might 
conflict with the allocation function in the sense that redistribution will affect incentives and 
production, resulting in a trade-off between efficiency and equity. Many government 
activities have been explained in this way with some economists maintaining that 
redistribution is the sole motivation for government action. 85 Social security expenditure 
can then be seen as a government function because it is a good mechanism for distributing 
income. 
In this regard it is necessary to insist that the analytical separation of efficiency and 
distribution, although perhaps helpful in some contexts, is superficial, as is the simple 
assumption of necessary trade-offs between the two.86 One way of arguing the 
interrelatedness of the two aspects is to assume that the income of the poor is a factor in 
the utility function of the rich. Hochman and Rodgers have indicated that in such a case 
redistribution might be efficiency enhancing in that everybody's utility will increase as a result 
of the redistribution. 87 The poor will be better off as a result of a higher level of income, 
while the rich value the opportunity to contribute to the higher income of the poor more than 
84Musgrave and Musgrave (1980:11). 
85See references in Mueller (1989:33). 
~>.esee Hochman and Rodgers (1969:542) for a discussion. 
137Hochman and Rodgers (1969:543 and 556). 
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they value their own lost income. Such an outcome will be the case if the rich have an 
altruistic preference for the income of the poor - what Sugden has described as the 
existence of an "altruistic externality". 88 
Such redistribution might, however, be a public good in the sense that people who do not 
contribute to the redistribution might also share in the benefits. Rich man A's utility 
increases because of the increased income of poor man 8, financed by rich man C's 
kindness. There is then again the opportunity for free-riding which might imply undersupply 
and so justify government intervention. 
Income redistribution can then be classified as a public good or as relevant to the 
internalization of externalities. In such cases of redistribution the question about government 
intervention then becomes a question about efficiency. 89 If income redistribution can so 
be brought under the rubric of public goods and externalities the judgement about the need 
for government intervention must depend on whether it is believed that public goods and 
externalities provide grounds for state intervention. lt is not apparent that such grounds 
exist, however. 
This category of redistribution problems becomes more important if it is realized that 
altruistic externalities need not be the only channel through which redistribution can be seen 
to be efficiency enhancing in the Pareto sense. Many other types of ex1ernalities might have 
the same effect. Redistribution as a result of increased expenditure on schooling might 
benefit everybody in a society in the final analysis because of the increased productivity in 
the economy. The redistribution incidental to public works programmes might "buy" more 
stability for society, resulting in an improved quality of life for both the recipient and the 
person financing the redistribution. 90 
What should be apparent is that redistribution is in some cases something akin to any other 
88Sugden (1982:341). 
etlsee Sugden (1982:341) and Hochman and Rodgers (1969:543). 
90Hendrie (1986:12-13). 
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service which people buy in order to make themselves better off.91 In other cases 
redistribution is incidental to the production or provision of certain goods and services, and 
thus a by-product of other activities.~ Helm and Smith refer to these as mixed goods 
which have some public good characteristics, but are also provided for distributional pur-
poses. !13 In these cases, at least part of the case for government provision must be that 
the government produces these services at a lower opportunity cost. 
The conclusion must then be that the unacceptability of the level of inequality in society does 
not necessarily imply a role for government. Other agencies, as Breton has indicated94, 
have in the past, and are still today, involved in activities leading to redistribution. The normal 
view - that the existence of unwanted inequality necessitates government action - is not 
warranted. In addition to the assumption of an unacceptable primary distribution of income, 
further assumptions or evidence are needed to explain government intervention. Such 
assumptions or evidence would have to establish that the state has a comparative advan-
tage in the provision of redistribution, or in the provision of services resulting in redistribu-
tion, in a specific situation. 
1.2.3 Viewing goods as goods 
The conclusion which follows from the foregoing is that redistribution, just like public goods 
and the elimination of externalities, should not be viewed on theoretical grounds to be 
something that must always be provided by governments. Instead, Breton's suggestion that 
the analysis of (the growth of) governments cannot be based on a fundamental (a priori) 
distinction between private goods and services and public or government goods and 
services, should be accepted. Accepting this entails furthermore "a recognition that there 
91 See also Ringen (1987:115-116). He argues that although civil pensions might increase 
the income of the elderly poor and thus lead them to cut their labour supply, this effect on 
the labour supply, cannot be seen as an efficiency loss or a welfare loss. lt is the result of 
the decisions or choice of individuals, therefore it cannot be construed as a loss of produc-
tion. The choice involved in redistributing or not, is then very much the same as that 
between saving and not saving, or buying or not buying, or buying Coke rather than Pepsi. 
928reton (1989:729). 
93Helm and Smith (1989:282). 
948reton (1989:726-727). 
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are many possible sources of supply for the goods and services wanted by demanders and 
that these sources compete with each other". 95 The decision about who will supply what 
services will then depend on the comparative advantage of the different institutions at 
different times. 96 
This approach should also be the starting point in the analysis of the relationship between 
economic development and the development of institutions providing social security. This 
view underlines the fact that instruments of social security which are today, as a matter of 
course, provided or controlled by governments in certain societies can be, and have often 
been, provided by other institutions ( for e:<ample, households, community and charity or-
ganizations, religious bodies, or business enterprises). Furthermore, these services can be 
provided by different levels of government, namely local, regional and central government. 
In fact, different levels of government and other institutions can be seen as competing pro-
ducers of social services. 
lt is thus clear that on theoretical grounds social security can be provided by a range of 
institutions and that changing conditions might affect the different suppliers differently so that 
the sources of supply will change. The next section argues that in spite of the inability to 
deduce clear theoretical guidelines from the theory of market failure, some clear trends can 
be identified. In the light of these trends (illustrated in Chapter 3), and the fact that these 
trends can be explained using the economic analysis of markets, valid generalizations can 
be made. 
1.3 Hypothesis 
As a result of the complexity of the structure of sources supplying welfare services and the 
complex changes over time, generalizations about the development of these institutions are 
fraught with dangers. In spite of these dangers, it is proposed here that although there will 
be many private and public sources supplying social security at any one time there is a 
tendency, as economic development progresses beyond a certain level, for a greater share 
95Breton (1989:745). 
00Breton (1989:726). 
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of these services to be provided by governments. This expansion of the "welfare state" 
takes the form of a reassignment of functions from other institutions to the state (often 
through the creation of new types of institutions) and an increased coverage of risks and 
needs provided for by the state. In other words, it can be said that as development takes 
place, the provision of social services tends to be "nationalized" in the sense that the state 
assumes greater responsibility in spheres previously seen as falling within the private 
domain, or in the domain of voluntary organizations. 
The above trend has been remarked on by many. Hufton in her work on the poor of 
eighteenth century France tells us that "(t)he history of European poor relief is at least as old 
as European Christianity and is one of change from a religiously based, voluntary charity, 
as expounded by the evangelists, to the complete assumption by the state of responsibility 
for the neediest members of society".97 Flora and Heidenheimer argue that "(t)he later 
consolidation of the absolutist state was accompanied by a gradual, though by no means 
continuous, 'nationalization', differentiation and extension of welfare institutions"98 and 
FloraP9 argues that " ... with the spread of the industrial mode of production, and diffusion 
of the nation state as the predominant form of political organization, the creation of public 
education, health and social security systems has become a world-wide phenomenon. In 
this respect, the evolution of the welfare state clearly represents a universal aspect of mod-
ernization". Breton also holds that a large part of the growth of the government sector in 
Canada can be explained by the "reassignment" of health services, education and the care 
of orphans and the elderly from the private to the public sector.100 Papadakis and Taylor-
Gooby believe that "the development of the welfare state is partially a story of official 
colonization of friendly society and trade-union self-insurance for the different fractions of the 
working class, of the absorption of working-class education and child care [and] of the coor-
dination and extension of the private, voluntary and municipal health care systems".101 
From a cross-section perspective it is also clear that a significant part of the larger relative 
97Hufton (1974:131). See also Barr (1987:9). 
98Fiora and Heidenheimer (1981 :22). 
99Fiora ( 1986: 15). 
H'('Breton (1989:726-727). 
101 Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby (1987:3). 
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role of the state in rich countries can be e:·:plained by the higher level of government transfer 
payments in such countries. 102 
The general idea of state provision usurping provision by other institutions or, in other 
words, the tasks of other institutions being reassigned to the state, is thus not original. In 
spite of its general acceptability this hypothesis has seldom been subjected to detailed study 
and clearly distinguished from more general postulates about the relationship between 
economic growth and state provision of social security. Moreover, only very recently has 
the implications of such a perspective for increased state provision of social security in the 
developing countries received significant attention from economists.103 In the rest of this 
dissertation it is endeavoured to put the generalization on a solid empirical footing and ask 
how the trend can be explained and evaluated from an economic perspective. Some of the 
implications of this perspective for the analysis of social security in developing countries and 
specifically South Africa are also looked at. 
In spite of the general validity of the generalization, it must be qualified in a number of ways. 
Firstly, the trend is most obvious in the case of Western Europe since the middle of the 
nineteenth century and accelerated markedly after World War Two, but it also applies to the 
United States, especially in the field of secondary education. During the twentieth century 
the same tendency was also visible in Latin America and in Africa. 
Secondly, it should be noted that it is not being argued that economic development is the 
most important causal factor explaining increased state activity in the field of the social 
services. Many other factors, sometimes closely related to economic development, such 
as the level and process of state formation, the intensity of the class struggle, changing 
ideas and the rate of democratisation are clearly also important. Association of two factors 
should not be seen as indicating causation. In Chapter 4 the possible interrelationships 
between economic development and social policy will be analyzed. 
This generalization further does not imply certain iron laws of socio-economic development 
102Aharoni (1977:60). 
103See especially Ahmad, et al. (eds.) (1991). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
32 
and the eventual convergence of social policy in different countries. lt is clear that different 
countries introduced more e>.tensive policy at different phases in their development process 
and that systems of social provision differ significantly even between countries at the same 
level of development. The systems of these countries differ importantly with regard to the 
space left for non-state institutions, the level of fragmentation of the system and the 
objectives of social provision. In spite of the diversity, also in terms of expenditure levels, 
an increasing extent of government intervention cannot be doubted. Any systematic 
explanation of this growth should, however, also be able to explain the diversity. 
Thirdly, changes in the world economy since the 1970's and the resurgence of conservative 
economic ideas led to a critical reappraisal of the role of the state in the economy and 
attacks on important aspects of the welfare state. This might limit the relevance of the above 
generalization for developed countries after the 1970's and might have an effect on future 
developments in the developing countries. lt should, however, be remembered that social 
policy is being focused on here and not government activity in other productive spheres. 
With regard to social spending Alber's view that developments since the 1970's, and 
especially curtailments in spending, should be seen as "a phase of consolidation rather than 
of dismantling" and "that social outlays continued to grow ... , but were now brought into 
closer correspondence with the growth rates of the economy"104 seems to be generalizable 
to other industrialized countries. The hypothesis does, however, not imply that future 
structural and economic changes might not reverse the hypothesized trend. 
104Aiber (1986:117). 
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CHAPTER 2 THE GROWTH OF STATE PROVISION OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
2.1 Introduction 
The central generalization of this study is that as economic development progresses beyond 
a certain level, there is a tendency for the provision of social services to be reassigned from 
other institutions to the state. The objective of this chapter is to advance some evidence to 
support this hypothesis. 
A decisive analysis of the hypothesis would need a comparison of the extent of state 
provision of the different services providing social security with the provision by other 
institutions, at various times for different countries. In addition to such a time series analysis 
of changing provision in specific countries, a cross-section analysis, comparing the method 
of provision of countries at different levels of economic development, could be used. A 
number of obstacles make such an appraisal problematical. With regard to the time-series 
analysis there are problems of data availability as well as conceptual problems. Quite often 
the problem of data availability relates to conceptual ambiguities. In addition to these 
conceptual and data difficulties, cross-section analyses have to deal with the issue of 
comparability of information for countries with diverse, and often unique, institutions and 
socio-political and economic systems. 
In the first section of this chapter (2.2) a number of problems related to identifying and 
comparing the sources of service provision are discussed. The discussion indicates the 
difficulty involved in making an exhaustive direct analysis of changing provision and, together 
with Section 2.3, provides the motivation for the indirect approach that is followed in the two 
subsequent sections. This analysis of concepts and problems is also relevant for the 
treatment of expenditure on social provision in South Africa in Chapter 5. Section 2.3 
discusses some examples of direct comparisons of changing provision of certain services 
by different institutions. There are few such detailed studies available. The available studies 
further cover shorter periods than are needed and only a small number of the relevant 
services. A conclusive study using such direct comparisons is therefore not possible. For 
these reasons Section 2.4 examines the growth of government expenditure and the different 
components of government expenditure relative to total expenditure for a number of coun-
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tries and groups of countries. This provides evidence on the growth of government and 
some indirect evidence on the reassignment of functions. Section 2.5 describes the extent 
of state provision in the United Kingdom and the former West Germany in order to illustrate 
the comprehensiveness of contemporary state provision and its extent relative to the 
situation at the turn of the century and earlier. 
2.2 Problems related to measuring the relative role of state provision 
2.2.1 The meaning of government provision 
In some cases the very basic distinction between public and private provision, or between 
the provision by the state and provision by other institutions, may become obscure. This 
becomes clear when it is realized that "state provision" can mean many things. lt can 
denote either production of a service, or financing (subsidization of the consumption and/or 
the production of a service), or the regulation of the consumption and/or production.1 
Many permutations of these basic possibilities can be foreseen and are actually found in real 
economies. Table 2.1, which is redrawn from Barr and does not include regulation as a 
complicating factor, gives some idea of the possibilities. 
FINANCE 
PriV.llol 
Private 
F.:-:-:1 
PRODUCTION 
Public 
C.:·mmutH train tran:;~.)rt 
P.:•.'-tal ~ ·!·rvl·~·"" (J:·r•:.:l.:·mlnantty) 
E•:I•J•:-:tll·~nal Inputs (t.:,.:.~:::.. ,.t.;.) li•:.:+·it,Zil ::.corvl.: . .;.~ f·:.f th"' ~-: ... or 
Put.llc Primary .:.M ~..,~.:.n.:lary .,,ju.:..l-
tlon 
One ambiguous situation is where goods or services are produced by the private sector but 
financed by government, such as food bought with food stamps or transfer incomes. 
Another possibility which is difficult to classify is where production and financing are private 
but with consumption, or participation, either compulsory or heavily regulated by the state. 2 
18arr (1987:94). 
2Aharoni (1977:50-51). 
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Examples of the latter are retirement schemes financed by individuals (through contributions) 
which are, however, compulsory and also administered by the state, and the government 
regulation of private pensions. 3 Unemployment insurance in most countries is normally 
provided by the state but financed by the individual employers and employees. 
Tax expenditures also entail such a mix of private and public provision. These tax 
concessions, which require the purchase of certain services (for example, pension benefits) 
or responsibilities (for example, dependent children), represent significant implicit subsidies. 
They are found to a significant extent in most economies. Many privately produced and 
procured goods are in this way "financed" by the state by changing their relative costs. 
The above definitional problems reflect the fact that government output in the sense of 
goods and services underestimates the influence of the state on the economy and in 
specific economic spheres, because it excludes the effect of the state through "rules and 
regulations". 4 Looking only at conventional output ignores the correct view that the "true 
output of governments are (actually) policies" and that focusing only on goods and services 
implies including only the "accounting budget" of government. To this should be added "the 
difference between what citizens buy as a result of the legislation and what they would have 
otherwise freely purchased". Put differently, "the difference between the price of the good 
that citizens are forced to buy and what it is worth to them" should be added to normal 
estimates of state expenditure.5 Only after "addition" of this more abstract type of output 
can we hope to establish the "true" extent of government intervention in the economy. 
Estimating this so-called "economic budget" of the state is, however, impossible. 6 lt not 
only raises the intractable questions of incidence, but also requires precarious inferences 
about the exact indirect effects of government policies. Therefore it is necessary to focus 
on government output of goods and services. The implications can be serious. lt is clearly 
conceivable that the effect of non-quantifiable aspects of government intervention may 
3Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980:15). 
4Mohr and Rogers (1991 :66). 
5Breton (1974:16-20). 
6Aharoni (1977:48) refers to the absence of an unambiguous measure of public output. 
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outweigh the effects of government provision of what is conventionally called goods and 
services.7 
2.2.2 The valuation of output 
Even after accepting the need to focus only on a narrow definition of government output, 
serious further problems remain. One such problem relates to the valuation of government 
output. Because goods produced by governments, or similar types of products, are seldom 
traded in markets, market prices cannot be used as an indication of "individuals' relative 
evaluation of different commodities"."' As the only viable yardstick of the value of 
government output, some measure of government expenditure is normally employed. This 
approach implies measuring the value of government output in terms of its cost of 
production or in terms of input costs (cost of resources). As McGrath remarks, this 
approach is based on a very problematic assumption, namely that there is a "unique 
relationship between value and cost".9 
Many factors such as the likelihood of wastage in government production and the disregard 
of the subjective preferences of individuals might lead to the cost of production providing 
an overestimate of the value of government expenditure. On the other hand, the fact that 
government provision of services providing social security might provide significant external 
benefits, or may be closer in nature to investment than to consumption, will result in an 
overestimate of the cost of government provision and therefore an underestimate of its 
value. 
Numerous factors can thus disturb correspondence between value and cost. There seems, 
however, to be little alternative to focusing on government expenditure as an indication of 
the value of government output and by implication as an indicator of the relative role of a 
71n Chapter 5 the South African e:-<ample of progressive income redistribution through 
conventional government output most probably being neutralized by implicit taxes (as a 
result of restrictions) on the poor is mentioned. 
8Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980:16). 
9McGrath (1979:5). 
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government in the economy and in the production of certain services.10 Seeing greater per 
capita state expenditure, or greater state expenditure relative to total production in the 
economy, on a specific service as an indicator of the extent or adequacy of state effort 
should be guarded against. Such evaluation of effort will have to take into account provision 
of the service by other institutions in society as well as the problems of inefficiency in 
provision and the maldistribution of benefits. Table 2.2 compares health inputs to health 
"outputs". The incongruity between inputs and outputs, and the resulting dangers in 
equating level of expenditure to value and effort, are especially clear in a few cases. The 
comparison between the United Kingdom and the United States is well-known and shows 
widely differing inputs (total private and public health spending as a percentage of GDP) 
providing more or less the same outputs. Relative to the measure of input, health status in 
South Africa also is comparatively low. 
The problem of valuation is of course not limited only to government output. In the same 
way problems arise about the exact nature of the goods and services provided by less 
formal institutions such as households and communities and the related difficulty of valuing 
these outputs. In other words, problems arise when trying to identify and categorize the 
products (goods and services) of certain institutions and to find an accurate value or 
opportunity cost for these products. In addition, very little systematic information exists 
about the activities of less formal institutions.11 
These factors leave us with little clarity and even less hard evidence on the total extent of 
provision of the relevant services. As a result there is also no norm against which changing 
government provision can be compared. A pertinent example is the measurement of the 
contribution of different institutions to schooling or education, which is an important aspect 
of child care. Firstly, it is impossible to put a value on the inputs at home which are 
complementary to schooling and which are necessary to make it effective. Furthermore, 
estimating an important part of opportunity cost of schooling - namely earnings or productive 
10McGrath (1979:5) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980:16). 
11 ln the case of Japan, for example, Ernst (1982:561) says that "(t)he benefits and services 
rendered by 'intermediate structures' between the state and the individual ... are nowhere 
enumerated". 
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contribution foregone - raises substantial, if not insurmountable problems.12 The deeper 
underlying problem is the lack of an acceptable measure of value in the case of goods and 
services not exchanged in the market. The problem is of course even more fundamental 
in that market evaluation can also be viewed as being essentially arbitrary, based as it is on 
a non-rational or incidental income and asset distribution. 
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2.2.3 Defining the public sector 
A more manageable problem is to decide which institutions' expenditure to include as 
"government" expenditure. Nevertheless, a lack of clarity on which definition is being used 
may lead to incorrect conclusions, especially when working comparatively. The most 
common concept used in this regard is general government expenditure which refers to the 
non-commercial activities of all central government departments and related bodies and the 
non-commercial activities of regional and local governments (see Figure 2.1).13 The 
concept public authorities is wider than general government in that the expenditure of 
government business enterprises is also included. These enterprises normally sell their 
services to the public, but are under direct ministerial and departmental control. Examples 
are the South African Transport Services and the Department of Post and Telecommunica-
tions. The widest concept of government expenditure is total public sector expenditure 
12See Trotter (1988). 
13Van der Berg (1991a:4). 
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which includes the expenditures of the public authorities as well as that of the public 
corporations. Public corporations are businesses in which the government is an important 
shareholder, but which do not fall under either direct ministerial control or parliamentary 
budget control. 14 Also important is to establish whether extra-budgetary accounts and 
funds are included under central government expenditure, and how important lower levels 
of government are. This is especially the case in federal systems. 15 
Government expenditures are ordinarily classified according to their economic nature, the 
type of good or service procured or the function or objective of the expenditure. The most 
important economic distinction is that which exists between current expenditures and 
capital expenditures. Trends in the relative importance of capital and current expenditure 
are viewed as important under the assumption that capital expenditures will have a greater 
impact on development prospects and thus future well-being. 16 Another important 
(continued on p.41) 
HSee Van der Berg (1991a:3-4), Mohr and Rogers (1991 :67) and Mohr et al. (1989:34-35). 
15See World Bank (1990:250). One example of the possible confusion can be seen when 
comparing World Bank figures with data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development. Although definitions are given in most cases, the scope for confusion is 
immense. For 1986 The World Bank (1988:269) reported central government revenue for 
the United Kingdom and Japan as equal to 37.9 per cent and 12.6 per cent of GNP 
respectively (with the figure for Japan referring only to budgetary data). OECD figures put 
general government receipts for the two countries in 1985 relative to GDP at 42.8 per cent 
and 31.2 per cent respectively (Mueller, 1989:322, Table 17.2). This shows what difference 
it can make if different definitions are used. 
15-yhis view can be questioned. lt tends to overestimate the role of physical capital 
accumulation in the development process at the cost of investment in human capital. 
Human capital is often safeguarded and accumulated through "exhaustive" government 
expenditures such as salaries of teachers, etcetera. Further it relies on the presumption that 
all aspects of development can only be achieved through high economic growth. Recent 
evidence indicates that significant advances in basic health, literacy, longevity, etcetera need 
not wait for growth through physical capital accumulation. 
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FIGURE 2.1 COMPOSITION OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR17 
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economic distinction exists between resource use by government and resource transfers 
by government. Resource use refers to government consumption expenditures and 
government gross domestic fixed investment. Government consumption includes 
expenditure by the government on inputs and productive services and is sometimes 
referred to as "exhaustive government expenditure"18• Transfers refer to monetary 
payments to households, subsidies to private firms, current or capital monetary transfers to 
other government institutions and interest payments by government. 
Some ambiguities arise if transfers are included in total government expenditure when 
comparing it to total production in the society. This follows from the fact that transfers do 
not imply resource use, but merely a reallocation of purchasing power which is not included 
in the denominator (total production). Inclusion of transfers may thus, for certain purposes, 
exaggerate the role of government in the economy. Furthermore, as Atkinson and Stiglitz 
have argued with reference to the similarities between tax expenditures and other state 
transfers, the definition of transfers is essentially arbitrary.19 T9 be consistent the inclusion 
of transfers should lead to the inclusion of tax expenditures as well. 
Although the ratio may lose some economic meaning if transfers are included in the 
numerator, excluding these transfers will lead to a further underestimate of the influence of 
the government on the economy. 20 The decision on whether to include transfers or not 
should thus be made with reference to the objective of the comparison. 
The most important functions according to which government expenditures can be classified 
are general administration, protection services, economic services and social services. 
Some expenditures may be difficult to classify according to objectives so that a category 
of unallocable output is normally found. One example of an expenditure that is difficult to 
classify in a functional sense is public debt costs. 
18Aharoni (1977:60). 
19Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980:16). 
mAtkinson and Stiglitz (1980:16) and Aharoni (1977:60). 
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to a significant share of average income. 24 
lt is clear that state and private transfers often have the same objectives so that changes in 
the level of public transfers will affect private transfers and vice versa. The hypothesis 
implies that state transfers will crowd out private transfers or, alternatively, come in the place 
of private transfers which have declined for one or other reason. Available evidence, which 
is clearly insufficient, seems not to contradict such an interpretation. The evidence is, 
however, not conclusive. 
Lampman and Smeeding studied the changing importance of inter-family and government 
transfers for income maintenance, food and housing relative to personal income in the 
United States. Their data indicate that between 1935/6 and 1979 total inter-family transfers 
declined from 6.5 percent of personal income to 5.0 per cent. Over the same period total 
government transfers related to the same services grew from 2.8 to 11.2 per cent of 
personal income. There was thus, on these figures, a reversal of importance with 
government transfers increasing from 30 per cent to 70 per cent of total government and 
inter-family transfers. They conclude, tentatively, that "in terms of compositional ch~nge, 
there does seem to be substitution [between government and private transfers] as we have 
measured it".25 
Cox's studies for Peru and the United States also suggest that private transfers would have 
been higher by significant percentages in the absence of certain public transfers. 26 Data 
used by Ruggles and Ruggles, pertaining to social and private insurance in the United 
States, indicate that between 1 969 and 1975 government transfers in this regard have been 
growing more rapidly than relevant employee benefits and much faster than benefits from 
personal insurance. Over this period, during which personal income increased 3.6 times, 
government transfers increased 6.4 times, employee benefits 5.4 times and benefits from 
personal insurance 2.5 times. They interpret this as a sign of government and employers 
24Cox and Jimenez (1990:206-207). 
25Lampman and Smeeding (1983:52-53). 
2ecox and Jimenez (1990:216). 
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assuming responsibility to sorne extent for social protection. 27 
In spite of their suggestiveness, these studies cannot provide a final answer. Important 
research on the changing relationships between differ6nt types of transfers over time and 
how they interact still has to be done. Because of the lack and inconclusiveness of current 
information more indirect evidence and general theor6tical arguments will have to suffice. 
2.4 Macroeconomic evidence on the role of state provision 
An alternative approach to the question of the relative role of government in the different 
spheres is to look at changing total government expenditure relative to total production in 
the economy and at the changing composition of this government expenditure. Establishing 
the extent of the growth of state intervention in the economy and isolating the categories 
responsible for these shifts provide an indication of whether the state has been assuming 
new responsibilities or has been tah:ing over functions from other institutions, and in which 
spheres this has been taking place. An increase in the share of total resources or resources 
in a specific category allocated by the state can then be seen as preliminary evidence of 
changing systems of provision or even "nationalization". Changing composition of 
government expenditure can also be seen as indicating shifts in the priorities of the state. 
lt should be remembered that many of the conceptual ambiguities mentioned also hold for 
an indirect approach to measurement. Specifically, the discussion is based on a narrow 
definition of government output as a result of the fact that the effect of policies and implicit 
subsidies and taxes are not taken into account. lt is also assumed that the level of 
government expenditure gives a good indication of the value of government output. 
In evaluating especially the cross-section figures it is furthermore important to take note of 
the dangers involved in the comparisons of levels of expenditure across countries. The 
variety of definitions that can be used as well as the different institutional structures can 
result in available figures providing misleading comparisons. As a result of this, great care 
27Ruggles and Ruggles (1983:373). 
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must be taken when making deductions on the basis of comparative figures. 28 
The most commonly used measure of the relative size of the public sector and its 
importance in different spheres is a ratio comparing some aggregate of government 
expenditure to total production in the economy. This ratio is then seen as providing "a 
useful indication of the overall influence of the public sector in the economy as a whole". 29 
As denominator in this fraction, gross domestic product at market prices (GDP mrJ, also 
referred to as expenditure on gross domestic product, is normally used. 30 The numerator 
is then one of the possible definitions of the role of government identified above or a specific 
category of government expenditure. 
Time series data comparing government e:<penditure to total output for most OECD 
countries show a continual growth of the relative role of the government sector since about 
1900, but probably for the last two centuries, with an acceleration of government growth 
after World War Two. 31 One set of evidence on this point is that tax levels as a percentage 
of national income grew from 14.96 per cent in France, 7.99 per cent in Germany and 9.99 
per cent in the United Kingdom in 1900-01 to 20.01 per cent, 29.21 per cent and 24.77 per 
cent respectively in 1924-25.32 In 1989 central government current revenue as a percen-
tage of GNP for these three countries stood at 40.9 per cent, 29.0 per cent and 35.6 per 
cent respectively.~1 In the post-war period the average level of government expenditure to 
GDP for 16 developed countries changed from 28.9 per cent in 1953/54 to 39.4 per cent in 
1973/74.34 The average ratio of general government expenditure to GDP at current prices 
in OECD countries changed from 26.6 per cent in 1960 to 4 7.3 per cent in 1985.35 Evi-
23See I.L.O. (1988:6-7), World Bank (1991 :278) and Van der Berg (1989d:16-17). 
29Beeton (1987:927). 
30See Beeton (1987:927 -928) for a motivation of this choice. 
31 Mueller (1989:320-322) and World Bank (1988:44-46). 
32Mueller (1989:323, Table 17.3). 
33World Bank (1991 :227). Note that these refer to central government expenditure. 
34Mueller (1989:336, Table 17.5). 
35Mueller (1989:322, Table 17.2). 
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dence for the United States shows that federal e:··.penditures changed from 2.6 per cent of 
GNP in 1902 to 22.5 per cent in 1937, while total government e:·:penditure (federal, state and 
local) changed from 7. 7 per cent to 35.0 per cent of GNP over the same time. 36 These in-
creasing ratios were invariably associated with increasing per capita incomes. 
Over the much shorter period since the 1970's the upward trend of central government 
expenditure relative to GNP also holds for middle-income economies as a group as defined 
by the World Bank (weighted average of 21.7 per cent in 1972 to 27.5 per cent in 1986), as 
well as for upper middle-income countries taken as a group (weighted average of 21.6 per 
cent in 1972 to 28.3 per cent in 1986).37 According to one estimate these figures must be 
compared with government revenue relative to GNP of about 5 per cent in developing 
countries in the late 1800's. 38 In spite of this general positive relationship it has been 
indicated that these averages hide wide variations in the ratios and even declines of the ratio 
in some countries.39 lt would, however, be fair to conclude that higher levels of develop-
ment in a country (developed or developing) are normally associated with a relatively bigger 
public sector. 
Cross-section evidence also indicates that government expenditure and social services 
provision are normally positively related to per capita income. Borcherding's figures show 
that taxes and social security contributions as a percentage of GNP 1965 through 1968 
averaged 11.8 per cent for 11 of the poorest countries (low 8.6 per cent; high 18.2 per cent) 
and 36.9 per cent for 11 of the richest countries (low 20.7 per cent; high 46.9 per cent).40 
These higher expenditure ratios for governments in developed countries are also reflected 
in World Bank figures where the average of total central government expenditure divided by 
GNP in 1986 was indicated as 20.8 per cent for low-income countries, 27.5 per cent for 
~Borcherding (1985:361, Table 2). For additional evidence see Gabriel and Loderer 
(1988:267). 
37World Bank (1988:266-267). 
38World Bank (1988:46). 
~orld Bank (1988:46). 
40Borcherding (1985:360). 
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middle-income countries and 28.6 per cent for industrial market economies.41 
The difference in the importance of the state between developed and developing countries 
seems to be systematically related to the relatively high level of social security expenditures, 
and especially government transfers to households, in developed countries. This becomes 
evident when looking at the factors responsible for the growth of government expenditure 
in developed countries and also the composition of government expenditure and revenue 
in the developed countries. One study has concluded that more than half of the difference 
in the government expenditure ratios between the richest and the poorest countries "are 
accounted for by current transfer payments to households". 42 
The World Bank has also judged that the lower percentage of central government 
expenditure relative to GNP in developing countries is the result, mainly, of "the industrial 
countries' higher level of transfers for social security and welfare".43 In the USA, for 
example, "transfer spending" grew at an annual average rate of 6.3 per cent between 1902 
and 1978, while all government expenditure grew by only 5.2 per cent per annum and the 
economy by only about 3 per cent. "Welfare expenditures" grew at about 6.8 per cent. 44 
For 14 developed countries transfers relative to GDP changed from an average of 11.9 per 
cent in 1953-54 to 18.8 per cent in 1973-74, while the relative ratios for the United States 
increased from 5.5 per cent to 11 per cent over the same period. 45 Gabriel and Loderer 
quote evidence indicating that between 1 950 and 1 970 the median value of government 
transfers relative to national income increased by 160 per cent in 14 OECD countries. 
During the same period the remaining government expenditures relative to national income 
41World Bank (1988:267). The difference between middle-income and industrial market 
economies is less accentuated in the quoted figures because of the inclusion of certain 
former communist countries (Hungary, Poland), European countries (Greece) and special 
cases (Israel) which have very high expenditure ratios. Similar cross-section trends have 
been found by earlier, more systematic studies. See Aharoni (1977:59-60). 
42Aharoni (1977:60) reporting on the findings of Thorn. 
43World Bank (1988:47). 
44Borcherding (1985:363, Table 3 and 364). The same patterns of relative growth holds for 
the United Kingdom and West-Germany. 
45Mueller (1989:336, Table 17.5). 
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increased by only 59 per cent. 46 
Tax ratios also reflect the fact that welfare expenditures account for a large part, although 
not all, of the divergences in expenditure ratios between rich and poor countries. Aharoni 
has estimated that the average tax ratio (to Gt4P) for less developed countries in the early 
1970's was 14 per cent excluding social security taxes and 15 per cent including social 
security taxes. For developed countries the two ratios were 25 and 32 per cent respectively. 
This shows that a significant part of the gap between developed and developing countries 
with regard to government expenditure and revenue derives from social security expenditure 
and financing. 47 
Expenditures promoting social security are also much lower on average as a percentage of 
total central government expenditures in the case of poor countries than in the case of rich 
countries. In 1986 the weighted average expenditure on health, education, housing, 
amenities, social security and welfare relative to total central government expenditure was, 
for low income countries, 19.2 per cent, for middle-income countries 31.2 per cent and for 
the industrial market economies 56.4 per cent. 48 Using a slightly narrower definition of 
social security and figures for 1985, V on Braun shows that central government spending on 
social security as a percentage of the total central government expenditure is higher, on 
average, in higher income countries. This is illustrated by Table 2.3 below, reproduced from 
Von Braun. 
Another important conclusion flowing from the data is that "the relative spending on social 
security tends to increase drastically only when economies reach the upper middle-income 
level".49 Von Braun's analysis also shows clearly that there is a positive relationship 
between income level and state expenditure on social security. Relating social expenditure 
per capita and GNP per capita for different African and other developing countries he finds 
that this positive relationship does not only hold when comparing developed and developing 
46Gabriel and Loderer (1988:269-270). 
47Aharoni (1977:61). 
48World Bank (1988:266-267). 
4~on Braun (1991 :398). 
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countries, but that it also holds when only developing countries are included in the sample, 
and when only African countries are included. 50 
Gi'·ntrat :JO:•V•'·rrorr..;nt sr..;MII'I:J •:•n ::,.:.:lal ~,;.;urlty .lS .l j:·2·r•:•tnla·J.;. •:•f 
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These figures indicate that as per capita income increases, government expenditures 
become more important relative to total income. A major part of this expenditure growth can 
be related to increasing state expenditure on services providing social security. State social 
security expenditure thus becomes more important relative to total state expenditure as 
development progresses. Together with the fact that total state expenditure grows faster 
than total income in the economy, this implies that state social expenditure will increase 
relative to the size of the economy as development progresses. Although this is not 
conclusive evidence on the shift of functions from other organisations to the state, it does 
illustrate that social security does become a more important concern of government as a 
country develops. This could either be as a result of governments providing "new" services 
or because of governments taking over functions from other institutions. The changing 
eil.1ent of provision by these other institutions, cannot be established, so it is not possible, 
from this evidence, to determine what provided the impetus for government growth in this 
field. The next chapter argues that it is possible to construct an economic explanation 
implying state social expenditure growth as a result of the state taking over as supplier from 
other institutions. 
lt is important to note that in spite of this general trend, specific growth rates and levels of 
expenditure differ significantly between countries which are more or less at the same level 
of economic development. This shows that per capita income is not the only determinant 
SOVon Braun (1991 :398-399). 
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of welfare expenditure and highlights the dangers inherent in postulating a simple "stages 
theory" of the growth of state social provision. 
2.5 Coverage of risks and population in the United Kingdom and Germany 
This section looks at the current system of social provision in Germany and the United 
Kingdom and compares the comprehensiveness of the current system with the dearth of 
government institutions providing such services in the late 1800's. The discussion provides 
further indirect evidence on the increasing role of the state in the provision of social security 
as well as some evidence on institutions which were replaced. These two countries can of 
course not be seen as representative of all welfare states. They do, however, provide an 
illustration of the comprehensiveness of social provision in what must be viewed as countries 
with some of the most extensive systems of welfare provisions. They are good examples 
of countries with a high level of per capita income. Substantial information is also available 
on the development of these two welfare states. In addition they show the variety of 
mechanisms, even in high income countries, which can be used to provide similar needs. 
Two general conclusions seem clear. Firstly, in the fields of income maintenance, income 
support, education and health, regulation, production and financing by the state is extensive. 
These governments are the dominant suppliers in the specific fields in these countries. 
Secondly, there is definite evidence that some of these services were earlier provided by 
other institutions in these societies which makes it possible to interpret the growth of 
government in these spheres as in part a reassignment of certain functions from the "private 
sector" (households, churches, business enterprises) to the public sector. 
2.5.1 The United Kingdom 
The mechanisms of social provision in the United Kingdom illustrate many of the common 
characteristics of the modern welfare state. When compared to other Western European 
countries they also underline the diversity of different systems of social and welfare provi-
sions. In spite of the ongoing debate about the real achievements of the British welfare 
state, it is clear that the current situation is in marh:ed contrast to the situation at the turn of 
the century. 
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The social insurance and assistance programmes in the United Kingdom are universal in 
coverage of persons and comprehensive in their coverage of risks. The different income 
support programmes aim at providing the minimum income needed for subsistence, 
irrespective of employment situation or status, and- also at assisting households in the 
fulfilment of certain functions such as child rearing. There is a low level of fragmentation of 
services (no special programmes for different categories of people) and administration is 
unified in a single Department of Health and Social Security. The same universality of 
access applies to the provision of education and health. Although there is room for private 
provision of these services, the state is responsible for at least minimum levels; private 
organization only comes into play at higher levels of provision or if preferred by consumers. 
The growth of government supply is to an extent reflected in aggregate expenditure figures. 
Total government expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product rose steadily from 
the beginning of the century to about 47,2 per cent in 1980.51 Social and welfare spending 
as a percentage of gross national product rose from 4 per cent in 1910 to 29 per cent in 
1975.52 Social expenditure grew faster than other government expenditures and has since 
1972 comprised more than 50 per cent of total government expenditure. 53 Income 
maintenance and income support comprise the biggest part of social expenditure (40 per 
cent in 1980), with education and health second (20-25 per cent each), and housing varying 
between 12 and 20 per cent since 1950. Personal welfare services have been growing but 
still take up less than 4 per cent of the social expenditure budget. 54 
Current social provision clearly represents a product of gradual growth since the 1800's. 
The outcome and the nature of the change over the last decade is highlighted by Mishra's 
comparison of "welfare" in Britain around 1860 with that around 1970 (see Table 2.4).55 
51 Parry (1986:163). 
52Gough (1989:278). 
53Parry (1986:166). 
54Parry (1986:167). Estimated figures for 1987 were broadly in line with these shares. See 
Barr (1987:6, Table 1.1). 
55Mishra (1977:92). 
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The gradual growth of the British welfare state has often been divided into a number of 
phases with different periodisations resulting from different perspectives. Barr distinguishes 
four phases with reference especially to events in the field of income support and poor 
relief.SI:I Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby identify five stages according to the "stance of 
government". 57 
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These different periodisations all describe a shift from market reverence and punitive relief 
before 1870 to increased acceptance of the need for coordinated state action in the spheres 
of income support, health, education and welfare. These different fields of social provision 
will be discussed separately in order to give an idea of current provision and its historical 
origins. This discussion is based on Barr, Kaim-Caudle, Parry and Papadakis and Taylor-
513Barr (1987:9-21). For him separate phases were introduced with the Poor Law Act of 1601, 
the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, the "Liberal reforms" between 1906 and 1914 and 
finally the post-war legislation of 1944 to 1948. 
57Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby (1987:3). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
53 
Gooby.58 
(a) Income support 
In the field of income support, both with regard to life cycle changes as well as with regard 
to more permanent destitution, the major government institution before 1900 was the 
infamous poor law system which provided "relief within a framework of repression".59 
Especially after the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act, this form of relief became notorious for 
the principle of "less eligibility" and the so-called "workhouse test". 60 The provisions of the 
poor law provided some relief, administered and financed initially by local communities, but 
after 1834 administration became more centralized. Because of the insufficiency of this 
scheme of state provision the Poor Law Commission of 1 909 reported that " ... the majority 
of commissioners [regional representatives of the control board] still looked to charity and 
private voluntary action as the first line of defense against poverty". 61 The poor law 
authorities also tried to get the principles of the poor laws applied by the voluntary 
organisations and gave some support for and attempted to coordinate voluntary action. 
In the latter part of the 1800's there was also strong growth of self-help organisations to 
contend with the risks of industrial society, and "friendly societies, savings clubs and trade 
union insurance ... became a major source of support in sickness, unemployment and old 
age for the upper working class". 62 
The early 1900's, which Barr refers to as the "period of Uberal reforms"63, saw the 
introduction of legislation reflecting a major change in the approach to poverty. The first 
change came with the 1908 Old Pension Act which Rimlinger described as "the first major 
t:.rBarr (1987), Kaim-Caudle (1973), Parry (1986) and Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby {1987). 
59S. and B. Webb as quoted by Rimlinger (1971 :18). 
~he principle of "less eligibility" refers to the objective that the able-bodied should not 
receive benefits higher than those of the working person while the "workhouse test" refers 
to the fact that relief was dependent on living in the (less than pleasant) workhouses. See 
Barr (1987:11-12) 
f,
1Rimlinger (1971 :59). See also Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby (1987:4). 
e2Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby (1987:-l). See also Kaim-Caudle (1973:205). 
63Barr (1987:14). 
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break with the principles of 1834" (referring to the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834).64 
The Pensions Act provided means tested assistance to those over 70 without contributory 
conditions. Good conduct during working life was, however, required. 65 This legislation, 
together with the National Insurance Act of 1911 represented, according to Parry, "(t)he first 
departure from minimalist welfare policy".66 The National Insurance Act provided 
contributory unemployment benefits and health insurance to a limited group of workers. 
Parry argues that, in spite of the limited nature of these schemes, "the ideological principle 
was conceded, and the following 30 years saw the gradual rela'{ation and extension of 
eligibility".67 The National Insurance legislation and National Health Service legislation of 
the 1940's finally "secure(d) an integrated public organization of the social services" and 
" ... broke decisively with the tradition of public support to privately organized services".68 
In income support this implied "the fully fledged provision of a guaranteed national 
minimum", organized centrally and within a unified system.69 
Current state provision then provides extensive coverage of the population against most 
major risks. A distinction can be made between contributory benefits, normally referred to 
as social insurance, and social assistance benefits, which are usually means-tested. An 
additional category of cash grants are those referred to as categorical benefits. 
The National Insurance Scheme provides for compulsory insurance for the whole workforce, 
including the self-employed. Benefits are paid on condition that earnings-related 
contributions, which are shared by employers and employees, were paid during the 
foregoing year. The benefits are normally flat-rate, the only exception being an optional 
earnings-related pension scheme. The insurance scheme provides benefits in the event of 
64Rimlinger (1971 :59). 
65Barr (1987:16) and Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby (1987:106). 
66Parry (1986:159). 
67Parry (1986:159). 
68Parry (1986:160). Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby argue that this process led to "much of 
the Upper-working-class system of private and friendly society insurance [being] assimilated" 
in state structures. (1987:4), 
69Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby (1987:5). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
55 
sickness, occupational injuries, invalidity, unemployment, maternity and retirement. lt also 
provides for a death grant and survivors' benefits. The programme is_ centrally administered 
through the Department of Health and Social Security. A small part of the programme is 
financed from general revenue. 
Social assistance in the form of cash benefits as well as categorical benefits are also 
administered by the Department of Health and Social Security. The two most important 
programmes here are a cash child benefit to all mothers of children of pre-school and 
school-going age (which, among other things, replaced earlier tax relief) and "supplementary 
benefits" for those out of work in order to raise their income to an officially defined poverty 
line. A regular cash payment subject to a means test is also paid to the working poor (the 
so-called "Family Income Supplement"). Subsidized school meals and milk and higher 
education maintenance grants are also provided by the educational authorities. 70 
Social assistance through personal welfare services are provided by integrated social service 
departments in the local authorities. These include residential care, day care, home service 
and meals for the elderly, provision for the physically and mentally handicapped and 
residential care for deprived children. 
(b) Education 
Presently school attendance in the United Kingdom is compulsory and free to the age of 16, 
while university education, to which access is regulated on the grounds of academic merit, 
is heavily subsidized (through payment of tuition fees from public funds and maintenance 
grants to students).71 While education is mostly financed from general government 
revenue, expenditures and administration are in the hands of local authorities. Only about 
6 per cent of all pupils attend private schools. 72 
State provision of education was a forerunner of other universal social programmes and was 
the only universal programme operating at the beginning of this century. Government 
7
°For a complete list of benefits see Barr (1987: 176). 
71 Barr (1987:343 and 344). 
nParry (1986:178). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
56 
intervention in education dates from the first half of the 1800's. Early interventions included 
enforcement of instruction to workers on the Factory Acf3 and grants in aid of voluntary 
school building and teacher training. 74 After the expansion of access to state education 
with the 1870 Education Act public access and compulsion was increased in stepwise 
fashion. Primary education was made compulsory and free in 1891 and assigned to local 
authorities in 190275 and the 1944 Education Act resulted in "secondary education for 
all".7" State intervention also expanded from the early 1800's in other fields of child care 
such as prevention of abuse, adoption, medical inspection and subsidization of school 
meals. n This increased state provision did not take place in a vacuum but first developed 
alongside education provided by charities, religious groupings and other voluntary action. 
The state later took over the major responsibility for education from these intermediary 
institutions. 78 
(c) Health 
British citizens enjoy free access to medical treatment and most health service. These 
services are organized through the National Health Service and 14 Regional Health 
Authorities under the control of the Department of Health and Social Security. Delivery takes 
place through three branches of the National Health Service, namely primary health care 
(mostly via general practitioners), hospitals and community health care. Although private 
services are available, it has been estimated that more than 95 per cent of all people use 
the National Health Services in most fields of health provision, excepting dental health and 
the provision of spectacles. 79 Financing is largely from general government revenues, with 
73Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby (1987:72). 
74Barr (1987:13). 
75Parry (1986:159). 
76Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby (1987:72). 
nsarr (1987:16) and Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby (1987:4- 5). 
78See Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby (1987:4 and 72). They argue that the state came to 
"supplant and incorporate" most charitable and religious provision. 
79Kaim-Caudle (1973:318). Barr (1987:323) estimates that in recent years the private sector 
involved about 5 per cent of total health expenditure and provided about 2 per cent of 
hospital beds. 
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the rest coming from national insurance contributions (11 per cent) and from direct charges 
(3 per cent).80 
Once again, the unifying legislation for health care in 1948 represented the outcome of a 
lengthy process of growing state involvement and the final ascendancy of state provision 
over provision through intermediary structures. Although the state was involved in rule-
making with regard to public health since 1843, provision of medical services by the early 
1900's consisted of a mixed bag. Until 1911 only the poorest could receive free treatment, 
initially through Poor Law hospitals. Those who could afford it contributed to hospital 
schemes organized by voluntary organisations. After 1911 breadwinners in certain industries 
became part of a contributory medical insurance scheme as part of the National Insurance 
Scheme, while the situation for others (the poor and those not insured with the official 
scheme) remained unchanged until 1948.81 
(d) Housing 
Housing assistance in Britain is currently given through tax expenditure for mortgage interest 
relief, public housing construction and rent rebates on publicly owned housing. Public 
housing is often subsidized and rent and tenure control provide some relief related to 
privately provided housing. 
State involvement in housing dates to the late nineteenth century with action normally drive~ 
by public health concerns.82 Intervention in the nineteenth century concentrated on 
regulation through enforcing minimum standards. This regulation created difficulties for the 
poor in acquiring accommodation. While "private philanthropy" helped to alleviate the 
problem, the state intervened in the early 1900's in order to affect supply and control prices. 
This intervention took the form of obligations placed on local authorities in terms of housing 
provision in 1919, central government subsidies to local authorities, rent controls in 1915 
and tax relief from before World War Two.83 
808arr (1987:322). 
81 8arr (1987:17) and Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby (1987:41). 
82Barr (1987:379). 
83Barr (1987:19-20 and 379) and Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby (1937:136 and 148). 
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Evaluating the achievements and efficiency of the British welfare state cannot be done here. 
A number of statistics do, however, give an indication of the extent and importance of these 
measures. All people over 65 received retirement pensions in 1981, 52 per cent of the 
unemployed received unemployment benefits and 9.2 per cent of the population social 
assistance.""' Average benefits as a percentage of average gross earnings was 38.8 per 
cent for retirement pensions, 36.1 per cent for unemployment/sickness benefits, 36.0 per 
cent for social assistance and 12 per cent for child allowances in 1931. In 1931 total govern-
ment taxation and benefits lowered the income of the average household by about £700.85 
2.3.2 German~ 
As in the case of the United Kingdom, the current German situation represents the result of 
a slow move towards state responsibility for income maintenance and improving and protect-
ing human capital. Especially since the late 1800's the roles of public philanthropy, locally 
organized poor relief, the last vestiges of the manorial system and guilds and other self-help 
schemes were overtaken by compulsory, government regulated schemes. In the words of 
Rimlinger: "During the 1870's the balance of forces shifted decisively from self-help to state-
help". 87 For the next 1 00 years state-help became more and more the rule. The origin of 
the German welfare state is normally traced to Bismarck's social insurance legislation of the 
1880's although intervention in other fields and schemes with less e><:tensive coverage 
predate these. 88 
Currently the German system of social services provides the same universality and 
comprehensiveness as that of the United Kingdom. There are, however, important 
differences. While the UK system is primarily concerned with providing a basic minimum, 
the German system aims "to maintain the standard of living attained by the recipient during 
84Parry (1986:185). 
85Parry (1986:189). 
~'&rhis section relies ex1ensively on Alber (1936) and Kaim-Caudle (1973). 
87Rimlinger (1971 :107). 
88See Ringen (1987:29) and Van der Berg (1 988: 12). 
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his working life".89 The extent of fragmentation of the social services, the decentralization 
of administrative responsibility to autonomous statutory bodies and the greater commitment 
to the insurance principle are also in stark contrast to social service provision in the United 
Kingdom. Furthermore, in spite of being a "late industrializer", Germany was a leader in the 
provision of compulsory education and the control of education by the state, as well as 
being the innovator in providing compulsory social insurance (dating from as early as 1883). 
The country did, however lag behind other countries in introducing, for example, child 
allowances and compulsory unemployment insurance. 
The extensiveness of state provision is clearly reflected by the macro-economic indicators. 
Total public expenditure as a percentage of GDP increased from below 15 per cent in 1900 
to close to 50 per cent in 1980, while total social expenditure increased from about 5 per 
cent of GDP in 1913 to around 30 per cent in 1980.90 As Flora and Heidenheimer point out 
"social expenditure disproportionately shared in this tremendous increase" in government 
expenditure, rising from about 30 per cent of total public expenditure at the turn of the 
century to 62 per cent in 1960.91 Income maintenance expenditure comprised over 50 per 
cent of total social expenditure in 1980, health and education just under 20 per cent, housing 
about 3 per cent and benefits in kind and general social services about 8 per cent. The 
average real growth rate per annum of social e:·:penditure between 1951 and 1983 was 6.3 
per cent, while social security narrowly defined grew at 6.5 per cent per annum, state health 
expenditure at 6.9 per cent, housing at 3.5 per cent and education at 5.9 per cent. 
(a) Income support 
Old age and invalidity are catered for in Germany by autonomous bodies with representa-
tives from employers and employees under close supervision of public authorities. There 
are separate schemes for workers, employees, miners, and farmers and two schemes for 
civil servants. These are organized either on a regional or national level. Membership of 
a scheme is compulsory, except for certain groups of self-employed people who are allowed 
to join schemes operated by professional associations. Old age, invalidity and survivors' 
a
9Aiber (1980:5). 
90Aiber (1986:9, Graph 1). 
91 Fiora and Heidenheimer (1981 :49). 
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pensions are paid conditional on contributions, which are proportional to earnings and 
shared by employers and employees. The state also makes a contribution to the funds (21 
per cent in 1980), and transfers from other funds (eg. sickness and unemployment) 
accounted for about 3 per cent of receipts in 1980.92 The pension schemes aim at 
providing the main income of the beneficiary and to enable the beneficiary to maintain his 
or her standard of living after retirement. 
Insurance against occupational injury (which is very widely defined and includes among 
other things, injury while travelling to and from work) is also compulsory, administered by 
occupational associations (statutory bodies) and aim at compensation for loss of earnings 
capacity as well as providing extensive rehabilitation and health care. lt is financed by 
employers through a type of payroll tax with. contributions depending on the risk-rating of 
the industry and the merit-rating of the individual firm. 
Compulsory unemployment insurance is administered by the Federal Labour Office. lt is 
financed by earnings-related contributions from employers and employees. Benefits are paid 
for a maximum of 52 weeks and based on previous earnings up to a certain income limit. 
Unemployment assistance is available for those who do not qualify in terms of the insurance 
scheme and is financed from general revenues. Since 1969 there has been a shift away 
from cash assistance in times of unemployment towards more active labour market policy 
in the form of training, labour exchanges, counselling and subsidies for job creation. 
In addition to unemployment assistance, further social assistance is rendered through 
programmes paying cash benefits to the needy not falling under any of the insurance 
schemes and through the normal services in kind to the handicapped, the old and the 
destitute young. The latter services are coordinated by local authorities and often provided 
by subsidized private organizations. A universal child allowance is paid to all families with 
children at a flat rate per child and is the responsibility of the federal government. Benefits 
under the different insurance schemes are also adjusted in order to take into account the 
family responsibilities of recipients (number of dependents, etcetera). Income maintenance 
is paid to single parents where the responsible parent does not meet his responsibilities, and 
education allowances are paid in respect of pupils and students under certain conditions. 
92Aiber (1986:39, Table 3). 
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(b) Education 
Free education is essentially administered by the different state governments although there 
is a high level of coordination and a strong central input regarding educational policy. As 
in the UK, compulsory education and state control was a forerunner of other social 
programmes. As Alber informs us: "The principle of compulsory education was introduced 
in Prussia as early as 1717, and had become effective in all Prussian territory by 1825. The 
Prussian state had gained effective control of the education system by 1872 after fierce 
battles with the Catholic Church". 93 
(c) Health 
Health services are provided free of charge by private producers under contract with the 
nearly 2000 autonomous health insurance funds which are financed by contributions from 
members. Contributions are earnings-related implying some redistribution to families with 
children and lower income groups. 94 Contributions are fixed by the funds within limits laid 
down by the state and membership is compulsory except for non-manual employees earning 
more than a certain income. The health insurance funds also pay cash benefits in the case 
of illness but the Wage Continuation Act of 1966 placed the responsibility on the employer 
to continue the normal wage for the first six weeks of illness. Small employers must insure 
themselves against this risk. 
(d) Housing 
Three types of housing assistance are provided, namely subsidies on housing construction 
by private firms, premiums on private savings for construction and housing allowances for 
families below a certain income level. Indirect subsidies through tax credits on mortgage 
payments are also provided. 
A number of figures illustrate the extensiveness of state provision of welfare in Germany. 
In 1980 72.4 per cent of persons over 60 were receiving old age and invalidity pensions (civil 
servants excluded), 64.6 per cent of the unemployed received unemployment insurance, 3.5 
per cent of the total population received social assistance and 6 per cent of all households 
93Aiber (1986:5). 
94Kaim-Caudle (1973:315-16). 
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received housing allowances. Educational allowances were paid to 32.6 per cent of all 
students and 40.7 per cent of all secondary level pupils. 95 In line with the objective of the 
German system to provide an adequate income in order to maintain living standards, 
benefits are higher relative to average incomes than in Britain. Pensions equalled 40-4 7 per 
cent of average net earnings in 1980, unemployment payments 50 per cent, social 
assistance 29 per cent, child allowances 11 per cent, housing allowances 6 per cent, student 
benefits 27 per cent and pupil benefits 15 per cent. 96 Transfer income as a percentage of 
disposable household income increased from less than 15 per cent in 1 950 to about 27 per 
cent in 1970.97 
95Aiber (1986:46, table 6). 
96Aiber (1986:49, table 7). 
97Aiber (1986:65). 
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CHAPTER 3 
3.1 Introduction 
63 
EXPLAINING THE INCREASED ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE 
PROVISION OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
The previous chapter indicated the extent of the change in the role of the state with regard 
to social policy over the development process. In this chapter an explanation of this ten-
dency is offered. lt was argued earlier that the change could be seen as being the result 
of a reassignment of certain functions from other units of collective choice and collective 
provision (institutions such as the family and religious bodies) to the state. To explain this 
change it is not enough to provide only an explanation for the growth of the relative role of 
the state. Reasons must also be advanced why provision of these services by other 
institutions became relatively less important. In other words, some explanation must be 
provided for the changing "division of labor among families, markets, and government".1 
Many explanations have been forwarded to explain the growth of the relative role of the state 
in economies2, as well as to e:-<plain the growth of the so-called welfare state3• The studies 
of the growth of the welfare state are mostly sociological in character and share the central 
concern of this study, namely explaining the increase in the role of the state in social 
provision .. The economic literature on the growth of governments focuses on state expen-
diture more generally, and expenditure on social security is not the central object of 
explanation. The different forces identified in these two sets of literature are divided into 
supply and demand factors and critically discussed under those headings in Sections 3.3 
and 3.4. Few of the studies in these two groups focus on the growth of the state or the 
welfare state as a substitute for, or in competition with, other institutions. 
1Ben-Porath (1982:60). 
2For overviews see Andic (1981:143-149), Mucller (1989:Chaptcr 17) and Gabriel and 
Loderer (1988:269-270). 
3See Wilensky, et al. (1987:384-401). 
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An important exception, and the basis of the offered explanation, is Breton's analysis of the 
expansion of, what he called, "competitive governments".4 Breton's analysis is useful 
because it opens the door to building a theory of government supply of goods and services 
based on the assumption of consumer sovereignty and rationality. Earlier economic studies 
on the supply of government services focused more on the conflicting interests of the 
consumer of state services and the agents responsible for state provision, such as 
bureaucrats and pressure groups, and the ability of these suppliers to manipulate and 
misrepresent demand for these goods and services. Other studies are dominated by an 
analysis of demand factors in explaining government growth. This is also true of most of 
the sociological approaches which focus either on rising income levels or changing tastes 
and needs for services providing social security. 
In addition to the recent study by Breton, two other sets of studies underlie this approach 
to explaining government growth. One of these is represented in the recent compilation by 
Ahmad, et al. on social security in developing countries.5 A number of studies in that 
volume give attention to the similarity of the objectives of traditional and more modern social 
security systems and the implications of the interaction between these types of systems for 
the provision of social security in developing countries. Lastly, it will be seen, the explana-
tion relies on North's analysis of the impact of the process of industrialization on relative 
prices and the viability of different institutions. 6 
The explanation offered is an economic explanation in the sense that it traces the growth of 
government provision to changing supply and demand conditions in the "market"7 for 
services providing social security. Such an economic explanation is not only useful as a 
description (for "understanding"), but can also serve as an aid in evaluating change, that is 
saying whether it is, economically speaking, a "good thing" or a "bad thing". If it is said that 
current provision of social security can be related to the state of supply and demand, it 
4Breton (1989). 
5Ahmad, et al. (1991). 
6See North (1981) and (1985). 
7Becker (1981 :ix) distinguishes between "implicit" and "e:·:plicit" markets. Here we are dealing 
with "implicit" markets. 
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implies that the outcome represents the preferences of and constraints on consumers and 
the current state of technology (and thus the production function) and costs. An outcome 
consistent with these "objective" or "market" conditions then reflects the best that we can do 
under the circumstances. In other words, if the present role of government is compatible 
or in line with changing demand and supply forces, the economist, as "guardian of 
rationality"8, can give such an arrangement for the provision of social security a stamp of 
approval. A crucial assumption, on which more will be said in the following section, is of 
course that demand does reflect individual choice and that supply does reflect the state of 
knowledge and prices, or in other words that the "market" works well. 
A short synopsis of the argument will be given to complete this introduction. The second 
section notes and justifies some of the assumptions behind the economic analysis of 
markets. Some reasons for following this distinctive economic route to explanation and 
evaluation are also given. The third section sketches the major economic and structural 
changes thought to be responsible for the transformation of provision. Sections four and 
five analyze in more detail how these changes could be expected to affect respectively the 
demand for and supply of services providing social security and how these changes can, 
consequently, be used to e:~plain changing methods of provision. The last section spells 
out some implications of this analysis. The issues of affordability, timing, necessity and likeli-
hood of growing government provision of social security in developing countries are 
discussed. 
The basis of the argument is that as countries pass through the semi-industrialized phase 
of development they experience, among other things, increased specialization, rapid indus-
trialization and urbanisation. These, and other structural changes associated with economic 
development, engender changed social and economic conditions with numerous effects on 
the objective of social security. There will, firstly, be a need for new or different protective 
measures against different ("new") contingencies (for example industrial accidents and 
unemployment) as well as a need for "new" measures to promote social security (different 
education and health services). There might thus be a changed demand (or at least need) 
for services providing social security. The supply side will also be affected because the 
structural changes influence the cost of production and efficiency of organizations which can 
~e phrase is that of Kenneth Arrow, quoted by Meier(1984:4). 
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provide social security. More specifically, changing opportunity costs and relative prices will 
affect the comparative advantage of institutions involved in providing social security. 
The argument offered emphasises supply factors as an explanation of the growth of 
government provision of social security. Although development does affect the nature and 
extent of demand, changing demand does not specifically e:~plain government provision to 
satisfy that need. As regards supply it is argued that governments as sources of supply 
over time replace other institutions because they can produce these services at the lowest 
cost. This cost advantage results mostly from considering a wider range of costs than is 
ordinarily done. 
The continued diversity of welfare provision in comparable countries is attributed to the fact 
that the exact effect of the changing economic structure (objective conditions) is determined 
by the specific social, political and institutional structure by which it is confronted and thus 
"filtered". Ideology and norms are part of this "superstructure" which ensures variety. 
If increased state provision is then in line with individual preferences expressed through the 
collective choice process, as well as supply conditions, it can be seen as a rational and 
welfare-enhancing response to certain changing economic conditions. lt follows that 
expansion of state provision of social security might not affect growth negatively and that the 
redistribution resulting from state provision cannot be seen as detracting from efficiency. 
3.2 Motivating the use of the economic analysis of markets 
The economic analysis of markets9 entails a visualization and explanation of outcomes as 
the results of the rational choice of economic actors between a set of alternatives. This 
analysis was originally developed in the context of market exchange but has been extended 
to the analysis of political outcomes 10, and also to the analysis of allocation by other 
9Many would just refer to "the economic approach" or "economic analysis". Economics 
does, however, in its core areas contain more than the analysis of the interaction of human 
beings as if through markets. 
10See Mueller (1989:1-6) for an overview of the origin of the field of "public choice". 
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institutions, such as the family11 • As Seeker has e:·~plained, the core of such an approach 
to phenomena is "the assumptions of maximizing behavior, stable preferences, and equi-
librium in explicit or implicit markets". 12 
The outcome, that is the quantity of goods and services exchanged, reflects choices of 
individuals (demand) and the current state of the production function and costs of 
production (supply). The choices of individuals, it is assumed, reflect their preferences and 
constraints, with constraints resulting from limited income of people and the positive prices 
of goods. Underlying this analysis, and especially its usage as a predictive tool, is the 
behavioural assumption that individuals act rationally, that is, they will consistently choose 
in line with their objective. This objective is normally assumed to be self-interest, which 
translates into the behavioural assumptions of utility ma:·:imization in the case of consumers, 
and profit maximization in the case of producers. 
In terms of explanation, changing prices and quantities can then be explained as the result 
of either changed preferences, changed constraints (prices and incomes), changed 
technology (affecting the production function) or changed opportunity costs of production. 
In terms of evaluation the market outcome is viewed as representing an efficient outcome 
as it provides the best outcome given the constraints. 
Explaining and evaluating political outcomes, or outcomes of collective choice, in terms of 
the economic analysis of markets necessitates certain assumptions. The first necessary 
assumption is the one which Sreton stressed, namely that "goods are goods and services 
are services".13 This implies that goods and services produced by the state can also be 
provided by other institutions and that different suppliers, including the state, compete for 
the custom of consumers. People thus choose between different suppliers and are not 
11Gary Seeker has been the most prominent name in this field, which is sometimes referred 
to as the "new household economics". See Sen-Porath (1982) for a selective description 
and evaluation of the "research programme". 
12Secker (1981 :ix). Another formulation on the same page which gives a slightly different 
perspective is when he argues that "(t)he economic approach ... assumes that individuals 
maximize their utility from basic preferences that do not change rapidly over time, and that 
the behavior of different individuals is coordinated by e:<plicit and implicit markets". 
13Breton (1989:720-721). See the discussion in Chapter 2.2 of this study. 
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coerced to use government services, or the coercion involved is not significantly more 
serious than in the case of other avenues of provision.14 A second necessary assumption 
is that political mechanisms (voting, representation, etcetera) accurately communicate or 
reflect the demand for goods and services in the absence of choice through the market 
mechanism.15 Instead of a sacrifice of purchasing power reflecting demand, as in the 
analysis of markets, voting and entry and exit of citizens reveal preferences and demand. 
Tax liability and other costs of purchasing from the state entail "pseudo-prices".16 
Accepting these two assumptions leads to a clear view of government provision as an 
alternative to provision by business firms (the marh:et) and other social groupings. Instead 
of viewing the state as analogous to a person maximizing an objective function, it is seen 
as "a sort of analogue to the market".17 In what has been described as a "contractarian 
approach to public choice"18, the state is seen "as an institution through which individuals 
interact for their mutual benefit" or "as a quid pro quo process of exchange among citi-
zens" .19 The relationship between citizens, family members, and members of other "clubs", 
"takes the form of 'as if' market transactions at implicit prices".20 
An important corollary of the approach is that collective outcomes can be related to 
individual actions. In general terms a relationship is postulated "between the objectives of 
social policy and the preferences and aspirations of members of the society".21 More 
specifically, "public policies are seen, ideally, as a choice on the part of the citizenry".22 
Such a point of departure has attractive implications which are summarized well by Ringen: 
14Breton (1989:722-723). 
15See Breton (1989:721-725). 
16Breton (1989:726). 
17Mueller (1989:3). 
18Mueller (1989:6). 
19Mueller (1989:5-6). 
20Sen (1984:372). 
21 Sen (1970:1). 
22Ringen (1987:262). 
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"[The approach] is faithful to the ideal of democratic politics, it has its basis in the 
principle of methodological individualism and thus avoids the fallacies of functional 
and related approaches, it squares with the notion that society is created by people 
and that people are active subjects and not mere passive objects and it relieves us 
from having to start from any stated or tacit assumption of conspiracy or power 
abuse behind political failure. "23 
This does not imply that the system of collective choice is perfect and that nothing will ever 
go wrong. lt does, however, provide us with some criteria for the working of political 
institutions and a guide to finding breakdowns.24 
The (implicit) approach taken here is consequently to look at how changing circumstances 
could have been expected to affect the demand and supply for services providing social 
security, with special reference to the various sources of supply. lt is assumed that the 
preferences of consumers count and that all institutions compete as providers. The 
"prediction" is then compared to the actual outcome which was, it has been argued in 
Chapter 2, the growing state provision of social security, in part to replace the contributions 
of other institutions. The fact that the actual outcome is consistent with the expected 
(implicit) market outcome is seen as indicating that this outcome is rational, in the sense that 
it makes efficient use of scarce resources. 
Efficiency can be understood in the normal sense of Pareto-efficiency, which pertains to a 
situation where it is impossible (in consumption) to improve the well-being of one person 
without harming the well-being of someone else. Used as a criterion of social welfare (which 
is done implicitly), efficiency in the Pareto-sense is of course problematical. This follows 
from the fact that the criterion cannot be used to rank all alternative states because it breaks 
down when evaluating a change which would provide gains for some and losses for others. 
lt can thus not deal with situations where redistribution is implied because that would imply 
23Ringen (1987:263). 
24Ringen (1987:262-263). The case is similar to the analysis of markets in terms of the 
model of perfect competition. Although some of the assumptions are extreme simplifica-
tions, the approach is vindicated by the descriptive, explanatory and predictive gains as well 
as from being able to compare the real to some sort of "ideal". 
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interpersonal comparisons of utility. An allocation which is totally unacceptable redistribu-
tionally might thus still be classified as Pareto-optimal because moving to an alternative 
situation might affect the very rich slightly negatively. 
The criterion thus implies that change should take place ("be approved") only when people 
are unanimous about the change, or when "conflict or the benefit of one party at the 
expense of another is absent". 25 Although it is thus uncontroversial as a criterion of 
improvement, it is also informationally silent in the most interesting cases where conflict 
exists. In concentrating on efficiency, other values and objectives which can also be seen 
as fundamental to well-being and the welfare state are excluded from consideration. 26 
Pareto-efficiency can then be seen as a necessary condition for an optimum but not as 
sufficient. 27 
The fact that efficiency is not a sufficient criterion for evaluating changes in well-being does 
not make it a useless criterion for this analysis. Various reasons related to efficiency which 
can be found for state provision of social security will be explored. The motivation for this 
inquiry is that the negative effect of social provision on efficiency and total output is one of 
the critical criticisms of such provision, especially in the context of developing countries. 
Ignoring other goals and values does not mean that they are not important; only that state 
welfare provision is analyzed in terms of that criterion which is assumed to be its weakest 
aspect. 
3.3 Changes associated with economic development 
The growth of government provision of social security is here associated with the process 
of economic development and especially that phase which is sometimes described as the 
Industrial Revolution. With reference to the contemporary experience, it is seen as being 
exhibited by semi-industrialized or middle-income countries. This refers then to a process 
that became visible in Great Britain and Europe during the late eighteenth century and its 
25Boulding (1952:18). 
26See Helm (1989:36-37 and 40-42). 
27Sen (1973:204) and Boulding (1952:12). 
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extension to almost all countries in the nineteenth and especially the twentieth century. lt 
has also been described as the "epoch of modern economic growth"28 or with reference 
to the nineteenth century, the "second economic revolution"29• 
These terms are all admittedly imprecise and much has been written on the uses and 
abuses of the concept. 31) One description of the process is as a "phase during which the 
economy 'grew up' as a result of advances in manufacturing techniques powerful enough 
to raise the productivity of whole industries. These industries made up a modern sector of 
the economy which achieved increasing returns and expanded faster than the traditional 
sector, ultimately at its expense, although traditional manufacturing was itself not exempt 
from change and went on expanding for some time. "31 In spite of the broadness of the 
concept we can identify a number of related processes and effects with relevance for the 
provision of social services by the state. Due to the interrelatedness of the processes any 
categorization must be unsatisfactory in one or other respect. 
Building on the analysis by North in his recent analyses of the growth of government in the 
United States, six interrelated processes can be identified. 32 These processes are 
industrialization; 
increased specialization and division of labour; 
population growth, increased mobility of the population and accelerated 
urbanisation; 
reduced transport costs and the increased availability of information; and 
the process of secularization and an accelerated rate of societal change. 
2~Kuznets (1973:247-248). 
29North (1981: Chapter 13 and 1985:388) . 
. l')For a discussion of some of the problems related to the concept see Jones (1988: Chapter 
One). 
31Jones (1988:14) presenting Mokyr's view. 
32North (1985) and the more detailed discussion in North (1981 :Chapter 13). 
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North relates these processes to the "revolutionary technological change of the nineteenth 
century".:n This technological change encompassed the development of "automated 
machinery . . . in production, the creation of n~Sw sources of energy" and improved abilities 
"to transform matter into useable materials and energy". 34 Because of the capital intensity 
and indivisible nature of these new technologies, they gave rise to an economy character-
ized by "large scale continuous production and distribution".35 
This process of industrialization was associated with a relative decline in the importance of 
agricultural production, and later of the manufacturing sector relative to the service sector. 36 
Along with these sectoral sl1ifts came increased productivity reflected in rising levels of per 
capita income37, which can be traced partly to increasing specialization and division of 
labour. 
The processes associated with industrialization (as listed above) can be seen as having 
numerous effects impacting on the provision of social security. These influences can be 
expected to affect the demand for social security as a result of rising incomes, an increased 
dependence on markets (especially wage labour) and increasing transaction costs of 
exchanges (as a result of increased specialization and division of labour). Skill requirements 
also change significantly. The dislocation of social ties and traditional rights will also lead 
to the disintegration of traditional safety nets. In addition the growth of diverse interest 
groups as a result of the specialized occupational and other groupings might bring effective 
pressure to bear on authorities to cater for some of their needs. The clustering of people 
in urban settlements and the increased interaction and interdependence might create new 
interdependencies and risks such as the easier spread of infectious diseases and the need 
for proper systems of sanitation. 
33Especially North (1985:388 and 392). 
34North (1981 :173-174). 
35North (1985:388). 
36Kuznets (1973:248-249). 
37Kuznets (1973:248). 
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With regard to supply, there were falling costs of production in most spheres as a result of 
specialization and division of labour made possible by large-scale production. This was 
accompanied by rising transaction costs as a result of the increasing complexity of 
economic exchange and its impersonal nature. 38 This affected the opportunity cost of 
production of goods and services by different institutions significantly. Also on the supply 
side the increased commercialization as well as the formalization (and recording) of business 
transactions and increased use of systems of accounting made the monitoring and taxing 
of firms easier. 39 The spread of markets and modern methods of production also provided 
certain goods at lower prices than households could produce them. In this way households 
and other intermediate institutions as suppliers were pushed out of the market for insurance, 
education and health. 
In the next two sections the effect of these changes on the provision of social security by 
the state is analyzed. 
3.4 Factors affecting the demand for services providing social security 
3.4.1 Rising income and the demand for government provision of social security 
The level of economic development of a country, measured in terms of per capita income 
or some other measure of affluence or wealth, is often advanced as the "root cause" of state 
provision of social security. 40 This argument finds its most extreme expression in the 
hypothesis of convergence, which implies that the social provision in countries with widely 
differing political and social structures will become more alike as they approach the same 
levels of economic development. 41 Normally the explanations offered are, however, more 
subtle than this, as the correlates of economic growth, such as democratisation and the 
development of a more efficient bureaucracy, are also mentioned. There does, on the other 
hand, seem to be a pervading consensus that rising levels of production and income 
38North (1985:389). 
~see Breton (1989:734 and 738). 
111Aiber, et. al. (1987:459), Wilensky, et. al. (1987:384-387) and Al1aroni (1977:58-59). 
41 See Wilensky, et. al. (1987:387-389). 
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produce an "economic surplus"42, which is partly allocated to state production and 
provision of services providing social security. This "surplus" is then used to explain the 
growth of state welfare provision. This view of the growth of state welfare provision is 
important in that it underlies the widely held view that developing countries cannot afford the 
rapid expansion of state welfare provision. In essence then the explanation can be 
rephrased in the following way: Industrialization and the resulting productivity gains lead to 
rising levels of per capita income, pushing outwards the budget constraint of individuals and 
leading them to buy more social security services, which are presumed to be a luxury 
good. 43 
The positive relationship between increasing per capita income and the relative size of 
government expenditures (that is, not only on social services) has been formalized as 
Wagner's Law. This "law" has been interpreted by Van der Berg "as implying an income 
(per capita) elasticity for public spending per capita of more than one".44 Wagner explained 
this tendency as resulting from the fact that, firstly, a substantial number of public goods 
are luxuries and, secondly, that economic development will be associated with increased 
market failure necessitating state intervention. 45 
What is of concern here is the first argument, namely that government services are luxury 
goods and therefore only become affordable at higher levels of development. The 
postulated positive relationship between per capita income and relative government share 
seems to be broadly validated by time-series and cross-section evidence of experience over 
the last 1 00 years. 46 Formal econometric testing with income growth as one of the 
explanatory values has, however, failed to measure an income elasticity of demand for 
government expenditure of more than one. This implies the absence of an income effect 
42Fiora (1986:XVI). 
43See, for example Aharoni (1977:61). 
44Van der Berg (1989d:3). For a more detailed treatment see Bird (1971). 
45Bird (1971 :4). 
46See, for example the time-series and cross-section evidence in World Bank (1983:44, Table 
2.1 and 46, Table 2.2) and Chapter 3 above. 
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on government expenditure as a percentage of total production.47 Although there are 
severe problems with the econometric measurement, Mueller concludes that "increasing 
personal income" cannot "account for much of the relative increase in government size". 48 
Viewing income growth as an important cause of government social expenditure growth can 
also be questioned on theoretical grounds. Firstly, the statement that services providing 
social security are luxury goods is difficult to accept. All reasonably stable societies have 
systems of provision aimed at coping with destitution and to deal with vulnerability as a 
result of relevant contingencies. Elaborate systems of income insurance and other safety 
nets have been observed in what can be called "traditional societies" and it has been 
remarked that "barring exceptionally unfavourable circumstances, traditional methods for 
controlling the risk of falling into distress have usually enabled the people to counter natural 
and other hazards in a rather effective way". 49 lt could even be argued that because of the 
generally lower standard of living in traditional societies the increased vulnerability and "fear 
of dearth"50 might lead to the establishment and upkeep of safety nets being a priority, and 
definitely not a luxury. People in these societies might then be prepared to sacrifice more 
(a greater share of total income) in order to maintain these support structures. This is one 
way of explaining the survival of many of these protective institutions of traditional societies 
in spite of their clearly high costs. 51 
lt can furthermore be argued that, even if some types of social provision can be seen as 
luxuries, income growth will affect the demand for all normal goods and luxury goods. The 
demand for the products of both the private and the public sector will thus be stimulated. 
47Borcherding (1985:365-366) and Mueller (1989:324-325). For a South African estimate and 
some of the difficulties involved in measuring this elasticity see Abedian and Standish 
(1984:399-403). 
48Mueller (1989:324). 
49Piatteau (1991: 156). See the rest of the article for examples of traditional systems of social 
security. 
50Scott (1975:vii). 
51 See Platteau (1991: 159-161) for a discussion of some of these costs. He refers specifically 
to the costs associated with patronage relationships and the effect of the insurance systems 
on capital accumulation and initiative. 
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For income change to be able to explain increased state provision a further assumption is 
needed. The needed assumption is that certain goods can only (or mainly) be provided by 
governments, and that the demand for these goods provided by governments grew faster 
than that for other "luxury goods". This would go against a central assumption, defended 
above, that "goods are goods". Using income growth as explanatory variable thus assumes 
not only that supply will respond to demand but also that the supply response will have to 
come from government. As Breton argues, Wagner's Law" ... is a victim avant la lettre of 
the welfare economics mentality which ascribe functions or responsibilities to the state on 
a priori grounds and as such assumes, at least in part, what has to be demonstrated". 52 
Without a theory of supply of services providing social security to explain the specific way 
in which the increased demand was met, income growth as an explanatory variable does 
not take us much further. 
3.4.2 The Industrial revolution and changing needs and preferences 
Rising demand for government services and for state provision engendered by changing 
needs and preferences associated with economic growth might have had an effect on state 
provision. What is the concern here are the changes resulting from increased indus-
trialization. Two trends closely associated with industrialization are increased specialization 
and division of labour and urbanization. While increased industrial production might have 
increased the vulnerability to industrial accidents and occupational injuries53, specialization 
and division of labour was associated with an increased predominance of the wage labour 
relationship as the method of employment. This implies the increased dependence of a 
worker on the ability to work in a demanding environment and on the ability to sell his labour 
power. In addition to this dependence on the labour market", the general spread of 
markets and the geographical reach of markets made people more vulnerable to market 
conditions and business cycles55• This was partly as a result of the decreasing costs of 
528reton (1989:724). 
53Van der Berg (1988:5). 
~see Dreze and Sen (1989:5-6) for a discussion. 
5SVan der Berg (1988:5). 
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transport and information. 56 lt could be construed that these changes and increased 
dependencies led to an increasing need for insurance against industrial accidents, disability 
and unemployment. 
Alternatives to state provision of such insurance (substitutes) might also have been on the 
decrease. This would have been the effect of the dissolution and replacement by markets 
and industrial production, of old paternalist, feudal and guild relationships and the increased 
mobility of the population. 57 
All kinds of traditional methods of social provision would come under pressure from the 
spread of markets and industrialization. Breton argued that increased mobility will dislocate 
social relationships. 513 Platteau described the outline and complexity of this change as 
follows: 
''The problem is essentially that by opening up new and varied avenues for 
social and economic mobility, the growth of the market tends to encourage the 
overt expression of (perhaps latent) individualistic propensities among the 
people, to dissolve old cooperative ties and to disentangle the individual's 
interest from those of the social group. Deeper and deeper penetration of 
market values has the effect of loosening the web of traditional social relation-
ships: people become more and more free of group pressure to conform and 
less and less concerned about the well-being of the extended family or social 
group."59 
As a result of this dearth of substitutes for state provision of security it would also be 
reasonable to expect increased demand for state provision. 
56North (1985:389). 
57Van der Berg (1988:5). 
58Breton (1989:734). 
59Piatteau (1991 :158-159). 
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The increased clustering of people around industries, that is urbanisation, could further have 
affected the demand for state provision of a whole range of services related to social secur-
ity. As Mueller remarks, "[t]he very definition of public goods and externalities connote 
geographic proximity".130 Examples are water provision, sanitation and other aspects of 
public health, which are all goods and services with significant external consumption effects 
(externalities) or goods which are normally viewed as public goods. 
Once again there has been little empirical support for these variables in the empirical testing 
of the likely factors leading to government e:o(penditure growth while Mueller further 
concludes that "[n]o other taste variable has garnered both compelling a priori and empirical 
support". 61 
In addition to the inconclusiveness of empirical testing a number of factors must be kept in 
mind. While the sources of vulnerability and destitution might change over time, it is once 
again difficult to compare the exact extent of difference in risk of destitution and to decide 
whether industrialization has exposed people to more risks. Variability of income under 
alternative systems and the difference in degree of risk of destitution need not be much 
higher in an industrial society than in traditional societies. In fact it was argued in the 
previous section that the acceptance of the high cost of social security provision in 
traditional societies might be an indication of the vulnerability to risk. 
With regard to dealing with the externalities associated with urb~nisation, it must again be 
pointed out that the removal of externalities can be viewed as a service, and that more than 
increased demand is necessary to explain government provision. A wide range of 
mechanisms exist to deal with externalities, for example clubs, negotiation between affected 
individuals and a clear specification of property rights. 62 These avenues do not imply a role 
for the state in the actual production of goods and services but rather in providing a 
framework for decentralized interaction. This role does not have to entail a dramatic effect 
on the relative size of government. 
60Mueller (1989:324). 
61 Mueller (1989:324). 
62See Chapter 1 above. 
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The observation that the number of substitutes for government action might decline as a 
result of economic development is probably true. This will be argued in the next section. 
Increased market provision (by firms) of goods and services can, however, also provide 
some of these needs and will then work against the growth of the relative role of the state. 
Whatever the exact balance is, it is clear that at this point a theory of supply and cost of 
production of the different institutions becomes necessary in order to explain the declining 
ability of some institutions to provide security and the increasing comparative advantage of 
other institutions. 
3.4.3 Democratisation, pressure groups and rent-seeking 
Another possible, and very popular, demand-side hypothesis is that the growth of special 
interest groups looking for redistributive favours and the alleviation of externalities and 
provision of public goods can help to e:<plain the more than proportional expansion of 
government. The possibility of increased effective interest group activity as a result of 
economic development has been explained in numerous ways. Van der Berg has ascribed 
it to the growing political influence ("shifts in political power"), possibly as a result of enfran-
chisement or urbanization of earlier marginal groups63• Olson has ascribed the growth of 
interest group activities to the "stable economic and political environment in western 
developed countries since World War 11". 64 
North maintains that one of the effects of economic change since the late 19th century has, 
as a result of increased specialization and division of labour, been a multiplication of the 
"number of potential special interest groups by increasing the specificity of the issues around 
which they could organize. At the same time, the decreasing cost of communication made 
the organization and maintenance of special interest groups much less costly than 
before."65 
63Van der Berg (1989d:10). 
64 Discussed in Mueller (1989:337). 
65North (1985:391). 
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In line with previous argumentation, increased interest group action could, however, also 
have been addressed to other institutions or the supply of public goods and the elimination 
of externalities by these groups themselves66• Again additional reasons are needed why 
specifically government expenditure on social security would rise. Mueller partially explains 
this by arguing that the ability to use the state to resolve a large number of problems related 
to externalities and public goods leads to a saving of transaction costs. In other words, the 
state specializes in dealing with these types of problems. As a result the normal benefits of 
specialization result.67 This point, however, leads to the domain of production costs and 
the determinants of supply, which will be discussed later. 
lt is thus possible to find intuitively acceptable reasons for the growth in demand for social 
services. These demand factors do not explain, however, the fact that the increased 
demand was met by state provision. Increased demand, ceteris paribus, is thus an 
inadequate explanation of increased state provision of social services. 68 Using demand fac-
tors as an explanation relies on the notion that certain activities can only be provided by 
government. The argument thus goes against the valid assumption that "goods are goods" 
and its implications. 
In what follows, the emphasis is on the factors determining the source of supply of services 
providing social security. If it is found that there was indeed a relative growth in the demand 
for social services, an explanation of the changing sources of supply will still be needed. 
ssn,e same goes for income redistribution. 
67Mueller (1989:34-35 and 335-336). 
68 An application to the field of private goods might perhaps help to decide whether the 
argument is spurious or not. An increased level of sales of Toyota motor cars can possibly 
be explained with reference to an increased demand for motor cars as a result of increased 
consumer income, or some other demand factor. The correctness of such an inference 
would have to be ascertained by looking at the sales of other makes of motor cars. If sales 
of other makes did not increase or increased by a smaller percentage, then the first 
explanation, although superficially in line with the "facts", would exclude very important 
information about the fa.gtors responsible for increased Toyota sales. The reasonableness 
of this argument would seem to indicate that once the principle that goods are goods is 
conceded (that is that governments compete with other suppliers), the necessity of looking 
at the supply factors becomes clear. 
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Any motivation relying on changes in the demand sphere still has to ezplain why govern-
ments can provide a specific good at the lowest price. In the words of Breton: 
even if a genuine demand for public goods and the abatement of negative 
externalities exists, nothing can be presumed about the behaviour of public 
provision and public expenditures without analysing supply. Public goods and 
services, like market goods and services, are 'produced' and supplied and it 
is just as unacceptable to disregard the forces that govern that production and 
supply as it would be to jettison those forces when one is analysing the growth 
of economies. "69 
3.5 Factors Determining the Source of Supply 
The purpose of this section is to argue that increased state provision of social security can 
be related to changing supply conditions in a situation of stable demand for such services. 
The growth of social security provision by the state and the dominant role of the state can 
thus be referred to as a rational adjustment to changing economic conditions. 
3.5.1 The bureaucracy /fiscal illusion approach 
Before continuing it is necessary to deal with an argument which leads to an interpretation 
of increased government intervention as having little relationship to the preferences of 
consumers. An influential explanation of the. growth of government expenditure and state 
welfare is that it represents the preferences and choices of bureaucrats maximizing their own 
utility functions, rather than those of the citizen-consumers which they are supposed to 
serve. This situation can arise because these actors (agents) are inadequately constrained 
as a result of the absence of marl\et discipline, and because of their ability to hide the costs 
of their actions from the client-citizen. The notions of bureaucratic power (an imperfectly 
constrained bureaucracy) and fiscal illusion (deception about the true cost of supply) are the 
698reton (1989:718). 
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most prominent supply-side e:·:planations of the growth of government in the public choice 
tradition.70 
The argument is that bureaucrats strive for an expansion of the size of their bureau in order 
to increase remuneration, power and status. In the words of Weaver, "the government is 
comprised of self-interested politicians and bureaucrats who participate actively in the 
collective choice process, possess significant discretionary power, and affect political 
outcomes to advance their own ends".71 Whereas the usefulness of such expansion will 
be judged by the markets and profit history in the case of a private firm, there are apparently 
few checks on the social value of the output of the bureaucracy. The persistence of such 
a situation is made possible, it is argued, by the fact that the complexity of the tax system 
makes it difficult for citizens to perceive the cost of the expansion of the bureaucracy and 
therefore to act against it through the voting system. Increasing public output can then be 
seen as a result of the "slackening of the reins of government in citizens' hands".72 
lt is difficult to reconcile this approach with the behavioural assumptions of the public choice 
approach and its roots in neo-classical microeconomics. The assumed absence of 
constraints on the self-interested behaviour of civil servants disregards a basic premise of 
the public choice approach which postulates "a behavioral 'connection' or bridge between 
the cost and benefits of public policy".73 In essence this approach argues that bureaucrats 
can ride roughshod over the choices of citizens because of their monopoly power, control 
of information and their ability to hide the true cost of services (fiscal illusion). The 
bureaucracy /fiscal illusion approach leads to a "state-rules-citizen view"74 or a '"non-
democratic' conception of government"75• Such an approach must, when taken to its 
logical consequences, lead to a disregard ot" the link between price and consumer choice 
70See Mueller (1989:337-343) and Borcherding (1985:372-374). 
71Weaver (1982:7). 
72Mueller (1989:347). 
73Breton (1 989:739). 
74Mueller (1989:344). 
75Weaver (1982:7). 
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which is a cornerstone of the economic approach to politics. lt further implies a complete 
neglect of the preferences of clients in the analysis of outcomes. Such a disregard is of 
course contrary to the starting-point and spirit of neo-classical economic analysis. 
As an alternative, it can be argued that the existence of alternative supply sources forces 
bureaucrats to compete. If their utility functions become the determinant in production they 
will simply "price themselves out of the market". As something similar to a monopolist in the 
market, government may have some market or coercive power which allows it to take 
monopoly rents, but the existence of monopolies does not imply that there are no 
constraints on monopolists or that consumer demand becomes irrelevant. In this regard two 
arguments may be advanced. 76 The first is that of Breton which holds that governments 
are not the only institutions which coerce. 77 Coercion takes place whenever people get 
less, or something different, than what they actually thought they purchased. Such 
disappointment with private goods and services is a fairly widespread phenomenon. 78 
Secondly, we can expand North's argument that "the state is constrained by the opportunity 
cost of its constituents, since there always e:-:ist potential rivals [substitute producers] to 
provide the same set of services". 79 Wtlereas he refers to rival "states" and other "potential 
rulers" in the country, the existence and practise of alternative supply sources of the services 
which governments provide illustrate the existence of competition. 80 
In the light of the argumentation above, it is clear that the focus on bureaucracy cannot on 
its own explain the changing supply. This approach is, however, not completely irrelevant. 
lt is clear that the nature of political institutions may lead to a less than perfect control over 
agents (bureaucrats) by principals (voters and legislators).81 This incomplete control can 
76See also the surveys of evidence by Borcherding (1985:372- 374) and Mueller (1989:337-
343) for a discussion of the inconclusive empirical evidence. 
77Breton (1989:723). 
78See also Hirschman (1982: Chapter 1) for a discussion of the importance of "disappoint-
ment" in affecting consumer behaviour. 
79North (1984:36). 
80See also Breton (1989:729-730) for a similar argument. 
81 North (1985:393). 
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be built into a model of supply determination in a number of ways. t~orth has done this by 
distinguishing between fundamental factors underlying the growth of government and 
secondary factors which affect the "timing and pace of growth".82• The fundamental 
factors, or the factors determining the basic direction of change, he identified as changing 
relative prices and the effect thereof on the viability of institutions. The secondary factor is 
the specific political framework within which decision are reached, such as the specific type 
of democracy or the control system over bureaucrats. lt can thus be argued that in an 
explanation of the growth of government in the social sphere there are certain fundamental 
factors which explain the general increasing role of the state. Certain other factors, however, 
explain the diversity across countries in terms of the timing of introduction of services, the 
selectivity of benefits, the level of benefits and the specific b:llance between state and private 
provision. These specific charactsristics can be traced to the specific political institutions 
in a country and, among other things, how the3e affect the discretion of supplier 
bureaucrats. 
3.5.2 Changing comparative advantage and greater supply of government services 
providing social security 
In response to ~Jorth's argument that the increased specialization and division of labour 
associated with the "second economic revolution" led to an increased demand for services 
earlier provided by household and other institutions, Breton argues that the mentioned 
changes should rather be interpreted as having affected the cost of production of different 
institutions differently and resulting in a comparative advantage for government provision. 83 
At other points North can be interpreted as agreeing with Breton. In one place he argues 
that "the growth of government is a function of [among other things] ... the inability of 
voluntary organizations to completely meet the new needs of the family and of economic 
organizations".84 Further on it is held that "a fundamental change in relative prices resulted 
in profound economic and political reorganization by changing the economic viability of 
s:!North (1985:397 and 392). 
133Breton (1989:743) and North (1985:388). 
84North (1985:392). 
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existing institutions".85 lt is the contention that these same forces and related processes 
can also explain the observed increases in state provision of services providing social 
security, as defined here. 
Both Breton and North provide ample justification for their views. Motivation for the support 
of this argument is provided by summarizing the main components of shifting comparative 
advantage outlined by Breton and North and by looh:ing at the changing position of the 
family in "welfare production". Some remarh:s will also be made about poor relief and 
income support. Because of the paucity of statistics on the value of services and transfers 
of less formal institutions it is difficult to advance definite empirical information to support the 
argument. Such evidence as is available, however, seems to support the contention. An 
interesting future challenge is the construction of a databa::;e to elucidate these matters 
further.86 
3.5.3 The main components of the shifting comparative advantage of institutions 
North argues that the changing viability of institutions can be related to changing relative 
prices and costs. These changes are traceable to aspects of the "second economic 
revolution". He identifies a number of general trencls.87 Firstly, manufacturing in the large-
scale processes associated with industriali=ation would generally lead to lowering unit costs 
of production. As this large-scale production entails specialization, both within and between 
firms, transaction costs/.18 would, however, increase. This increase is the result of the need 
to coordinate and integrate "increasingly complex production and distribution processes". 
In this regard he stresses the increased cost of "monitoring and metering performance" as 
a result of the replacement of "personal e:-~change" by "impersonal e:,change". 89 
85North (1985:397). 
815See Section 3.3 above. 
87North (1985:391-392). 
I.U3He defines transaction costs as "the costs associated with capturing the gains from trade, 
including the costs of specifying and enforcing contracts". (1985:339). 
89North (1985:389). 
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Other costs such as the cost of transportation and information also decline and, with the 
lowering production costs, l5ad to an expansion of markets and the ability to buy things 
much cheaper on markets than from institutions that previously provided them. This factor 
can also lead to increased vulnerability to changing circumstances in markets. The 
increasing availability of employment for women in the service sector, as well as the low cost 
of market production, increased the opportunity cost of home production. The lowering cost 
of maintaining special interest groups (cost of communication and information) also lowered 
the price of obtaining services in this way. 
A last factor which North mentions is "the enhanced ability of governments to e>-tract 
resources from the populace". 90 This lower cost of taxation came about as a result of the 
ability to force many of the administration costs onto firms and the alleged greater efficiency 
of indirect taxation, compared to income and wealth ta;.~es. 
These changes then worked against the viability of certain institutions, especially those 
providing a wide range of goods and services. The family is one example of such an 
institution. Supply changed from such institutions showing a lack of specialization towards 
increased provision by the state and firms. North uses certain types of market failures, such 
as adverse selection and moral ha::srd, to explain why the state, and not market provision, 
stepped into the space left by the demise of other institutions. 91 
The most important component of North's analysis is his view of the role of transaction 
costs. Although it is costly to value or measure the goods and services involved in a 
transaction (e.g. the amount of labour provided, the quality of lectures or publications, the 
grade of corn), it is necessary to monitor these. The necessity for monitoring flows from the 
fact that self-interested individuals c&n gain from giving less than specified in the contract. 
There is an incentive to shirk on the terms of a contract in order to maximize utility and 
profit, or to minimize disutility and losses. Measurement and monitoring would also be 
useless in stopping opportunistic behaviour without the existence of enforcement 
mechanisms which can be applied given non-compliance with specifications. 
90North (1985:391 ). 
91 North (1985:392). 
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Because of the costliness of measuring and enforcing contracts, methods can be and have 
been followed to economize on these costs. One option is to specialize by identity, as Ben-
Porath has called it. In other words, transactions can be limited to a small group of people 
among whom many repeat transactions take place. 92 Examples of this would be 
transactions between family members and between members within a small community. 
Because of the fact that people have considerable knowledge about each other, and that 
they will also rely on each other in future (there will be "repeat binary interactions"93), their 
"self-interested" behaviour will be constrainsd and result in "voluntary" compliance with the 
letter of the contract. In such cases, because of the significance of the prior "investment in 
resources specific to a relationship"94 , there is a reduction in transaction costs. Such 
transactions, which are closely related to what North has referred to as "personal ex-
change(s)", are characterized by low transaction costs as a result of the common set of 
values among transactors and the "self-enforcement" of contracts. 95 The drawback of such 
personal exchange is that it cannot co-e:·:ist with specialization over large geographical areas 
and over a large number of processes, bscause such specialization will so multiply the 
number of exchange process needed, that exchange will have to become impersonal. Low 
transaction cost as a result of personal exchange will then normally co-exist with high 
production cost and limited trade. 
In addition to the self-interest involved in sticking to the unwritten terms of "personal 
exchanges" (eg. through ensuring future willingness of othsr people to trade with you), such 
exchanges can also involve a sacrifice of self-interese6 as a result of a commitment to 
certain values, for example because of love for a child. Such devotion to values might also 
92Ben-Porath (1980: 1 ). 
93Breton (1985:734). 
94Ben-Porath (1980:1). 
95North (1984:258-259). 
96Self-interested behaviour can here be interpreted as selfish behaviour or behaviour in line 
with a "simple, hedonistic, individual calculation of costs and benefits" (North, 1981 :53), as 
is normally the case in economics (see Sen in Klamer, 1989:143, Ah:erlof, 1983:54 and 
Elster, 1983:10). As the sources referred to indicate, the assumption of self-interest is 
extremely complex as well as perhaps too vaguely specified (see especially Sen). This inter-
esting issue cannot be discussed further here. 
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constrain behaviour in the case of impersonal tS:<change. A person might not steal because 
of his belief in the importance of upholding private prop~Srty rights, etcetera. In this sense 
norms might, within small or large groups, work against the choice of narrow selfish interest 
and lead parties to an exchange to observe the terms of the contract. Norms then serve 
to reduce transaction costs and thereby contribute to making trade and increased 
specialization possible. 97 
Breton discusses many of the same issues as North but focuses more clearly on changing 
costs as factors affecting the source of supply of the provision of goods and services. After 
mentioning the importance of changing productivity of "conventional inputs" (land, labour, 
entrepreneurship, capital, differential economies of scale in production, differential 
technological change) in the determination of the comparative advantage of different institu-
tions, Breton goes on to discuss two sets of costs which he believes deserve more attention 
in the analysis of institutional change. These are the cost of controlling free-riding and "the 
differential deadweight cost or e:<cess burden of the sums levied to pay the goods and 
services produced and supplied".98 
After defining the ability to control free-riding as the "capacity to ensure that those who 
benefit from goods and services carry a commensurate burden of the costs", he argues that 
free-riding takes place and needs to be countered in more situations than is often thought. 
In addition to the normal cases where free-riding is to be e:·:pected, such as the provision 
of public goods, he specifically refers to "private goods whenever their allocation is rationed 
by non-price-mechanisms". 99 He then looks at four specific methods of controlling free-
riding namely Olsonian tie-ins H•:., social pressures, moral codes and tax enforcement.101 
97North (1934:253) argues that the comple:dty of modern exchange and interaction would 
not be possible if selfishness was not constrained by values or a commitment to the rules 
of the game. 
98Breton (1989:738). 
99Breton (1989: 
100Many collective organisations provide services on which people can free-ride, such as 
lobbying for higher prices, creation of stable prices, establishment of a productive 
environment, higher wages, etcetera. Because self-interested people can free-ride on these 
benefits they will have no incentive to contribute to the financing of these services. For this 
reason institutions providing these services provide selective inducements in the form of 
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His submission is that the efficiency of methods of free-rider control normally aasociated with 
families and less formal institutions, i.e. tie-ins and social and moral forces, tends to decline 
as a result of economic development (cheaper availability of goods from business firms, 
mobility and secularisation), while tax enforcement, at least in a closed economy model or 
a less open economy, becomes more efficient as result of growing commercialisation. This 
then gives government provision a comparative advantage because of the low cost of 
production as a result of the low cost - relative to other organizations - of controlling free-
riding. 
On excess cost he argues that not only government ta:·:es lead to dead-weight costs but that 
all methods of controlling free-riding lead to excess cost. Deadweight costs imply a gap 
between the cost of a service and its value, or, a "loss of consumer surplus over and above 
the revenue raised".11)2 Under certain conditions the link between costs and benefits might 
be strengthened so that prices are forced down and closer to the marginal valuation of 
consumers. In this way deadweight costs are reduced. Breton's conclusion on this point 
is that deadweight costs have been rising for some intermediate institutions, while falling in 
the case of goods provided by the public sector. While in government provision the "link 
between cost and benefits" has been strengthened, it has been weakened in the case of 
other institutions.103 
What Breton identifies as the cost of controlling free riders is of course similar to North's 
transaction costs, or at least one component of wh-:1t North calls transaction cost. Breton's 
approach is useful in that it makes clear that the cost of transacting (e.g. coordinating the 
labour force, drawing up of contracts, legal action to ensure compliance) is part of the total 
cost of providing a good or service to clients. The success of an institution in controlling 
these costs will then have an important impact on its survival and ability to compete with 
benefits from which people can be e:·:cluded ("private goods") in order to force people to join 
and help to contribute. These selective benefits are referred to as "Oisonian tie-ins" with 
reference to its original treatment, under the name of tie-ins, by Olson (1965). 
101 Breton (1989:732-733). 
102Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980:367). 
103Breton (1985:7 45). 
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other institutions. That is perhaps more clear than in North's formulation which distinguishes 
between "costs of production" and "transaction costs". 
3.5.4 Aspects of the changing comparative advantage of family production of goods 
and service providing social security 
As an example of how industrialization and economic development can change the viability 
of institutions in the provision of certain services, some aspects of family provision in terms 
of the concepts of changing costs and prices introduced in the previous section are 
discussed. 
The family, defined as either a "eo-resident group" or "kin who cooperate and interact 
closely"104, is clearly an important institution with regard to both consumption and 
production in most societies. Although reliable estimates of the family contribution to total 
value in different societies are not available, it is normally judged to have a fairly significant 
role. Ben-Porath argues that "(t)he family plays a major role in the allocation and distribution 
of resources" and is "the most important institution for non-market transactions" .105 To 
provide evidence on the important role of the family, even in highly developed societies, 
Zapf's figures on production by families in Germany during the late 1970's can be used. He 
found that "private households are the biggest transportation, food and laundry businesses 
in the country. But also ... about one third is involved in agriculture (own field or kitchen 
garden) and in home building, and much more in repairs of several sorts. Many more old, 
sick and handicapped persons are taken care of in households than can ever be admitted 
to institutions. Two thirds of households are engaged in neighbourhood help and 
exchange. "106 
104Harris (1989:58). 
1058en-Porath (1980:1 and 23). 
106Zapf (1984:271-272). 
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In spite of the e~-ctensive role of the family in all societies it is clear that the nature of the 
family changes as economic development takes place. One aspect of this transformation 
is the shift from the relative importance of e;...1ended kinship groups to nuclear families. 
Secondly, the range of goods and services provided by the family declines rapidly over time 
and as economic development takes place. For the United States, where the process has 
perhaps gone furthest, Fuchs has remarked that in recent times "one of the most persistent 
themes that emerge from the data ... is the fading role of the conjugal family as the major 
institution of US society". 1 r:~7 The corollary is that the family in less developed societies 
does many things which the state, firms, religious organisations and other institutions, which 
can be referred to as more "formal" institutions, do in more developed societies.108 
Families provide or have provided a large number of goods and services, so that trying to 
list the most common ones cannot be of much value. 109 Ben-Porath has remarked that 
families are commonly involved in joint production of goods and services (either for selling 
in the market or for consumption by the household), joint consumption, and in the provision 
of insurance. For the purposes of this study the role of the firm as producer of services 
providing social security is important. In the fields of income support and consumption 
smoothing, education, health provision and housing, families still play an important role in 
most societies. Here, the focus will be on the role of the family in mitigating risks and in 
providing education. These are two of the roles of families which have often been 
discussed. 
It has often been surmised that families, in whatever form, play an important role in the 
removal of uncertainty in traditional or poor communities. 110 Recent studies of the nature 
107Fuchs (1983:53), quoted in North (1985:390). 
100See Burgess and Stern (1991 :59) and Rosenzweig (1983:1167). 
100See, for example, Zapf's list, quoted above. Breton mentions "shelter, food, protection, 
security, insurance, child care, nursing and convalescence services, unemployment relief, 
assistance to the elderly and single mothers, loan guarantees, ... protection against 
homelessness and destitution", as well as referring to such private goods as "visits, 
telephone calls, and monetary transfers". Note that many of the goods and services that 
are consumed by households will be jointly produced by the household and other 
institutions, for example firms. 
110Becker (1981 :238). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
92 
of inter-family transfers in developing countries have confirmed this interpretation of 
interaction between family members. Rosen:::weig, on the grounds of evidence from India, 
talks of "kinship ties" as "implicit insurance based transfer schemes which contribute to 
consumption smoothing". 111 Burgess and Stern argue that "(t) ransfers between related 
or proximate individuals have been shown to serve the purposes of risk mitigation, insurance 
against income shortfalls, support for the elderly in retirement, help during illness (and) 
unemployment insurance ... ".112 Many of the functions of formal, state-based income 
support schemes (insurance or assistance) then fall within the domain of the family or 
kinship group in less developed societies. 
In the case of education, the kinship group tends to play a more important role in societies 
that are less developed. While in modernized societies families do play a role in the 
provision of education113 it is probably true to say that the largest share of education is 
provided by the state in formal institutions. Against this Bed..:er has stressed the importance 
of the family as a body for the transfer of specialized skills and knowledge and for the 
"certification" of such knowledge in traditional societies.114 This role of the kinship group 
as hoarder and disseminator of specialized and "empirically ascertained knowledge", as well 
as the locus for the use of such knowledge in production, has also been confirmed by 
Rosenzweig's recent accounts.115 
lt is important to explain the reasons for the predominance, or comparative advantage, of 
the family in these functions in certain situations as well as the conditions which create and 
maintain this superiority. This will also provide an e:·:planation of why the range of services 
fulfilling social security provided by the family tend to become narrower over time. Initially, 
the reason for the comparative advantage of the family in the provision of insurance and 
then in education will be looked at. 
111 Rosenzweig (1988:1197). 
112Burgess and Stern (1991 :59). 
113See, for example, Zapf (1984:272). 
114Becker (1981 :237). 
115Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) and Rosen:::weig (1988). 
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A number of characteristics of families in traditional communities are important in explaining 
their significant role in providing insurance. These characteristics all contribute to lowering 
the transaction cost of insurance or, in other words, to lowering the cost of free-riding. 
Especially in the field of insurance, information problems can lead to prohibitive transaction 
costs in the case of impersonal markets. These high costs are related to two well known 
problems associated with risk-pooling through insurance, namely adverse selection and 
moral hazard.116 Both these problems have their origin in the costliness and asymmetrical 
distribution of information, and can be seen as part of a more general "incentive problem" 
threatening collective action.117 
Adverse selection relates to the fact that in impersonal insurance markets the true riskiness 
of the client cannot be ascertained by the insurer, while the client has sufficient information 
to evaluate whether insurance is worth his or her while. Because of this inability to 
distinguish between good risks and bad risks an "average" premium will be charged. This 
premium will drive low risks out of the market while providing coverage only to high risks, 
resulting in high costs of insurance and inefficiency. Some people who want to insure do 
not because prices do not reflect the real risks. 
Moral hazard refers to the fact that the insured can influence the likelihood of the event 
leading to payment. This may lead to the non.;availability of insurance where the insured can 
affect the probability of the relevant event taking place at little cost to tllemselves. The 
absence of insurance, in such a situation, can be seen as resulting from the inability to 
calculate the likelihood and the. likelj si::.e of los2es. In other cases the e>.ient of the loss 
may be subject to manipulation which will also result in high and inefficient costs of 
insurance.118 
There are many ways of addressing these informational problems. Adverse selection can 
be addressed by looking at previous claims re.cords and disclosure of relevant information. 
The problem of moral hazard can be addressed by coin.surance, deductions or verification 
1115For elementary discussions see Barr (1987:115-119) and Friedman (1990:528-530). 
117Piatteau (1991 :136). 
118Barr (1987:117). 
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of loss.w' Needless to say, these methods all consume resources as a result of the need 
to obtain information. This would increase the transaction cost of providing insurance. 
Personal exchange, of which transactions between kin would be one example, reduces 
these information costs. 
The relatedness of kin and their intimate knowledge of each other would lead to trust and 
an absence of opportunistic behaviour, which underlie the problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection. While the physical proximity of the transacting parties normally entailed 
in kin insurance lowers the cost of monitoring the different parties, the need to again transact 
in future (the existence of repeat binary transactions) will tend to make (implicit) contracts 
self-enforcing. In addition, individuals cannot afford sanctions in the form of expulsion from 
the community. This effectiveness of sanctions, not enforced by a third party, can also 
explain why moral and social pressures function as efficient methods of controlling free-riding 
in families. Opportunism and selfishness are also more likely to be tempered by altruism 
and love within the family circle than outside it.120 
lt should be clear from the above that a number of conditions are necessary to make it 
possible for families to lower the transaction costs of providing insurance. A few of them are 
physical proximity of the parties, the e:.:istence of repeated transactions, a lack of alternative 
opportunities and intimate knowledge of the different transactors. lt is exactly these con-
ditions that will be undermined by the changes associated with the process of economic 
development. The increased mobility and earning opportunities associated with economic 
development will lead to fewer repeat interactions and difficulties of monitoring. Kin will also 
become less dependent on income opportunities within the family and thus less vulnerable 
to sanctions. Comparative advantage as a result of low transaction cost is thus lost. 
lt should further be remembered that the family achieves its low transaction cost partly 
through sacrificing the benefits available from specialization and it thus represents a trade-off 
119Barr (1987:118). 
1roFor a discussion of these matters see Ben-Porath (1980), Breton (1989), Seeker (1981) 
and Rosenzweig (1989). 
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in terms of high production costs. 121 The spread of markets and the greater conglomer-
ation of people through urbani::ation allow specialization in the provision of insurance as well 
as the spread of risks over a larger number of people. The eo-variance of risks associated 
with family insurance is then also improved in this way. This might lower other aspects of 
the costs of production of insurance. The benefits of interacting in small groups "resulting 
from the specialization by identity"122 will then not weigh up to benefits that can be 
extracted from specialization by type of service. 
More or less the same scenario holds for the provision of education by the family. In a 
stationary society with limited income earning opportunities, family-specific assets as well as 
intimate knowledge about the use of such productive assets, normally in a very risky 
production environment, are very important. The knowledge of elderly members of families 
is thus extremely valuable to the younger generation. In sucll an environment membership 
of a specific family might also play an important role in the certification of skills and 
knowledge. 123 On the other hand, the non-specialized nature of many activities (for 
example household chores) might enable general education within the family to be sufficient 
for making a productive contribution. 
Once again dynamic change will threaten the supremacy of the family, this time in the 
provision of education. As a result of new opportunities for earning incomes, technological 
change and the imperative to specialize, the inherited knowledge of older generations 
becomes less indispensable. Family education is now on the one hand too specific 
(concerned with specific productive assets) but on the other hand too general (that is not 
catering to the needs in the more specialized work environment). Urbanization and the 
lowering of transport costs lead to possibilities of offering education at lower opportunity cost 
because of increased specialization and scale economies. Schools take certification out of 
the hands of the family. The increased formal labour force participation of women as 
121 North (1984:259). 
122Ben-Porath (1980:1). 
12~Becker (1981:239-240). See also Rosen::weig and Wolpin(1985) and Rosen::weig (1988). 
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development progresses implies an incre:ssed opportunity cost of home production. This 
will also apply to the home production of educational services.124 
The above two examples then show how economic change can affect the comparative 
advantage of an institution in the provision of social services, in this case education and 
income support. In both cases broad categories of services (education/risk mitigation) 
which were adequately provided by a specific institution or a number of institutions were 
dealt with. As a result of economic development, certain changes affect the context in which 
the service must be provided. This change of context (eg. greater specialization, urbaniz-
ation and mobility) makes it impossible for the institution to compete in the provision of these 
services to the same extent as before. This inability to compete results from two factors. 
On the one hand specialization and the spread of markets make these services more 
cheaply availsble in the market than the family can provide them. On the other hand the 
changing structure of the economy also makes it more difficult for the family to exact 
payment from its members for services rendered, leading to increased free-riding and 
transaction costs. lt would be possible to prove the same point for other services providing 
social security, such as health and housing. 
lt is also likely that the loss of one of its functions might have the effect of hastening the 
demise of the family. For example, the loss of its ability to provide education and the fading 
of the significance of family spe:cific capital make it impossible for elderly people to exact 
services from younger generations. Whereas income support earlier could serve as a 
precondition for later access to assets and the sharing of specialized information the older 
generation now has no "bargaining chip". What has happened is that the opportunities for 
trade between household members have diminished. Alternatively it can be argued that the 
reduction of the efficiency of the enforcement mechanisms of the family has led to the fact 
that certain transactions which could have benefited all members of the family will not be 
concluded. 125 
124North (1985:390). 
12~This is the gist of Seeker and Murphy's (1988) e:·:planation of the efficiency enhancing role 
of state intervention in a large number of cases such as education and pensions. 
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3.5.5 Some aspects of community and small group provision of support 
Intermediate to family transactions, which imply little specialization and low transaction costs, 
and the central government, with its formal entitlement rules and enforcement mechanisms, 
there are a large number of institutions or associations providing social services. These are 
often organi::ed on the basis of the geographical pro:·:imity of members (local government), 
religious affiliation or specific needs (voluntary child welfare). These various organizations 
use different methods of exacting contributions to finance their services in the light of the 
inability of charging a clearly defined price. These organizations might also be affected by 
economic development, both in their ability to e:~act a contribution (enforce payment) as well 
as in the appropriateness of the service which they deliver. In so far as these institutions 
use tie-ins and social pressures to exact contributions (control free-riders), a reduction in 
their efficiency in this respect and thus their comparative advantage can thus be expected. 
In the case of religious organi::ations, increased secularization implies fewer contributions 
to the church in the form of both money and human resources. This makes it more difficult 
for the church to fulfil some of its customary functions such as poor relief and health 
provision. 
The same forces seem to have weakened the provision of security by communities. In the 
19th century in the United Kingdom and even later in the United States, the financing and 
administration of poor relief was the responsibility of local communities. 126 Weaver has 
referred to the negative effect of "increased density, heterogeneity and mobility of the popu-
lation" on locally provided poor relief. 127 Some of the problems identified are the strain on 
local funding of relief as a result of the non-local nature of the problem due to the mobility 
of people. Furthermore, the increasing comple;<ity and size of communities increased the 
informational demands of identifying "deserving" cases (needed to control free-riding) while 
the effectiveness of social pressures in limiting free-riding was on the decrease. The 
commitment of the community to caring for the different categories of needy also declined 
12/:lSee Weaver (1982:21-2-+) for evidence on the USA and Barr (1887:9-12) for evidence on 
the United Kingdom. 
127Weaver (1982:22). 
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as a result of the weakening of communal ties. This necessitated institutional adjustments 
consisting of increased private charitable action and public sector coordination.128 
In a different context, namely that of risk-sharing mechanisms in traditional village societies 
as described by Platteau, comparable effects of economic development on local social 
security schemes can be observed.129 Whereas inter-family transactions can be construed 
as one way of addressing the high transaction costs involved in reducing risk under certain 
conditions, the traditional village community can be seen as an alternative way. According 
to some, this is a highly successful alternative me.thod of dealing with these incentive 
problems.131) The effectiveness of village provision relies on a number of factors. The 
pervasiveness of risk and uncertainties (and the consequent high cost of information), as 
well as the absence of formal methods of monitoring (records, for example) and enforce-
ment are countered in a number of ways, so that risk mitigation through implicit insurance 
schemes does in fact take place. 
The factors leading to insurance in this situation are the high net benefits of insurance and 
the reduction of transaction costs through substantial "specialization by identity" and 
restricted privacy. Customary rules and moral codes, as well as the serious implications of 
opportunistic behaviour131 or, more generally, the nature of the system of rewards and 
penalties, furthermore reduce the cost of enforcement and transacting. These comparative 
advantages will be reduced by the process of economic change. Platteau refers to the 
effect of development on these security systems via increased population growth and 
growing market penetration. Population growth increases the pressure on scarce resources 
and leads to steps to limit access to traditional support systems such as communal land and 
sharing of output. Market penetration affects many of the traditional social relations (repeat 
128Weaver (1982:23-24). 
129Piatteau (1991 :136-139 and 158-161). The discussion above is a selective summary of the 
indicated pages in Platteau. See also Gilbert (1 976) on the continued usefulness of tradi-
tional support systems in developing countries. 
1~Platteau (1991 :137). 
1310pportunistic behaviour will lead to inability to trade within the community, which is very 
serious given the lack of alternative opportunities. 
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interaction, intimate knowledge, personalized exchange) and so reduces the informational 
advantage of the local economy.132 
3.5.6 State and market in the provision of social services 
Numerous factors associated with economic development, and more specifically 
industrialization, will make the provision of certain services in the field of social security by 
certain institutions prohibitively "e:c:pensive". This is the result of possible cost savings as a 
result of specialization, on the one hand, and increasing transaction costs associated with 
traditional ways of provision. Continued provision by these associations and households will 
then be inefficient and provision by the state and markets can be viewed as an exploitation 
of this entrepreneurial opportunity and the self-interested endeavour on the part of 
consumers to buy from the cheapest source. lt is, for example, clear that many of the 
erstwhile functions of the family were taken over by markets (personal insurance and savings 
opportunities) while others have been taken over by the state (consumption smoothing, 
education, health, personal social services). 
A last, and not insignificant, problem is to explain why, in many cases, the state - and not 
private firms - stepped into the br6ach. This is normally e:~plain6d with reference to the 
existence of externalities and the public good characteristics of the services involved or, as 
resulting from "the pressure for income distribution"133• lt was argued in Chapter 1 that 
this is not sufficient. Many e;..1ernal effects are internalized and public goods provided 
without government intervention. Increased government provision must be explained as 
resulting from the procurement by consumers of services from the most efficient producer. 
The most efficient producer is the one with the comparative advantage in, or the lowest cost 
of, production. 
Following the approaches of Breton and North it was further argued in this chapter that the 
cost of controlling opportunism, or transaction costs, seem to be an important explanation 
of the state's ability to provide goods and services more cheaply than other institutions. 
132See Platteau (1991 :158). 
133North (1985:391 ). 
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Savings on transaction costs can also be part of the explanation of the state "outbidding" 
private firms in the provision of certain services providing social security. Such an explana-
tion must, however, be tentative as making conclusive comparisons of costs and cost 
structures is out of the question. Once again only broad arguments which show that 
government provision can be rationalized in terms of comparative advantage can be 
presented. What Seeker and Murphy said in the conte>..1 of government intervention 
regarding the family ("We cannot prove that efficiency guides state involvement in the family. 
We ... show, however that state interventions in the market for schooling, the provision of 
old age pensions, and access to divorce are consistent on the whole with the efficiency 
perspective."134), is also true here. 
The notion of the state as a provider of certain collective goods because of its ability to 
reduce transaction costs also underlies Mueller's analysis of the voluntary provision of public 
goods. 115 The whole analysis (which to an extent summarizes the discussion of the 
declining role of the family) can be described in the terminology of game theory, as has 
been done by Mueller. 
In certain situations cooperation in the provision of a public good might be efficient, but 
selfish individuals will fail to optimize because of the dominance of the non-cooperative 
outcome. That is, if both maximize selfishly, 
(1) they are both worse off than they would be if both cooperated but 
(2) each is better off than he would be if only he cooperated. 
Such a Pareto-inefficient outcome can be avoided if the two parties can come to some sort 
' 
of an agreement, or if it can be ensured that both cooperate. The fewer the number of 
players and the more the number of games that are played, the easier will it be to elicit 
cooperation. While the simplicity of the situation will make it easier to realize what the 
optimal strategy would be, the repeated interaction and smallness of the group enables 
detection of non-cooperation and the ability to follow strategies which can elicit cooperation, 
1348ecker and Murphy (1983:2). Italics in the original,underlining adcled. 
135Mueller (1989:9-13). 
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such as "punishing" non-cooperative plays or playing "tit-for-tat".136 In an industrializing 
society with a "large, mobile, heterogenous community" (and absence of repeat plays) 
deciding on what the optimal outcome is, detecting non-cooperation and eliciting 
cooperation might need some inducement mechanism such as tie-ins, compulsory taxation 
and formal systems of monitoring and enforcement.137 
In the case of such complex societies there would be a number of reasons why the state 
would have a comparative advantage in providing the3e public goods. Mueller has argued 
that "given that government exists to resolve one set of marl-\et failures, they may economize 
on transaction costs when used to resolve others" and that "government as an institution for 
achieving a Pareto-optimal allocation of rasources, e:.:ists to economize on the transactions 
and bargaining costs of obtaining information on individual preferences regarding public 
goods and externalities when the number of individuals is large".138 The state then 
represents an institution in society specializing in the provision of goods where transaction 
costs are high because of information problems. As a result of this specialization economies 
of scale are developed. 
Earlier it was argued, using the theories of Breton and North, that the means of free-rider 
control in the hands of the state, namely compulsory ta:,ation, became more efficient as a 
result of changes associated with economic development. The increased number of 
transactions as well as the rise of impersonal e:·~change were associated with more formal 
recording of transactions and increased use of formalized accounting systems.139 
Together with the increasing importance of wage labour (employees as against self-
employed people), this made the monitoring of tax dues a~ well as the introduction of new, 
more productive and flexible ta:,es possible. North concludes that especially the modern 
income and sales taxes have led to an increased ability and efficiency of financing 
136Mueller (1989:9-13, especially 12-13). 
137Mueller (1989:13-14). 
13-"Mueller (1939:35). Note that Mueller's argument is not that government intervention is 
justified by market failure. The argument is more subtle: some coordination may be needed 
in societies of a certain comple;,.:ity and given such a need, specialization by one body in 
providing these services can be optimal. 
139Breton (1989:738). 
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government action. 140 While other institutions were losing their ability to control free-riders, 
the means used by government were becoming more efficient. In such cases shifting "pu-
rchases" from other institutions to government might result in savings. 
Many of the services providing social security entail serious informational problems and free-
rider problems which may prevent "mutually advantageous bargains"141 from being 
concluded. The resulting inefficiency can take the form of non-availability of the service, or 
conclusion of transactions at a price at which less than the efficient amount is procured. In 
these conte>.1s state provision provides an efficient outcome while private provision through 
markets will be non-existent or serve only parts of the market. 
3.6 Explaining the diversity of systems of provision 
Although all countries are affected by industrializstion and economic growth, it is unlikely that 
convergence to identical support systems will take place. Such a view is supported by the 
diversity of the systems of countries at more or less the same level of development, as was 
discussed. The systems of different countries tend to differ with reference to numerous 
criteria such as the level of stateness and fragmentation, objective of and level of benefits 
and entitlement mechanisms. The question is then how to account for this diversity in the 
light of the fact that all countries are subject to the same forces of modernization. As has 
been argued earlier, this diversity can be seen as the result of the fact that the changes 
associated with industrialization interact with significsntly diverse political and social systems 
in different countries. The type of democracy (direct or representative) or its presence or 
absence at specific points in the development of social security might be one such factor. 
Another factor might be the strength of specific traditional institutions providing social 
security and their ability to adapt to changing economic circumstances. 
140North (1985:391-392). 
141To use Graaff's (1989:255) "modern" definition of market failure. 
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3. 7 Implications of the analysis 
David Friedman, commenting on the peculiarities of the "economic analysis of law", 
remarked on "the way in which economists tend to convert issues from disputes about 
equity, justice, fairness or the like into disputes about efficiency" and "that economic analysis 
frequently demonstrates the existence of efficiency arguments for rules usually thought of 
as based entirely on considerations of justice".142 Although not dealing with law, this chap-
ter endeavoured to move the discussion about state provision of social security from the 
realm of social justice and to show that there may be efficiency gains from increased state 
provision of social security. This was done not because efficiency needs to be seen as the 
only important objective but rather to show that some of the most prominent arguments 
against extensive state provision of social security might be missing the mark. 
This view can be contrasted with two other widespread views. They are the common 
arguments that state provision of social secu~ity is a luxury, and therefore only within reach 
of the developed countries, and, secondly, that such provision must entail efficiency losses 
as it is essentially concerned with redistribution. In contrast it was argued that services 
providing social security are normal services which are in demand in all societies, including 
poor societies, because of the riskiness of the environment. As a result of economic 
development, the ability of institutions traditionally delivering these services to continue 
delivering is undermined. As a result of the cost reducing possibilities of specialization and 
the ability of economi=ing on transaction costs, the state can step into this breach. Growing 
state provision then need not only imply a reassignment of functions but also an efficiency 
gain. State provision not only replaces provision by other institutions but may free resources 
for other activities. 
The above conclusions have a number of implications with relevance to issues surrounding 
the extension of formal social security in developing countries. More specifically these 
implications reflect on the necessity, affordability, timing and likelihood of growing 
government provision of social security. 
142Friedman (1989:180). 
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Firstly, greater government provision of social security should not detract from future growth 
but should tend rather to enhance growth because it implies more efficient provision of 
certain services. If this is the case, expansion of state provision of social security is 
advisable. Secondly, because government provision presents a mere reallocation of 
functions between institutions on grounds of efficiency and not the provision of extra or new 
services, these activities should use less resources than before. If looked at in terms of 
aggregate resources available, state provision should thus be affordable. Although these 
services should be affordable, the specific way in which they are financed might entail 
redistribution. Redistribution is here, however, incidental to enhancing efficiency and the 
good of all. Increased total production should imply that any redistribution would be short-
term (or entail a redistribution of income over the life-cycle of the taxpayer) and that it should 
be possible to compensate those who initially lose. The fact tllat gains are possible is of 
course not to say that the opportunities will be used. As a result of the uncertainty about 
what the most efficient outcome is and how it can be reached, significant conflict can arise. 
The fact that gains are possible does not remove the substantial problem of arriving at the 
optimising collective choice.143 
The reasoning in this chapter has implications for the necessity and timing of greater state 
provision. Because there are alternative institutions that can provide security, the 
seriousness of the absence of government provision will depend on a number of factors. 
One of these is the extent to which the deve:lopment process and its concomitant social and 
political changes have destroyed the ability of non-government organisations to provide 
security and whether other groupings (for example employers) are able to respond to the 
changing environment. lt is possible that some kinds of traditional provision might adapt 
more easily to capitalist development than others or that a specific political structure might 
nurture or discourage certain institutions. 144 In the light of this, no general rules can be 
1~ese difficulties are of course the material. of games theory. See Mueller (1989:9-17). lt 
is important to note that such collective decision mal\ing is not only necessary in the case 
of provision by the state or other social groupings. Possibla gains from market exchanga 
may also not be forthcoming because of a lack of a system of collective choice whereby the 
basic rules of the "game" are established. See Mueller (1989:7) for an eloquent statement 
of this point. 
1
""7he South African situation can illustrate some of these forces. lt can be argued that the 
South African development process was more destructive of community-based organizations 
as a result of the persistence of the system of migratory labour and because of forced 
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made about necessity and timing. A lack of response to changing circumstances might, 
however, result in the extension of the life of ineffective and costly institutions. In this 
respect the focus should not be on whether social security should be provided, but rather 
on the suitability of different institutions for providing it. 
removals. In addition the lack of trade uniOf1 rights for Blacks until the 1970's might have 
reduced the pressure on employers to provide benefits associated with social security. On 
the other hand the opposition against apartheid might have forged strong community ties 
and a clear idea of and commitment to what is in the public interest. 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART 11 
The second part of this study has two broad aims. Firstly, it is to use the South African 
experience in order to explore the main themes of this study further. These themes are the 
complex interplay of different institutions in the provision of social security and the tendency 
" 
towards "nationalization" of the services providing social security. Closely linked to these 
themes are questions about the forces leading towards changing provision and especially 
those relating to the shifting comparative advantage of different institutions.\ These themes 
will be examined in terms of brief historical perspectives on some aspects of social provision 
before 1910 and an interpretation of the experience after 1810. 
Secondly, the aim of Part Two is to address questions about the need for expanded state 
provision of social security in South Africa and the opportunities for and constraints on state 
action. This will be done through an evaluation of the present system of social provision and 
an examination of constraints on the expansion of the role of the state. 
Chapter 4 consists of historical perspectives on poor relief and educational finance until 
1910. This chapter concentrates on illustrating the main themes of this study as mentioned 
above. The difficulties involved in directly comparing the extent of state provision to that of 
other institutions in the specific social spheres were analyzed in Chapter 3. As a result of 
these difficulties, and in order to provide some background for the chapters that follow, 
chapter 5 provides an analysis of changes in the level and composition of government 
expenditures. The implications of chapter 5 are in line with those of chapter 6. Chapter 6 
looks at the development of institutions and mechanisms providing social security between 
1910 and 1990. The focus is on the evolution of institutions rather than on expenditures. 
Both these sections seem to confirm Bromberger's periodisation of social policy between 
the late 1930's and 1980 into a number of distinct phases.1 
Chapter 7 provides a characterisation and appraisal of the current system of social provision 
in South Africa. Chapter 3 consists of an an31ysis of constraints on the e:·:pansion of state 
provision and likely future prospects in the light of the theoretical e:~planation of growing 
state provision in Chapter 3. 
1Bromberger (1982). 
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The analysis of the historical development of and future prospects for social provision in 
South Africa seems to confirm the hypothesis of chapter 1 and the theoretical reasoning of 
chapter 3. Increased state provision of social security does follow economic development 
and can be viewed as a rational adjustment to changing circumstances. Although it was at-
tempted to obstruct this adjustment in South Africa by refusing to accept the interdepend-
ence of all "groups" and trying to force social provision back on traditional structures, the 
eventual adjustment was "merely" delayed and made more painful. 
The economic irrationality of apartheid has often been commented on, especially in the light 
of its obstruction of what are sometimes described as "natural marh:et forces" through 
limitations on the movement and entrepreneurial activity of individuals. The failure of 
apartheid is then adduced as additional evidence of the failure of state-centred systems and 
the need to limit the activities of the state. This study certainly does not imply the need for 
~xtensive control of individuals. lt does, however, show that the irrationality of apartheid lies 
also in the failure to recognize the interdependence of individuals, and in the resulting 
economic necessity of collective action to provide certain goods and services which have 
redistributive effects. The implications for economic policy are thus significantly different 
from those flowing from the alternative interpretation of the failure of apartheid. 
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BRIEF HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CERTAIN DEVELOP-
MENTS IN POOR RELIEF AND EDUCATION BETWEEN 1652 AND 
1910 
The wide definition of social security used in this study, as well as the length of the period 
covered, make it impossible to look in detail at all the relevant institutions. The focus is 
therefore on the development of poor relief and some aspects of educational finance 
because of the availability of suitable sources and the, useful illustration which these policies 
provide of the main themes of this study. 
Even focusing on such a narrow field is problematic. Recent historical works have greatly 
improved understanding of the history of poverty in South Africa and the means by which 
the poor survived and escaped from poverty.2 Most of these works do not, however, focus 
specifically enough on the provision of security and related public policy for the purposes 
of this study. Three exceptions, which ara consequently used e:,tensively in what follows, 
are the works by Marais and by lliffe, and certain parts of the work by Van Onselen.3 
Another problem is the scarcity of formal or state institutions catering for the poor in pre-
colonial Africa. 4 This makes it difficult to trace the development of poor relief before the 
arrival of formal institutions from Europe and has made it necessary to start in the normal 
eurocentric way with the first European settlement at the Cape in 1652. 
The absence of formal institutions in pre-colonial Africa should not be seen as evidence of 
the absence of any institutions catering for the deprived and vulnerable, nor as evidence of 
the absence of poverty and insecurity in pre-colonial Africa. Many institutions did, among 
other things, cater for the poor. 5 Of these the family, in all its different forms, has been one 
'I 
2See, for example, Bundy (1979), Van Onselen (1982) and Beinart (1982). 
3 lliffe (1987), Marais (1943) and Van Onselen (1982). 
4lliffe (1987:7) and Von Braun (1991 :404). 
5See lliffe (1987) and Von Braun (1991). 
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of the most important. Although the ability of the African family to serve as an institution 
providing social insurance has often been exaggerated, lliffe, in his recent work, concludes 
that "families were and are the main sources of support for the African poor".6 Family 
structures did, nevertheless, differ between regi~~Trn\fd.Q.~ and lliffe further argues that 
"family structure was not an immutable ethnic characteristi~:, but could change to meet 
changing needs". 7 
The insufficient treatment of less formal ways of dealing with insecurity in pre-colonial and 
early colonial Southern Africa is a serious shortcoming which must be blamed on the scarc-
ity of historical examinations of these issues. Therefore, without trying to be exhaustive, a 
brief overview of poor relief in the Cape and Transvaal until 1910 is given. Some remarks 
are also made about the interaction of public and private financing of education during this 
period. 
In spite of the scarcity of information and the limited coverage, such an overview is useful. 
Responses to deprivation in the nineteenth century are interesting for a number of reasons. 
Most importantly it illustrates some of the different avenues through which the poor 
survived8 as well as the variety of public responses to poverty. lt further shows the short-
comings of these responses and the pressures making for change. 
4.2 Poor relief in the Cape 1652 to 1806 
The first settlement of Europeans, employees of the Dutch East India Company (D.E.I.C), 
can be seen as an effort by the company to lower the occupational risks for their sailors and 
in one interpretation, to increase profits in this way.9 According to Marais the need to be 
prepared for future deprivation was anticipated by compsny officials when the first company 
6lliffe (1987:7). 
711iffe (1987:8). See also Murray (1931 :Chapter 5). 
811iffe (1987:7), identifies four avenues through which the poor can, and have, survived, 
namely "their own effort", "organisation by the poor themselves", "informal and individual 
charity" and "through institutions which the wider society created either to care for the poor, 
to confine them, or to help them escape poverty". 
asearle (1987:13 and 19). See also Burrows (1933:27-29). 
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employees in the Cape were allowed to leave the employment of the company in order to 
settle and pursue an occupation at the Cape in 1657.10 A fund financed from certain 
collections (presumably after church services) and fines was established in anticipation of 
this. 11 From about 1664 assistance was given from this fund to the "really poor"12 in the 
form of cash to procure the basic necessities of food, clothing and bedding.13 With the for-
mation of the first religious congregation and the arrival of the first appointed minister the 
responsibility for poor relief, as well as the aforementioned fund for poor relief, became the 
responsibility of the church. Church and company were, however, closely intertwined with 
ministers being appointed by and their salaries paid by the D. E. I. C. In return poor relief was 
expected to be maintained as one of the normal functions of the church. The administration 
of the poor relief was handled by a deacon - a lay person appointed for this purpose.14 
In addition to the "integrat[ion] of secular and religious philanthropy" established thrc~ugh the 
use of lay persons by the church 15 this arrangement also e:<hibited an interesting mix of 
employer, government authority, church and community sharing the responsibilities for aid 
to the poor. This mix was also evident in the financing of poor relief expenditures. Funds 
came from collections at church services, collection boxes ("armbusse") in houses, drinking 
places and inns, certain fines levied by the government, legacies and fees for trivial and 
other "services" provided by the church. As a result of the burden of manumitted slaves on 
church funds, people freeing slaves were forced to pay an amount to the church for every 
slave emancipated after 1777. This followed an earlier ruling whereby a guarantee had to 
10Marais (1943:1). 
11 Marais (1943:1). 
1~e really poor were defined as "those burdened with many naked children and who as 
a result of poverty must sleep on the naked earth or a little straw in the stable with the cows" 
and also "suffering pregnant women, the needy ill, widows and orphans." (Resolutions of 
the Policy Council quoted by Marais 1943:2; own translation). 
13Marais (1943:2). 
14Marais (1943:4-5). 
1511iffe (1987:79). 
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be provided that the freed slave would not· become a burden to the deacon within ten 
years.16 
The benefits provided covered a wide range from cash benefits to goods and services in 
kind.17 Cash transfers developed from irregular benefits to regular monthly grants to the 
elderly, the disabled, widows and poor ill people. These transfers were also paid to erstwhile 
slaves under the same conditions, although after 1705 at a lower rate than for other races. 
The most important system of benefits in kind was the placement of the destitute, old, and 
disabled as well as orphans in the care of other households who received an amount of 
money in return for these services. Apparently this system of out-relief worked well so that 
the lack of specialized institutions such as orphanages and homes for the old was not felt. 
This system of relief without institutionalisation was in contrast to the system in Geneva, on 
which other aspects of the Cape poor relief system was modelled. Whereas such care was 
given in a vast "General Hospital" in Geneva,· the absence of appropriate institutions at the 
Cape necessitated the provision of care in private homes.18 Such general"hospitals", fulfil-
ling the function of health care and poor relief, were common institutions in early European 
poor relief. 
In addition to the cash grants, clothing was also provided to the poor, and in some in-
stances, rent. In 1732 six houses were built from the poor fund in order to house some 
poor families. Provision of food to the poor took place occasionally and sometimes monet-
ary assistance was also given to those in temporary need. Health care for the poor was 
procured by paying an annual sum to a "surgeon"19 to treat the poor and provide them with 
the necessary medicine. Assistance in periods of illness also included monetary assistance 
and placement in private houses where the ill could be cared for. 20 In isolated cases even 
16Marais (1943:9-13). 
17This summary on the nature of relief is based on Marais (1943:13-21). 
18lliffe (1987:97). 
HIFor information about the state of medical practice at this stage see Burrows (1958). 
20Marais (1943:53-55). 
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the trips of people to the inland warmbaths for recuperation were financed. 21 Funds were 
also used to ensure the education of children of the poor through payment of their school 
fees and other necessities. At a later stage a "church school" was maintained for the 
education of children of the poor, orphans and other children in the care of the church. 
Orphans and children in the care of the church were also placed in houses where they could 
earn their keep or in positions as apprentices when age allowed. 22 
Although no formal criteria to qualify for assistance e:-.:isted, csses of which the officials of 
the church did not have personal knowledge were investigated by the deacons and if 
necessary by the surgeon. In addition to this "means test", assistance was sometimes 
withheld on the grounds of alleged immoral and other undesirable behaviour. Provision of 
relief was, however, not limited to members of the Dutch Reformed Church.23 
In the absence of sufficient information on social conditions in the Cape during the late 
seventeenth and eighteenth century it is difficult to evaluate the impact and effectiveness of 
this system of poor relief "which survived in essence until the end of Dutch control of the 
Cape in 1806".24 Making inferences about the forces which shaped the system of poor 
relief and ensured its apparent stable survival for more than 1 00 years is also problematic. 
Marais opines that the provision by the church as branch of the state/company and the 
method of provision was wholly a result of copying the tradition in the "fatherland". 25 The 
provision of out-relief as a result of the absence of suitable hospitals and institutions such 
as orphanages and poor houses was the only local innovation. 26 In spite of the impossibil-
ity of a thorough-going analysis and evaluation, some aspects of this early system of provi-
sion are noteworthy. 
21 Marais (1943:21-27). 
22Marais (1943:37-51). 
23Marais (1943:64). 
24lliffe (1987:97). 
25Marais (1943:65). 
26lliffe (1 987:97); Marais (1 943:65). 
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Firstly, in contrast to current practices, race seems to have been less important as a criterion 
for access to assistance and social services. According to Marais distinction between "white 
and brown" was normally not made in matters relating to church and school in the time of 
the D.E.I.C.27 Although segregated education was not strived for, emancipated male slaves 
were from 1685 not treated in the hospital, but in the so-called "Slave Lodge". 28 Monthly 
grants to "free blacks" were after 1710 also limited to less than that (about half) paid to other 
people, although exceptions were made where obvious need existed.29 Thus, in spite of 
the view ascribed to church authorities that "geen onderskeid dien gemaak te word in lief-
dadigheidswerk tussen wit en swart nie"30, the roots of present differentiated payments 
between races can be found far back. 
Secondly, expansion of the settled area, the founding of new congregations of the Dutch 
Reformed Church further inland, as well as the establishment of a Lutheran congregation in 
the late 1780's created institutional problems for the provision of poor relief.31 As the Dutch 
Reformed Church (D.R.C.) had to provide assistance not only to their own members, it was 
difficult to find an acceptable division of responsibilities between the two congregations as 
well as a division of the sources of finance, especially the sum paid on emancipation of 
slaves. In order to solve this problem a ruling from the political authorities was needed to 
set out the true responsibility of the different congregations and a joint commission of the 
two Church bodies was appointed to deal with families with members belonging to both the 
congregations. The fact that it was not found necessary to make a ruling with regard to 
people not belonging to either of the congregations seems to indicate that estrangement 
from the church was not a major problem. The above also indicates the problems that can 
arise for provision of relief by churches in a more complex society. 
The founding of congregations of the D.R.C. further inland led to further problems. The 
major problem was that most of the new congregations had insufficient resources to provide 
27Marais (1943:63). 
281liffe (1987:98). 
291liffe (1987:98); Marais (1943:62-63). 
30Marais (1943:64). 
31 Marais (1943:28-35). 
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poor-relief in their early years and had to rely on funds from the Cape Town congregation. 
Although some congregations eventually succeeded in providing for the poor within their 
area, others apparently had persistent problems in this regard. In 1791 the political author-
ities had to step in to assign responsibility for poor-relief in a poorer congregation to a richer 
congregation, much against the wishes of the richer congregation. The ability of the 
authorities to enforce such rulings shows that the church at this stage was an agent of the 
state in the provision of poor relief, and in return for the favours it received from the state 
it was given well-defined responsibilities. 
Finally, the existence of a reasonably formal system of provision in a colonial outpost in the 
seventeenth century has important implications. lt warns against seeing the provision of 
social security as characteristic of industrialized societies only, and to see affluence as a pre-
condition for establishing formal support systems. 
4.3 Developments in the Cape after 1806 
In contrast to the harmonious picture of society underlying the description of poor relief by 
Marais, sources on the nineteenth century present us with pictures of a rapidly changing 
society, apparently unable to deal with the deprivation resulting from these changes. One 
symptom of this was growing urban poverty. In the words of lliffe: "As the nineteenth 
century progressed, Cape Town's multiracial slums became places of sickening squalor".32 
The 1800's can be viewed as a period of increased visible poverty. In addition to the 
conjunctural poverty and the poverty of the incapacitated there was at this stage one of the 
first manifestations in Africa of structural poverty as a result of change and land scarcity. 33 
The extent of landlessness among the Khoi at'the beginning of the century and the transition 
from slavery to wage labour were associated with increased vagrancy and deteriorating 
housing conditions.~ lt is also reasonable to assume that the church based poor relief 
32lliffe (1987: 1 00). 
3.:\For the categorization of different types of poverty, see lliffe (1987:4-5) and for its 
application to Southern Africa lliffe (1987:98 and 114). 
341liffe (1987:98) and Kinkead-Weekes (1984:3). 
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system could not cope with the growing influx of people, the geographical expansion of the 
colony and the increasing heterogeneity and complexity of the society. In this regard it was 
indicated earlier how even limited geographical expansion and institutional rivalry 
necessitated intervention and enforcement by the political authorities. 
In addition to the changing objective conditions the views of the English authorities on 
poverty and state responsibility towards the poor differed radically from the Continental ap-
proach as reflected by the actions of the Dutch Reformed Church and the Dutch East India 
Company. As one historian put it, " ... Victorian liberalism ... frowned on the poor and help-
less".15 Methods of dealing with poverty in the Cape under English rule were in line with 
the approach of the English Poor Law of 1834. The first line of defence against "deserving" 
poverty (i.e. poverty resulting from physical disability, old age, etcetera) was seen as own 
savings, relatives and the community. As a second safety net private charity and institutions 
were viewed as important, but "indiscriminate" charity was frowned upon and sometimes out-
lawed. If none of these were available the authorities would provide relief, but then only 
under controlled and demeaning circumstances, so as not to attract the able-bodied, 
"undeserving" poor. Out-relief was thus rare and institutionalisation (or "incarceration"36) 
the preferred way of providing support. The austerity of the institutions served to target relief 
to only the most desperate or to the "deserving" (the so-called "workhouse test"). With such 
an approach there could be no systematic and adequate response to the problem of poverty 
with a consequent multitude of partial responses, many of which denied the true nature of 
the problem. 
Rather than addressing the causes of their condition, the able-bodied poor were prevented 
from becoming a public nuisance through vagrancy legislation which provided for jail 
sentences, forced labour and placement in the service of other people. 37 For example, 
during the 1850's relief was given to victims of the cattle-killing subject to "contracting for 
labour in the colony".38 Urban poverty in the form of slum conclitions was dealt with, at 
35Peires (1984:169). See also lliffe (1987:100-101). 
36lliffe (1987:101). 
37lliffe (1987:98-99) and Kinkead-Weekes (1984:4). 
38Peires (1984:151). 
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least since the late 1800's, through segregation and the creation of separate Black locations. 
Further examples of all these mechanisms abound. The institutionalisation of the poor in 
government establishments was visible in the transformation of the erstwhile Old Somerset 
Hospital to a poorhouse during the 1820's and the change of the former Slave Lodge, used 
since 1827 as a hospital for emancipated government slaves, to the Pauper Establishment 
which housed some of the helpless and chronically ill poor and lepers of all races. 39 From 
the middle of the 1840's these paupers, as well as the lunatics and lepers in government 
institutions, were housed on Robben Island. The different groups were transferred back to 
the mainland over the years. By 1898 most of the paupers were back on the mainland, the 
women in Grahamstown and the men back at the Old Somerset Hospital. The lunatics were 
all moved off the island by 1913, the whites to a new institution, Valkenburg, while the last 
leprosy patients left Robben Island in 1931.4° For the able-bodied poor a Labour Bureau 
was founded in 1886 and some evidence of relief work, initially for whites affected by the 
1899-1902 war, but after agitation extended to Coloureds, can be found. 41 
In addition to this inadequate government action, philanthropy and self-help also provided 
some escape. Many private charitable organizations, mostly run by different religious de-
nominations, were thus founded. During the first half of the century most of these organiz-
ations, except for the private Orphan House of 1814, catered for general poor relief and co-
existed with the out-relief that the different churches provided for their members. During the 
second half of the century there was an increase in the number of specialized, still mostly 
church funded, institutions. These included more orphanages, a school for the deaf and 
dumb and Salvation Army night shelters. 42 Self-help efforts were organized mostly around 
"sick and burial societies" of which a number exist6d in 1845, but also included a "benefit 
society of English tradesmen". 43 
39lliffe (1987:100-101) and Kinh:ead-Weeh:es (1984:3). 
40lliffe (1987:100-107) and Kinh:ead-Weeh:e;s (1984:3). 
41 Kinkead-Weeh:es (1984:4-8). 
4211iffe (1987:101-1 02). 
43lliffe (1987:10.1). 
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Self-help also took place less formally. The Cape Malays apparently took extensive care of 
their poor, while white poverty was often "hidden" by moving further into the interior, 
benevolence from relatives or a quasi working relationship as "bywoners". 44 
4.4 · Poor relief in the Boer republics until 191 o 
Bottomley, in a paper on "poor whiteism" and poverty in South Africa, has argued that the 
views of the republican governments with regard to provision of poor relief by the state 
differed radically from the laissez-taire approach of the colonial authorities. He maintains 
that constitutional provisions implying state responsibilities with regard to the welfare of its 
citizens were "almost a hundred years in advance of overseas nations". Public policy was 
guided by the "ideal of collective responsibility for the welfare of the burghers".45 In 1298 
the chairman of the Transvaal parliament also remarked that he believed no other state did 
more for its poor than the South African Republic. 46 
The evidence on these views is, however, not conclusive. As Pelzer indicates, relief action 
by the state stayed "sporadic" during the late 1800's and early 1900's and there was no 
"fixed policy" of poor relief.47 Support was normally given in response to memorials or 
petitions by burghers or in reaction to serious disasters. Petitions by the old and infirm were 
normally positively re~ponded to and in 1880 legislation was introduced to regulate the care 
of orphans by others and by public officials if needed. 48 After 1895 a single payment was 
also made to old Voortrekkers or pioneers over the age of 70. Since the eighties numerous 
rulings were introduced to lighten the tax burden of the poor as a result of head taxes and 
in the nineties relief work was provided for many, especially in road building. Loans or 
"reconstruction" were also commonly advanced by the Transvaal government against bonds 
on immovable property. These were financed through a specially formed "amortization 
fund", funds from the orphan chamber, the po~tal savings bank and the fund for victims of 
441liffe (1987:100). 
45Bottomley (1990:17,18 and 21). 
46Quoted by Pelzer (1942:7). 
47Pelzer (1941 :136-138). 
48Pelzer (1941 :136-138). 
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the first Beer War. Catastrophes such as the rinderpest and the dynamite e:<plosion, both 
in the middle-nineties, were responded to through loan schemes, the distribution of mules, 
donkeys, wagons, maize and wheat and the payment of compensation. Assistance was 
also given with the education of children of the poor.49 
As always, state provision did not mean the absence of other collective initiatives to alleviate 
poverty. Pelzer believes that the major burden of poverty alleviation around the turn of the 
century still fell on the churches. The fact that the churches provided poor relief was in at 
least one case used by the government to refuse aid to a private charity. 50 In Pretoria the 
Pretoria Charity Society provided night shelter and other assistance, while in Johannesburg 
the Salvation Army managed soup kitchens, night shelters for men and a "social farm" for 
the "destitute, poor and sick". 51 
A particularly interesting series of events in the development of social security, as told by 
Van Onselen, was ushered in by the founding in 1895 of the Present Help League in 
Johannesburg. 52 This organization, funded to a large e:'\1ent by the mine-owners, catered 
especially for skilled mine worh:ers who became unemployed. This left the increasingly 
impoverished families of unskilled, especially Afrikaner, workers to rely on already badly 
frayed communal support structures. In the midst of deteriorating economic conditions in 
1897 mass action by the Afrikaner unemployed led to a number of responses from other 
social classes. Mine owners offered jobs for unskilled Afrih:aners on the mines, the govern-
ment announced the Main Reef Road project to provide relief work, and the merchants and 
shoph:eepers founded another welfare organization in order to contain unemployment and 
its possible destabilizing effects. Subsequent disruptions such as the wars, periodic 
economic downswings and continual agitation by the unemployed led to increasingly coordi-
nated and concerted efforts to address the problems of insecurity. Although the clearance 
of "insanitary areas" was one response to these disruptions, another side of the response 
49For all the schemes mentioned above see Pelzer (1942:1-17). 
50Pelzer (1942:22 and 25). 
51 Pelzer (1942:23-24). 
52\yan Onselen (1982:126). 
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was the coordination of all charities under the Rand Aid Society and further municipal relief 
works. 
In 1908 the Rand Aid Association, under the pressure of increased unemployment, ran out 
of emergency funds and had to curtail its operations. The resulting response to the depri-
vation, and agitation from the unemployed, marh:ed a further move towards a broadly based 
attack on the problem of insecurity in a changing society. The Rand Unemployment Investi-
gation Committee was formed which had representation from all the important groups in the 
society: the state, employers, local authorities and workers. This committee coordinated the 
placement of "550 men on government public worh:s, 652 on the municipality's relief work 
and over 3000 men as unskilled workers on the mines" as well as "a couple of hundred 
Afrikaners ... on various land settlements".53 
Although the history cannot be recounted here in enough detail to reflect the full complexities 
and implications for state provision of social security, some essential points are reflected by 
these episodes. Firstly, there is a need for the provision of social security even in relatively 
poor societies, not because of humanitarian concerns, but be_cause insecurity threatens the 
stability and survival of societies. Secondly, although many types of responses from many 
different institutions are possible, under many conditions nothing but a coordinated effort, 
headed by the state, will be able to deal with the threats of insecurity and the burden cannot 
be shouldered by the directly affected section of the community only. Taken together, these 
initiatives and changes can be seen as evidence of the need for coordinated action to 
ensure social security and the growing inade~uacy of voluntary provision and self-help in a 
rapidly changing South Africa. 
k 4.5 Some remarks on educational provision before 191 0 
' 
Educational provision up to 1910 illustrates the variety of institutions that can provide the 
services related to education as well as the p&rsistent growth of government intervention in 
this sphere. The increasing role of government in this sphere can be seen especially in the 
expansion of government financing of education. The increased financing is normally 
associated with increased inspection and regulation of schools and the qualifications of 
5-'Van Onselen (1982:154). 
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teachers. Making education compulsory for children of school-going age normally implies 
the final step in "nationalization" because such compulsion implies government responsibility 
to provide school places and free education. 
Until the beginning of the nineteenth century in the Cape, and even later in the interior, edu-
cation was financed by the individual household (private) while, as was indicated previously, 
the Church assisted with the education of children of the poor. Religious authorities 
normally had direct control over education.54 In 1737 the first mission school for black 
children was also founded. 55 
With the introduction of English rule at the Cape in 1806, State/Church cooperation con-
tinued in education, especially with reference to the control of curricula and standards. 
Some free government schools with imported. English teachers were also opened, while the 
general policy of anglicization stimulated the growth of Dutch private schools. 56 The rise 
of a system of secular schools for whites, with mission and church provision of African 
education, was further strengthened in 1839 with the founding of a Department of Education 
and the appointment of a Superintendent-general of Education. From here a system of 
government financial assistance, combined with local responsibility, developed. These 
practices, which led to District School Boards and a system of grants-in-aid, were formalized 
in the 1865 Education Act. This act, which provided for the subsidization of local effort on 
a pound for pound basis, also applied to mission schools, some of which had received 
government aid since 1841. This aid apparently led to education being available free at 
some of the mission schools.57 By 1910, 91 of 119 ("white") school board districts in the 
Cape were enforcing compulsory education for children of 7 to 14 years or up to standard 
four (six years of schooling), who stayed within ·5 kilometres of a school. Education up to 
standard four only became free, that is completely state financed, in 1920.58 
54Hendrie (1986:97). This very brief history rt:lies heavily on Sached (1985), Malherbe (1977 
and 1925) and Hendrie (1986). 
55Malherbe (1977:537). 
56Malherbe (1925:56). 
57Malherbe (1977:538-9). 
58Malherbe (1977:252) 
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In the Republics there were also rapid change from the private, uncoordinated provision of 
education by the travelling "meesters", the church and the parents. 59 In the Free State an 
Inspector-General of Education was appointed in 1872. Education for those who were not 
able to pass an elementary literacy test, stayed within a certain distance from a school and 
were between 14 and 16 years of age, beca.me compulsory in 1395. From 1903 primary 
education was provided free of charge. 60 
By 137 4 the Transvaal also had an e:,1ensive system of st3te-aided schools. Available 
figures indicate that in spite of the intention of shared responsibility between state and 
community, the state carried the lion's share of the cost of education.61 This imbalance 
probably arose from the exploitation by communities of the state's willingness to assist with 
the education of poor children and children from poor communities after 1882.62 Although 
there were some reactions to the secular nature and central organi::::ation of education (for 
example, the founding of Dutch schools with a "Christian National" orientation in reaction to 
English rule), central control was re-established by 1907.~ In 1907 education was made 
compulsory between seven and fourteen yegrs of age or up to the si:...1h year of schooling. 
Primary education became free of charge in 1912. 
Segregation in schools was less rigidly controlled than in modern times, especially in mission 
schools which also provided education for a substantial number of, apparently poorer, 
whites.154 Increased formalization of segregation presumably came with the provision in 
1893 of separate public schools in the Cape for coloureds and whites. Mi:-:ed attendance 
was prohibited in 1911. Also in ~ Jatal, separate schools, completely financed by govern-
ment, were founded for coloureds in 1906. In African education the role of the state, in spite 
of finanCial assistance through subsidies to misslon schools, seems to have been relatively 
59See Sached (1985). 
~Malherbe (1977:253). 
61 Malherbe (1925:243). 
62Pelzer (1941 :5-9). 
63Malherbe (1925:243). 
64Malherbe (1977;538). 
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small. Malherbe argues that " ... up to about the time of union in 1910, ninety percent of the 
cost of Bantu education was borne by missions".65 
By 1910 White education was then to a large eJ<.1ent in the hands of the state. This is seen 
in the widespread complete state financing of primary education and the expansion of 
compulsory education, implying a commitment to make resources available. In contrast with 
this, black and coloured education was still largely in the hands of the missions and 
churches. The state did, however, as~ist to some e:·:tsnt in the financing of these schools. 
Schooling for these groups was also not made compulsory to any extent, showing a lack 
of state commitment to the provision of education for these groups. 
4.6 Conclusion 
As a result of the underdevelopment of the history of social institutions of early South Africa 
the dynamics of changing social provision remains very much uncharted tsrritory. More 
conclusive work awaits a more focused analysis of administrative sources and the available 
anthropological and historical work. 
In spite of these lacunae, the foregoing broad overview has some value. This is so in spite 
of its focus only on formal social security, excluding a multitude of mechanisms by which 
households and communities protect themselves. The value of the overview lies in the fact 
that it reinforces, from a historical perspective, some of the conclusions reached in Part 1 
on theoretical and comparative grounds. 
More specifically these historical examples reinforce the following aspects: 
Most societies have a variety of mechanisms to protect members against 
certain contingencies and to deal with deprivation. There seems to be a 
complex interaction between these different institutions with complete 
dominance by a specific institution being a rarity. 
The systematic public (or social) provision for the poor and the assumption by 
central authorities of responsibilities in the social sphere are not limited to 
65Malherbe (1977:540). 
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wealthy, industrialized societies. The provision of social security should thus 
not be seen as a "luxury". 
The changing social structure associated with economic development, 
especially the expansion of the scale and the increasing complexity of society, 
creates supply problems for less formal and less broadly based institutions. 
This normally entails a need for coordination by the state or the assumption 
of responsibility for certain services by the state. 
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GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE: CHANGING RELATIVE IMPORT· 
ANCE AND COMPOSITION • 1910 TO 1990 
In the previous chapter some of the growing pressures for public coordination of services 
providing social security in South Africa were pointed out. In this chapter a first set of 
evidence is evaluated in order to establish whether subsequent periods do in fact reflect 
such a shift towards state provision or, as it is suggested, "nationalization" of these services. 
One way of measuring such shifts is given by Nattrass who argues that "if one wanted to 
look at the changing contribution that the state is making to economic activity as a whole 
one would like to have data relating to output levels of the public and private sectors in the 
different spheres of the economy" .1 An important problem in this regard is that it is difficult 
and sometimes impossible to obtain this information. The problem, however, lies deeper. 
The underlying problems of classification, definition and valuation were discussed extensively 
in Chapter 2. That discussion is also relevant for the analysis of the South African situation. 
As a result of the difficulties in making direct comparisons between state provision and 
provision by other organi:::ations, an analysis of the changing importance of state 
expenditure in South Africa and its composition is provided. For the purposes of this 
discussion it is important to remember that analyzing the role of government by looking at 
the level of expenditures implies the adoption of a narrow definition of government output 
and ignores serious problems of valuation. 
Particularly important in this regard is the possibility that non-quantifiable aspects of 
government intervention may counteract the effect Gf government provision of more conven-
tional goods and services. Although this is a very general problem, relating to the adverse 
indirect effects of government action, it has special significance in the South African case 
where legislative restrictions on the mobility and the ability to accumulate wealth of certain 
groups of people have been severe. Government provision of goods and services over the 
last few decades, including tr:msfers, could be interpreted as "progressive" or "redistributive" 
1Nattrass (1988:235). 
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in the sense that Blacks (of whom the majority can be classified as poor) received more 
from government expenditure than they paid in ta:<es. The effect of rules, which are less 
easily quantifiable, were, however, in the opposite direction and possibly stronger than the 
"progressive" measures. 2 
lt does seem clear that those programmes which changed the "secondary distribution" of 
income in favour of Blacks were outweighed by policies restricting the freedom of blacks and 
thus blocking improvements and worsening the "primary distribution"3 of income. This is 
the only way in which the almost static income distribution between racial groups in the face 
of the increasing relative size of the black population between the 1940's and 1970's can be 
explained. 4 
In spite of the problems of analyzing government e;-:penditure in this way it has its uses. 
Some of these were indicated in Chapter 2 and are also relevant here. Most importantly it 
provides some indication of changing priorities attached to different services. In addition a 
general picture of government expenditure provides a useful background for the more 
detailed discussion of the historical development of specific social services. In the next 
section the changing level and economic composition of the government budget is 
discussed. Thereafter a discussion of some of the salient aspects of the functional 
composition of state expenditure follows. 
5.2 The relative importance of government expenditure and the different economic 
categories 
Analyzing aggregate government expenditure in South Africa is complicated by a number 
of factors. The fragmentation of responsibilities for services between different levels of 
government as well as the "autonomy" granted to certain fiscal authorities (specifically the 
2See Abedian (1984) and McGrath (1979:29). 
~e concepts of "primary" and "secondary" distribution is from Bromberger (1 982: 168) and 
are explained there. This article by Bromberger is also an excellent introduction to the 
complexity of the influence of government on the economy. 
"For the historical figures on the South African size and racial income distribution see 
Bromberger (1982:189) and Van der Berg (1989e.:36-37). 
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homelands and other racially based authorities) mah:e it impossible for the individual 
researcher to construct a reliable time-series of total government expenditure from estimated 
expenditures (budgets) and the reports on these by the relevant Auditor-Generals.5 lt is 
thus also necessary to use national income statistics on government expenditure in the 
determination of levels and trends. 
In spite of the variety of definitions of government activity and total production it is a general 
conclusion of the different studies which looked at governm6nt expenditure in relation to the 
si=e of the economy in South Africa that governm6nt expenditure as a share of total 
production has increased steadily since at least 1940, although some short-term reversals 
did take place.6 This experience is then normally interpreted as indicating the general 
validity for the South African case of "Wagner's Law". This "law" postulates a positive 
relationship between the government's share in the economy and the level of total output.7 
The South African e;<perience in this regard is seen as being in line with international 
experience. 8 
Abedian and Standish looh:ed at total public S8ctor evpenditure, worh:ing mostly from audited 
expenditure figures (financial statistics) of the different authorities. They found that public 
sector expenditure grew from R 162 million in 1920 to R45 533 million in 1982. The real 
growth rate of this expenditure (6.2 per cent per annum on average) exceeded that of total 
output, so that public e:.-:penditure as a percentage of gross domestic product at factor cost 
s-rhe analysis of Simkins et al. (1985) is instructive. They estimate from budgets of central, 
provincial and homeland budgets that "allocable and non-allocable government expenditure" 
in 1983 (presumably the 1983/84 financial year) amounted to R22 992.1 million (fable 2 
pp.6-7). The more complete estimate of the Central Statistical S6rvices (1990b) puts total 
expenditure in that financial year at R27 603 million. This implies an underestimate of about 
20 percent in the Simkins et al. study. Although the figures used are perhaps sufficient for 
their purposes, the variance indicates the possibility for confusion. For an example of the 
type of work, and assumptions, needed to work from estimated e:-:penditures, even for 
selected years, see Brand (1984). 
"See Abedian and Standish (1984:391-392); Van der Berg(1991 :3-7); Mohr and Rogers 
(1991 :66); De Loor (1984:25-26) and Maasdorp (1990:196-197). 
7Abedian and Standish (1984:399 and 405) and Van der Berg(1991a:1 and 3). 
0rv:lohr and Rogers (1991 :66) and De Loor (1984:25). 
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increased from 29 per cent in 1920 to 63 per cent in 1982.9 lt is, however, difficult to 
evaluate the accuracy of these estimates.10 
National income figures, available from 1946, indicate that total public sector expenditure 
increased from 24 per cent of gross domestic product at market prices (GDPMP) at current 
prices in 1946 to 35.53 per cent in 1939 (see Table 5.2).11 lt is, however, more conven-
tional to exclude the expenditures of public corporations and government enterprises when 
calculating the share of government in the economy. The focus is then not so much on the 
extent of government control, but rather on the extent of "non-marketed output". 12 
General government e:<penditure (see Table 5.2) as a share of GDPMP increased from just 
less than 20 per cent in 1946 to above 30 per cent by 1989, after having dropped to below 
17 per cent in 1951.13 This trend was mainly driven by general government resource 
consumption (general government consumption e:·:penditure plus gross domestic fixed 
investment by general government). General government consumption expenditure 
increased from 10.11 per cent of GDP at market prices in 1946 to 19.56 per cent in 1939, 
with a low of 8.6 per cent in 1949. Gross domestic fixed investment by general government 
increased from 1.6 per cent of GDP MP in 1946 to an average of about 4 per cent during the 
1970's, but dropped back to an average of 2.23 per cent during the 1980's, with a ratio of 
2.17 per cent in 1989. These tendencies are interpreted by Van der Berg as showing that 
"current expenditure [by general government] is crowding out not only private sector 
9Abedian and Standish (1984:391-392). 
H'See Van der Berg (1991a:7). Footnote 3. 
11The difference between the estimates of Abedian and Standish and those derived from nati-
onal income statistics should be the "consumption e:.:penditure" by public enterprises and 
corporations (i.e. wages, raw materials, etc.) These items are not included as public sector 
expenditure using national income figures (only investment by all the components of the 
public sector are taken into account). Or put differently, part of what is counted as private 
consumption expenditure in the national accounts is moved to government consumption 
expenditure in the calculation by Abedian and Standish. 
12Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980:15). 
1:Van der Berg (1991a:4). 
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activities, but also public cs.pital expenditures". 14 Gross domestic investment by public 
enterprises and corporations also started declining in the 1970's. 
Resource transfers by general government also sl1ow an upward trend over the last four 
decades, from an average of 6.45 per cent of GDPMP during the 1950's to an average of 9.56 
per cent during the 1980's. This trend is, however, largely due to the growing relative 
importance of government interest payments. These interest payments increased from less 
than one per cent of GDP MP in the 1950's to more than four per cent after 1983. Subsidies 
also grew slightly in importance with current transfers to households staying relatively 
constant, but capital transfers declining in importance, especially during the 1980's. 
14Van der Berg (1991a:9-10). 
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TABLE 5.1 
PUBLIC SE;T•)R EJ(PENDITURE 
(Curr.;.rcl R mllllc•n/1iJtt.-Ho89) 
YEftJl G[•PAT 
MPFli'ET 
PRICES 
1. 
T•)TJil. E''PEtJuiTLirtE [;',' 
19-16 
HH7 
19-!0 
19-19 
1850 
1951 
1&5.:: 
19D 
lSE-1 
1855 
SARB 
6500 
170~ 
::.J(-9 
;Jljl1 
3-1:::.-1 
5141 
PUBLIC 
t:.ECT•)R 
2. 
5~1 
7-10 
1~75 
1.-,-_., 
PUBLIO:-
."-.UTIK•fl-
ITIES 
3. 
-10.": 
f.::.-1 
-17-'J 
S-I f. 
CJO 
1121 
11:;7 
•::.EIIERA.L 
GO:•VERtl· 
MENT 
4. 
370 
~-10 
f.73 
811 
129 
RESOUAGE C.•:ot ISUMPTIOt~ 
(;0:•11,3UMP· 
Tlo:•tl 
E>:PENDI-
TURE 
BY GEt~ERAL 
GOVERN-
MENT 
5. 
84.RB 65131 
1 ~" -~ 
192 
18(1 
::cc 
X7 
-l(•'l 
4'.](1 
513 
Gf,•)~.:; [o•:CME&TK- H•E[• ltNESH.U:tiT 13 ... 
(•A•3.AJ11.3/· TIOU 
s·,· GEU. 
GOV. 
6. 
SAAO •)6:}3 
55 
C. (I 
1(•.:! 
11-1 
1& 
1-11 
e·,· G0VEFiti-
MEtH EtiTEA-
PRI:>E:> 
7. 
&AfoB .:,.:;.:,.1 
f..l 
1(•3 
17•:0 
17-1 
~18 
[)1' PUBLIC 
CORP(IR· 
ATIONS 
8. 
S.GH[l «:>31 
11 
-13 
51 
£-1 
0-1 
f.IJ 
TOTAL 
il. 
(1u+ 11 
;-1:::;-
1-'1+1-1) 
21-1 
1-11 
1 "~ ~· 
168 
.... ,, 
-'-'• 
315 
3:::7 
ltHEREST 
Otl PU[;-
LIC 
DEBT 
1(1, 
S.t>HQ 75-16 
:::!1 
:::!-1 
35 
SUE;SI[•IES CURREtH 
11. TRo\t~S-
f.HtB 7i..r.•IJ. FERS TO 
I·IOUSE-
H•:OLDS 
1:::!. 
SARB 7512 
5-1 
71 
-I:" 73 
41 
37 
100 
121 
39 1 ,...., 
-· 
13.5 
TflAtJ.:.-
FERB TO 
HIE REST 
OF 
THE 
WORLD 
13. 
SARB 7550 
3 
3 
-1 
5 
3 
3 
U.PITI\L 
TR~>.tJS­
FERS 
14. 
114 
41 
57 
e7 
98 
94 
93 
115 
161 
115 
117 
100 
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TABLE 5.1 
PUBLIC :'.E(, TOR Ei<:PENDITURE 
(Currunt fl mllll•:.n/1!!1-15-1P!J9) 
YEAR GOPAT 
MAArET 
PRICE!> 
1. 
TOTAl FPEtlUITURE ElY 
1W-l 
100~ 
1007 
196~· 
197u 
1971 
197.:.: 
1£-13 
1~77 
S!IRB 
65(-.~. 
10-IOG 
7f3:.: 
8355 
11::!85 
15!:'3~ 
PUBLI•~ 
SEC-TC•Fo 
" ... 
1-lul 
1G1-' 
1C51 
::.::..)5 
:::es:: 
6951 
83-10 
l.::J~.:: 
PUBLIO:': 
P.UTI-K•R-
ITIES 
3. 
13.:.:1 
1-lf•C. 
173(1 
4181 
471(1 
GEtiERAl 
G•:WERtJ-
MEtH 
4. 
11::!7 
1-1-11 
10-l(o 
~:Xl5 
511•:0 
89:).'3 
130 
RESo)UA( E (.ojtJSUMPTIO:•tJ 
O:.O:•tiSUMP· 
TIOII 
E:•:PEt JUI-
TURE 
s·i GEtJEAAL. 
130'/EAN-
MENT 
5. 
B.AAB 13!:'131 
8':1 
10:::2 
11:::1 
10:.16 
18:..~ 
4-1G6 
(oFI•:•·:;.:, O(oME:. TIC: Fr•Ho ltJ\'E::. TMEtH Efr' 
OR•:;fttiiS.t..Tio:ou 
E."o'GEtl. 
GuV. 
6. 
Sfl.RB 6683 
117 
.. ~.­
•.J-1 
3.01 
-If~ 
716 
IDO 
1J•)1 
13~3 
13·,· GuVERII-
MEtH EtHER· 
PRISES 
7. 
SAFII:.: 00.:.-1 
-1(•7 
-167 
G-. .:....• 
f.')!) 
13J7 
E:"o' PUBLIC 
(.(oF,J' .:oR-
ATiutJS 
8. 
SI>HEl 6f':l1 
0(1 
lW 
1:::1 
19-1 
...-
....... 
710 
1~7 
IE-10 
RESC•UFlO:-E TFtAJJSFER~- BY GEtiER~.L GOVERtiMEtH 
TOTAL 
il. 
(10+11 
+1;!+ 
1~1+ 1-1) 
J-13 
39-1 
-157 
f55 
fG5 
€57 
11G7 
13!1:) 
170:.1 
ltHEFIE·-"T 
ou rur:.-
LIC 
DEGT 
10. 
SARO 7!:'413 
-13 
f.(l 
77 
IIJ::! 
1'77 
18-1 
3-1~· 
I:.UG~:IIJIES 
11. 
E;.~RB 7•)(~ 
68 
11-3 
1-11 
:::1::: 
4-10 
o:.URFIEtH 
TFtt.JJ::..-
FERS TO 
HO:oU:::E-
HOL[•B 
12 . 
SAF;B 7512 
1·15 
1f5 
1~1 
371 
4:!-1 
793 
TFlj.JJ.~­
FEn:; T•:O 
TilE RE:)T 
C•F 
THE 
WORLD 
13. 
SARD 75f-O 
4 
7 
3 
7 
11 
15 
19 
(:4PIT.A.L 
TR.A.US-
FERS 
14. 
102 
137 
180 
210 
::::s 
40-1 
f.f8 
f.f)5 
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TABLE 5.1 
PUBLIC SECTOR EXPENDITURE 
(Cummt R mllll·)n/1£<46-1939) 
YE.Afi GliPAT 
WRI'ET 
PRICES 
1. 
TOTAL E:•PEIKJITURE B't' 
1G8 
19:"£1 
18CO 
1~C1 
19G::: 
19').3 
18:.-1 
1905 
19::'6 
1987 
1£1G& 
18U9 
1%J.) 
SARB 
6U)(, 
::V::::!-1:" 
~E77::: 
&:o3.::e 
71iJCL• 
:)1)531 
81-157 
1(•7:::~1 
1.::3126 
1-1:::1J5 
1~5.::~ 
1<:v~11•J 
~3:::E3.:! 
2f.:."6E~• 
PUBLI(: PIJC,LIO:. 
SECTC•R AIJTHI:OA-
2. ITIES 
3. 
137oj1 11Jt(o 
16-131 13-lf:) 
:: .. )731 1•3~Y:Z• 
.::-1161) ;)Y.:-1.:· 
::-re-15 :::E13,:,5 
;j.l(0.:11 :::~5(• 
::'971~ 3·1f.Z(• 
~:-f-:o7 ~1r:;r:;;-
E31(cr) 47C~E 
59()17 5-t~u)t) 
f7(•-1•3 f, 1 ).35 
t-.::733 75~·15 
·:..:oc...:,.) &1839 
1~Efjt:f1.Al 
o:.o:OVEFIIl-
MENT 
4. 
9-::r:-~ 
11775 
1-1r:•JI 
1'7f(J·1 
!:.:::177 
!:(;.::11 
317:..(1 
.J;e.t:: 
-11::011 
515~9 
5·~:]~5 
7161~ 
71064 
131 
(;(oiEUMP· GFI•:•~ ::; D•:OME~:TI(; fi''ED IIIVESTMEIH E:'t' 
TI•:Oil or.·::..:.ru.s . .:..n:"~u 
E:.:PENiil-
TUAE 
BY GENERAL 
GOVERN· 
l;;'o'GEil. a·,· GOVEFoll· e·,· PUBLIC 
60V. MEIH ENTEFI· CC•RPO:•R-
MENT c. PRISES .A.TIONS 
5. S.ARB 66C3 7. 8. f;IIRB 15561 s.~.Re H-=~ S.t.R£: O:W301 
55.:![; 1;.:~; 1-1G·J ::O.'JI1 
f'J:.,:o 1f.:.'J 16:'!3 ::-B:-e 
£!1W 176(• 1w::: -1132 
r.•:~:-7 !:'ij:Y• ::::--1-1 ~1912 
1 ::Jo31 :::1;:! 3·1~.13 39C.O:o 
U115 :::-~88 :J-118 -IJIJ1 
11f.:J21 ::oc~j; .'JIC·:O ·IJ:o;}4 
21:::~7 :::;27 ~r··· .. _..., .59-1•j 
:::E.s~7:! 3J31 0<32·1 5:::71 
~.a)58~ 3;'~1;] 3371 -W17 
3~::!-:t; ~-111 313-10 f,.(l81 
~-IJojS f.(l-1•3 37:J(j 7.'J.'lh 
5•)-1/f. ~019 ~1oj5 0571 
RES•iUFoO:-E TRAJISFER& B'o' GEIIEFL~l GO:•VERIJMEtiT 
TOT/-1. IIITEAE::.T SUl<=O:I[•IE:~ CUI'iREtH TAN I-~- (.f\PIT.Al 
~- 011 PUB- 11. TP.A.IIS- FEFI-:> T•j TR·~tl<;;-
(1u+ 11 LIC &.AFII:; 70:•:(3 FER-3 TO:• THE RE3T FERS 
r 1:::+ DEBT HOU~:E- or- 14. 
1311~) 1(•. HOL[IS THE 
S.AF.B lE~& 1::!. WORLD 
SP..RB 7512 13. 
SARB 7550 
:JfJ..\£1 756 fu-1 1(11.'3 ~0 66.3 
3913 1':.1>J 561 1.:. .. j] 10 f.13 
41YJ9 1f.S~ (<(;:: 1:.:11 15 936 
C"Cf:.., 
.... ,., .... , 1796 9':·9 ,.,~.(1 -10 1:::7-1 
I•H~ ::co.J 1•)(>~1 13;:11 :.:!~~ 15-1.3 
9718 :n~~ '15.:.-1 :::JC..(• ::::].(1 ~IEIJ 
11106 -13-1-'3 190.:: !:!7·.:.:· :)(11) 1CJ1 
1J•31u f;.Jf6 ~ .... ':.'i51 3.~'31 3.:'~ 1:::033 
1f.~OO 5[11)1 31:]7 .J(l!J.J 310 1:"·16 
17t3:! 072'1 3:"1::: o~:: .. :.£• ~91 1389 
1t:'•3J.') 7~1 3::.£•::: &X-5 3:JO 10(") 
~~t.1 1(..,/(1 ~6·:,!3 503:.:! ·3-1:} 15-13 
~~:..:'9 11111 5?:J5 58-3~ 161 
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TABLE 5.2 
PUBLIC 8E(;T(•R E:•:PEN[•ITURE 
R·:;lallv•; I•) GDP al marh·l prio.•<"> fH 
'fEAR GDPAT 
MARKET 
PRif::ES 
1 
TOTP.L E:-:PEUDITURE LW 
1::147 
1~·15 
19·19 
1J5C• 
1951 
19~ 
1955 
1&57 
19f(l, 
1859 
196(1 
1.~-1 
8,4.RB 65(oo'l 
IRmlllk•n) 
170.1 
:.u-:7 
3<:011 
-11 e.; 
5141 
PUBLK· 
:O.ECTOR 
~-1.((• 
:::o .. g 
2f..t5 
::·.).8~ 
:::~.65 
:::'3.79 
PUOU(. 
P..UHIC•FI-
ITIES 
3 
:::J.59 
':...:::.71 
.::1.11 
:::.;,83 
~:15-1 
:~.:!.61 
23.(r.:: 
!::3.1~ 
~.51 
::::::.00 
PlluU(: 
C •:OP.P•:•R· 
ATK!IIS 
1.}J-1 
17.&1 
1\';.73 
10.0:3 
1B.57 
1u.:::r:. 
10.1::1 
18.31 
1fG;j 
W.f-i: 
18.:::.:: 
10.t·1 
19.5~ 
(.0:•11-
SUMPTh)-
tJ E··:P. e·,· 
GENERAL 
GuVEnti-
MEtJT 
8 
1•:0 . .::1 
8.15 
0.•35 
9.5G 
0.07 
':1.10:• 
9..11 
10:•.f.l 
132 
GF••:•S:3 IJC•MESTI(: Fr•Eu 111'/E'>T-
MEtH BY I)A•i.l.tll~l1.TI(ItJ 
8'{ GEtJ. 
GOV. 
9 
1.l·1 
1.7~ 
1.(';) 
~.11 
Le~ 
:::.11 
~.17 
2.71 
~.85 
2.74 
3.07 
3.ui' 
B'o'G•:OV. 
ENT. 
10 
3.713 
'f'r, 
.......... 
5.47' 
-1.1(• 
4.(o5 
-1.86 
4.f9 
-1.72 
4.W 
4.:::4 
3.i't: 
E.'o' PUB. 
CORP. 
11 
(o.-11 
:::.31 
1..113 
1.':.1 
1.39 
:::.1·1 
1.31 
1.2tf 
1.f..:: 
1.!:!1~ 
1.3£1 
RESL•UACE TR4USFERS e·,· C:ol:tiER41 GOVERtiMEtiT 
TOTAL 
14 
(15+ 1o+ 
1i' i· 10) 
-c• /,._,_ 
6.19 
7.-1.1 
6.1)7 
5.:;.-~ 
6.7-1 
6.U 
6.E8 
7.t•) 
6.[,(1 
G.::.,;: 
5.B4 
ltlTEA· 
EST 
o:itJ PUB-
LI( 
DEOT 
15 
1.:::fl 
1.1::: 
1.(,:, 
1.1i.3 
0.01 
(•.t·l 
(I)J5 
0.7•i 
:;.un-
SI[•IES 
16 
1.:JJ 
1.0:•1 
1.:::.: 
1 .. 'J5 
1.37 
1.17 
(•.(<.1 
(•.£'9 
1).713 
0:•.&1 
CIJRF;EtJT 
TRAIJ'3-
FEFIS Tu 
l-lo)U:~~-
1-Io:ol[o.) 
17 
3.4(1 
2.77 
:::.36 
::!.IJ 
~.f(l 
::: .. n 
2.5-) 
2.51 
TR~IIB­
FEr,s T•:O 
THE REST 
•)F 
TliE 
WORLD 
18 
1).12 
0.11 
t:o.lu 
•J.I0 
0.1.:! 
0.11 
0.17 
0.1.! 
lo.1-1 
U.(•) 
u.u.! 
O.O:oo3 
C.4PITAL 
TRIIJIS-
FEriS 
w 
f..l)o) 
2.·12 
1.-16 
1.!}9 
~--1~ 
3.:.2 
2.37 
~-M 
1.77 
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TABLE 5.2 
I'UEILIC SECTojR EXPENDITURE 
R.;l.:.llvG to GuP at rroar~.:·t r.•rlo: . .:,:; (%) 
YEAR GDPAT 
MARKET 
PRICES 
1 
TC•TAL E'.'PEtJIJITURE BY 
t!:K-1 
Hl61l 
1~171 
10:'J 
1975 
1~77 
1978 
8.6-RB 65(16 
(Rmtltlon) 
BJ55 
tut::!f. 
I 1:385 
1~·17J 
PUBUO:; 
5EC.TO:•R 
::::s.:::.J 
::::c.~·:: 
.:.0.3!:. 
3S.io5 
37.(•1 
37.13 
35.a~ 
PUBLio: 
/>.UTI-lOA· 
ITIES 
3 
:!J.;jj 
:::.t.t/1 
=:7.(11) 
J(o.37 
31.::::3 
:::.1.51 
PLIBLIO:-
C.•:tRPO:•R· 
ATI•:OtiS 
;::.) .. 19 
~.1•) 
:::1.7-1 
::!1.81 
~.::.7f. 
::::f .. C.J 
!:!5.t~5 
:::I.-If. 
!::1.F.7 
:::5.01 
~5.73 
Cl)ti-
SLIMPTIO-
tl E'.•'P. BY 
GENERAL 
GuVEnti-
MEtH 
8 
lu.f.t 
10.£S 
11.((~ 
11.-15 
11.f•7 
11.:.•.:; 
12.1E 
13.:::8 
1~.-17 
11.55 
tun 
14.07 
15.13 
1~.45 
tJ.m 
133 
Gfi•:OS;~ uO:•MESTI(: Fr·'EO ltiVEST-
t.1EtiT r;·,· o:OR•:.>•tiiSATIOtl 
BYGEtl. 
GOV. 
9 
.'3.11 
::!.PO:• 
3.f.(o 
3.57 
3.87 
4.16 
u:-; 
4.31 
3.00 
3.3£• 
:3.=35 
[l'o' GOV. 
ENT. 
10 
1.:'J 
4.11 
4.86 
·1.-11 
-1.0:0.:: 
3.55 
3.1-1 
·1.5-1 
5.3.3 
3.(1.:, 
5.l(! 
f..97 
3.il!'l 
El'o' PUB. 
C•jRP. 
11 
1.&-1 
1.7': 
:::.3::: 
~.5::: 
::.x 
!::.5Y 
3.81 
5.16 
6.1;! 
0::.51 
AE~Ollf:O:.E TA.AtiSFERS BY GEtiEfll•L i3•jVERtiMEtiT 
TuTAL 
14 
(l5i·16i· 
17+ 10) 
13.15 
f..f.•j 
- •)·~ 
'·--
7.32 
7 . .::9 
- ~-; ,,...,~ 
f.1f· 
i'.-13 
7.74 
7.f/7 
0.55 
lUTEA-
EST 
O:•tl PUB· 
Ll•:. 
DEDT 
15 
1:0.:'1 
O.IJ6 
t.::::;J 
1.60 
1.-1::: 
1.-11 
1.61 
1 c:~. -~-
U3 
1.61 
1.31 
2.00 
3.32 
WB· 
SI[•IES 
lli 
u.;o 
1.13 
1 r,·. 
t.u:' 
1),(\;:j 
1.•)7 
1.47 
1.-li' 
1.:::1 
O:'URfiEtH 
TFJ•tiS· 
FEf,:~ TO:• 
I-I•:OU.SE-
H•)L[•S 
17 
::!.J5 
~.J3 
2.3.:: 
::::.3!3 
::!.55 
,..,, 
-·'I 
::!.65 
Tfi~ti-3-
Fi:f,,:; To) 
THE RE:;T 
O:•F 
THE 
W•:OI'.LD 
18 
(o.11 
U.((~ 
u.o.:: 
1)/• . ..l 
(\.oj.l 
(o.oli' 
(1,(14 
(t•PIT-\1. 
TA~JJS­
FERS 
w 
3.013 
::!.51 
~.81 
.... -_ ._., 
3.&fl 
1.51 
1.04 
1.f.3 
1.71 
1.73 
1.3·1 
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TABLE 5.2 
PUBLIC SECTOR E•:PENOITURE 
R0lat1v.:. t.:, GDP .:11 marl.o;·t ~·rl··.:·,; (%) 
YEAA (>OPAT 
MARKET 
PRICES 
1 
TOT/11. FPEtJDITURE BY 
HJCoj 
18lll 
19-:i~ 
1iXl3 
19Z~ 
19J5 
19~6 
1c•a:-
19':\j 
H•G9 
199u 
S/IHB C:;5J)6 
(Rmlllloo) 
~-=·3:::9 
71oj[;(o 
8~•f'31 
91-157 
tu7::..::t 
1;!303 
1-1:::135 
1•: IE-::!-1 
1~0::-110:• 
,2.J.::5J::: 
:U2t3f•j 
PUBLI•~· 
fE(,T•)Ft 
:.: 
3-1.26 
33.~~· 
3oUl1 
3:".::1 
3-;'.(o.t 
3C.53 
:r.~'' 
~~ .. ]f 
:).).('.! 
31:.f,[: 
3-1.-l[l 
PU('U(. PUBU(; 
/I.UTI-I•:OR- Co)RP•:OR· 
ITIE3 ATto::•tiS 
3 
:27.'), ::!-1.:!1 
;::e.-t~· :::-l.fJ 
~1.U; ~7.ft 
.:l::.-.. 1~ :::.:u:t~ 
~.:.f .. 'J ::d.f.~· 
2.:J.7t) 3(•.i'J 
3).1:'5 31.1(1 
:);}.Ji" at.~•::: 
:31..::3 .:::~.~-1 
3:::.10:• 3(•.~tj 
31.!:~ ::·f-.65 
134 
RES•:OUAO:.E COtE;UMPTh)t~ 
(.(oU· O:oFI•)::;:; 0•)t.1ESTIG FI'·'EO ltlVEST· 
SUMPTIO:t- MEUT a·,· C•r/il.JliS.~.TIOtl 
tJ E'•'P. BY 
GEt~ERAL 
GOVEnt~- B'o'GEU. B'o'GOV. El'o' PUB. 
tAEtJT GOV. ENT. GORP. 
8 9 10 11 
13.5::0 2.~ • .:: ').:)(1 f..£<5 
n~-=· ~.'.11 3.il•3 f." •• S.j 
15.:35 ~.7(• ~-~3 -U!.I 
15.-1~1 ~.13:! 1.:'·1 -1.:'8 
16.7~ ~.-13 2.95 -1.51 
17.-X• ~.3'1 3.o)~ -1.3.:: 
16.~·> :!.31 2.f.E 3.71 
113.6(• :::.31 ::!.UE :::.09 
17.01 ~ . .::3 1.fl4 !::.5G 
1£l,oj5 ::.17 l.f.O:o :J. ·~ .. :; 
18.:..::! 1.0:) Uti J.::..:: 
TOTAL lUTEA- "-UB- o~URREtH Trt.>IJ.S- G/>PITAL 
1-1 EST SIDlES TFl~ll8- FEiiS T•) TR'.tl3· 
(15116-t· C•t~ PUt::- 16 FEfiS TO THE FIEtT FEF1S 
1;' i· 1,j) U(. I·Kou::.E- OF Hl 
OEE:T I·IO:•L[o::; THE 
15 17 W•:•RLD 
10 
7.77 :::.r:J '1.25 :!.1-1 1),(1~ 1.63 
7.e::: ~-~'3 1.35 ~..:·«3 O.O:ol 1.;'::1 
fl.-1[1 'l.E'!J 1.3.:! 2.-10:• o . .::<. 1.92 
1•).t).) 3.71 1.7:3 :::.SF. l•.:':!~- 2.::15 
10:•.-13 -l.(o5 1.[f. ::!S-I •:0.10 1.:'1 
11.0:•> -1.13 :::.16 !:,1.71 ,)_;:!;- 1.-19 
1(J.I0 -1.15 .::.:::1 ~.o; 0.~~ 1.~3 
,,, 41 .,_,j,:, ::!.:::6 :::=.~32 •).3(1 (•.C5 
9.-11 -1.0:•1 ~-·j~ :=!.71 0.17 0.50 
£•.57 ·1.f.~· :::.(rl ::!.1•:; U.15 o.r:::-
8.0::•) -1 . .:!3 2.•jJ :::.~3 ("t_(l~ tl.'\. 
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These trends indicate that South Africa has not yt-t t-:·:perienced the seemingly typical phase 
of public sector development where the expansion of social security systems leads to a 
rapid increase in the importance of transfers to households in the government budget and 
tends also to increase the measured role of the government in the economy.15 A rough 
comparison of the South African experience with that of the United States and the average 
for fifteen developed countries is given in Table 5.3. In contrast to the developed countries, 
transfers in South Africa are relatively low and the constancy of transfers in the South African 
economy remarkable. 
Table 5.3 
GOVERNMENT RESOURCE TRAtJSFERS RELATIVE TO GDP 
(per cent) 
YEAR USA AVERAGE SOUTH AF-
FOR 15 DEV- RICA (CAL-
ELOPED ENDER 
COUNTRIES YEARS) 
1953/54 5.5 11.9 6.99 
1959/60 6.7 12.9 6.35 
1963/64 7.5 13.8 6 . .25 
1968/69 8.7 16.2 6.80 
1973/74 11.0 18.8 7.08 
SOURCE: Van der Berg (1991a:6, Tabla 1) and Mu811o::r (1939:3-
36, Table 17.5) 
The absence of a "progressive" or "modern" trend in transfer payments in South Africa is 
also shown by the fact that current government transfers to households as a percentage of 
current personal income has fluctuated between tllree and four per cent between 1960 and 
1989 with the exception of a few brief periods (see Table 5.4). This compares with 
percentages of above twelve per cent in si:< of the important OECD countries in 1975 (See 
Table 5.5). 
1SVan der Berg (1991a:2), De Loor (1984:33) and Goode(1984:56). 
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Tabl& 5.4 
CUF.P.EilT TI1MISFEF1S 1'\EGEIVED ri'\•:•M o:>EIIER.t·L •:>•:oVERIIMEtiT 
(R mllll·:on and .lZ .l r.-;r.:•onl.l\)•:0 -:.1 GDP an·1 ~..;rs-:.nal ln.:·)mt~ -
curr.;,rol prle&s) 
·,·EAR 
1961) 
100i 
1970 
19eU 
1~)1 
180:! 
1£<a.J 
1~ 
1835 
n.~ 
188i 
13-J8 
1009 
10::o) 
GC•PAT CURREtiT (:liRFIEIIT 
TF:tJISFEFI'3 
F.E•:.EIVED 
FRO:• M 
GEIIER.AL 
GOVERN-
MENT 
TFtl,fi->FER:;"; TFlt.tiSFERS 
Mft.F,EET lfiC.·jME ~.'3 .:. PER· .13 A. PER-
PF:ICE-3 (Rmilll.::.n) O:.EIITt.o:;E (•F (;EtiTt.GE (lF 
(A milll·:.n) S.6.AB •:>C•P GURRENT 
5AP.B 
65(lo3 
~58';' 
51-'1 
1::~;'J 
61)~~:2 
:"1 ((~'lj 
'=·(•E..'J1 
914!:;7 
107.:.:::1 
1:::J1:::o5 
14::!1:]5 
1<~5:::-l 
19311(1 
!::2:5-32 
!:.T~.::ff.(t 
Table 5.5 
7!:15 
::719 
·~7ft:. 
:3-;'(\.\JO 
-C•l::" 
E-(((:'7 
E~S~9 
-;"(1:'f.(• 
;":71788 
:;.~-~1~ 
11(•1-15 
1::87-1£; 
15::~=~·t3 
1:1."~.!3 
(A million) 
SARB 7512 
1:::91 
1 ~30 
19:11 
~(·:...\ 
·1':~~;) 
~~-1 
~-17 
:::.~1::! 
~.u 
~.('13 
:::.~0 
25!?. 
:.~~ 
~.71 
2.~7 
::!:;.:! 
::!.71 
!::.1€: 
.!.:::o 
GuVEF.tiMEIIT TF:~JI!:.FER3 T(• PE•PLE :.3 .o\ PEP.•:Eti-
T!-.GE O:•F PEP.2•:•U:•L IIF::OME 
(SC•UTH .AFF.I(:A .:.rm .::.aEo::TEO OEVEL•:•F"ED o:.OUIITRIES 
-1975) 
C0UIITI1'( PEP.•:.EIITt..o:.E (•F PER-
-SONA.L INGOME 
USA 12.6 
GP..N . 6.DA 13.1 
UNITED I'II~GD•:OM 13.9 
FRANCE 21.3 
GERMANY 16.7 
SWEDEN 17.7 
S•)UTH .AFRIGA 3.6 
3-:•ur•:.:,s: S . .t-.R.e., •:•L'wt.:·rly Bul/.;fln, Juro•o 1Z.91 ~>fo•:l 
Mu~grava ,m.j Mu:o()r~IJ•? (1 920:1-11, T.:ll:·l·~ :".1) 
ltiG0ME 
-'U1 
1.CJJ 
::lAI3 
:?.-19 
~.:?'5 
-1.01 
0.37 
... 1i 
4.51 
4.35 
... 1-' 
3.:::"9 
~-~:" 
The decline in the relative importance of transfers to housellolds as a percentage of current 
income from 4.35 per cent in 1987 to 3.29 per cent in 1989 (Table 5.4) is also associated 
with a declining share of transfers to households as a percentage of current general 
government expenditures (see Table 5.6). After av.::raging just under 17 per cent of current 
government expenditure in the 1950's transfers declined to 13.59 per cent on average in the 
1970's and to just under 10 per cent on average between 1980 and 1990. From 10.14 per 
cent in 1988 transfers to households dropped to 8. 19 per cent of current general 
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government expenditure in 1990. 
Table 5.6 
GEIIEFJI.Lo:;(.VERIIMEIIT · C:IJF.FcEtiT E"'PEfiOITUP.E :.rm TPJIIISFER3 T(o H•)U'3E· 
HOLDS 
j:;jE;U 
1~ 
197U 
1~ 
Hi31 
1:1~~ 
1:;)3:) 
1~ 
1~ 
1~Je 
1907 
1~ 
192.9 
1:¥..Al 
CUF.REIIT 
E:·:PEf<DITURE 
1. R million 
S.t.F.B 7f51 
3-\i' 
ee1 
~12C 
11261 
1-1110•) 
1C-ll?~ 
::!10:~'3 
-1~':~::! 
s:~u 
ft:·((!1 
CURREilT 
TPJJ~2FEF.3 
TO 
H•:•IJ :.EH(•lD3 
2. R milllvn 
S.II.F:B 7!::1;:: 
:..'l 
127 
:::28 
1~1 
1V?r, 
1831 
::.2(.1) 
:::7::!•j 
~"~J1 
~(·;>~ 
·1~•):7j 
5:f5 
51\J!:! 
TRMISFEP.S 
CURRENT 
E'.F'EIIOITURE 
3. 'Yo 
(O:-OL:/•X•l1) 
16.:'1 
18.155 
1'l5':l 
1(•.e.J3 
10.45 
10.-16 
1o.e.a 
9.87 
10.117 
10.-1" 
1(•.?.0 
10.14 
7.74 
lt can be concluded that particularly since the 1960's the relative importance of the 
government in the South African economy increased significantly when measured by 
government expenditure as a percentage of total production. Added to the apartheid 
legislation impinging on individual freedom, which probably reached its apex in the early 
1970's, this gave the government an e:-.tensive influence over the economy, in contrast to 
its modest role at the beginning of the century. This conclusion holds whichever concept 
of government expenditure is used and notwithstanding the inclusion or exclusion of capital 
expenditures or resource transfers. 113 This interpretation is corroborated by looking at other 
possible indicators of the role of government in the economy, such as public sector 
employment relative to total employment and public sector share of fixed capital and of 
investment.17 
Mohr and Rogers conclude from evidence similar to the above that "the si=e of government 
spending in South Africa increased significantly during the post-war period" and that "(t)his 
16See De Loor (1984:25). 
17See Wilson quoted by McGrath (1979:2-3) and Nattrass(1988:235). 
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was in accordance with international trends". Further, that "the rate of growth of government 
spending since 1965 and the current levels of government spending in South Africa are not 
particularly high". 18 Although the South African experience reflects many ambiguities and 
peculiarities, Mohr and Rogers' conclusion is clearly true for general government consump-
tion expenditure. Figures for 1988 show that South Africa's general government 
consumption expenditure at 17.3 per cent of GDPMP is close to the OECD average, but quite 
a bit higher than the nine per cent of Japan (see Table 5.7). With regard to total general 
government expenditure the South African 31.9 per cent is, however, significantly below the 
OECD average of 4 7.3 per cent for 1935 and compares with the Japanese figure of 32.7 per 
cent (Table 5.8). This differential "performance" in terms of consumption expenditure and 
total expenditure can be partly explained by the relative stagnancy of transfers to households 
in South Africa over the last four decades. Thus, if increased relative government 
expenditure implies a bigger role for government, this "nationali::ation" ::eems not to have 
taken place in the sphere of income transfers and support. Clarification of the sources of 
government growth however necessitates a look at the changing functional composition of 
government expenditure. This is shown in the next section. 
Table 5.7 
G(•IISUMPTK•II E:•'PEIIDITUF:E (•F •::.::ONEF~4L .:;,:.VEP.IIMEIIT Ill RELh.TIC•II El •::.OP 
(h:.r.:.~·nt.:Jg.:p: .. :.ulh Mrl-:3 an·:l ~·' 1-:·:.t.:.:l •:•EGD ar.:l •:OIMr ·:·:.•mlrl·;s) 
CC.UIHFU 19eu Hi71 1975 Ht?3 
GERMAII"f 13.·1 113.9 10.5 :!t).(l 
ITALY 1~8 15.5 15.4 19.5 
JAPAII 8.0:• '3.(1 10.1 10.2 
tiETHERLA.tmS 1·~ ~ 
-·u IR.O 17.4 17.7 
SPAIN 7.-\ e.o:: 9.2 12.3 
U.l\. 1e..J 1-;'.S :21.8 ::::::.•) 
U.S.A 1G.9 18.5 19.1 19.3 
AUSTRALIA 9A 1" <: _... 15.4 1;".6 
NEW :;:EALAtm 10.7 1:::.:; HO 1;".0 
PGRTUG.A.L 1•."•.5 13.5 15.0 1·1.C 
OECD (W.A) 
S.A 9.5 1,., ... , W•- 13.~ 15.7 
ZIMBABWE 
BRAZIL 
ARGENTINA 
18Mohr and Rogers (1991 :68). 
10.?~ 
19 
15 
9 
18 
15 
19 
:·(1 
Hl 
1':i 
1·1 
17 
13 
19 
12 
11 
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TABLE 5.8 
C:iEtlEFAL •::.•:0'/EntlMEtH E:•'PEtlOITURE REL~TIVE TO:• •3[op (P-:;or-
c:,nll:J·~/?·~Uih .toirf •. ·;:t and ~·;oi.;.:IG j CoEO:.[J .: .. :ounlriGC 19r•:O .;,n.j 10~5) 
O.::C•UtlTR'( 1£lftj 1!;1.~5 
GEnt.W.ff :~A .t7.~ 
ITALY 30.1 55.4 
JAPAN 13.3 32.7 
tlETHERL.UlDS 2.~.7 f.l). i' 
SPAitl 18.8 :J9.3 
U.K. 32.3 47.8 
U.S.A 27.0 36.7 
ME.AJJ (.<\ll C•EC[o) 26.6 H.3 
S.A 18.3 ::l0.7 
5.3 The changing functional composition of government expenditure 
A number of factors makes the construction of a useful time-series of the functional 
categories of government expenditure problematical, especially in the South African case. 
At this stage these problems preclude a definitive analysis of long-term trends in the 
composition of government expenditure. The origin of these problems can be related to the 
fact that economists have traditionally focused on the revenue side of the budget, especially 
taxation. Furthermore, the relative importance and total si::e of government expenditure as 
well as the deficit before borrowing, rather than the composition of expenditure, are seen 
as being essential.19 These factors have led to a scarcity of studies on the composition 
of government budgets as well as the absence of widely accepted categories of government 
expenditure. One result of this is that expenditures are often treated in an ad hoc fashion 
in government and other publications. 
More specifically, institutional change (shifting of responsibility between departments and 
levels of government and the creation of new, more speciali::ed departments) makes it 
difficult to trace different functional expenditures over time or to allocate specific expenditures 
to functional categories21) (for example, government debt servicing). Certain expenditures 
may also fulfil more than one function. In South Africa the proliferation of fairly autonomous 
19See also Hendrie (1986:24). 
:):Van der Berg (1991a:4). For the nature of the problem in the field of educational spending 
see Trotter (1988:10-14). 
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general government bodies flowing from the ambition to put each "ethnic group" in charge 
of its "own affairs" has led to the duplication of institutions providing similar services and a 
removal of significant expenditures from the central government budget. The resulting 
fragmentation of responsibilities between different levels of government and the fiscal flows 
following from the centralization of tax authority further obscures the picture. 21 
Most work on the composition of government e:·:penditure in South Africa has been done 
within the framework of constructing what is called "welfare budgets". 22 A welfare budget 
is then defined as "a joint statement detailing e:·:penditure benefits and tax burdens". 23 For 
South Africa the efforts to construct such welfare budgets have been few and almost 
exclusively focused on the differential impact of government taxes and expenditures on 
different race groups. 24 Consequently the functional allocation of expenditures was of 
secondary importance. In spite of the incompleteness of the information, three sets of data 
can be used in order to get an idea of the historical evolution of state expenditure. These 
data cover the financial years 1922/23 to 1938/4025, 1949/50 to 1975/7626 and 1982/33 
to 1987/8827• 
Table 5.9 presents information on the composition of government expenditure between the 
financial years 1 922/23 and 1939 I 40. These figures were compiled by the Social and 
Economic Planning Committee during 1944 as part of an evaluation of proposals regarding 
the expansion of the social security system. As the committee indicated, the figures should 
be interpreted with care in the light of the nature of the assumptions and decisions needed 
to classify all expenditures. lt should also be noted that these figures exclude the activities 
21Van der Berg (1991a:4). 
:::!See McGrath (1979:1-2) and Hendrie (1986:Chapter 2). 
23Hendrie (1986:25). 
~-'see McGrath (1979:7 -11) and Hendrie (1986:39-49) and also their discussions of earlier 
studies. 
25South Africa (1944:97). 
26McGrath (1979:19). 
27South Africa, Central Statistical Services (189Gb) and Van der Berg(1991 :8-9). 
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of local authorities, public enterprises and expenditures on the loan account. 28 lt thus only 
deals with current expenditures. 
r ABLE 5.9(1) 
=utJCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF GOVERf JMEtJT EXPErJDITURE FOR SELECTED YEARS 192.2-19-tO 
[CURRENT R thousand) 
19~~-23 19:27<~:3 193~-33 1937-38 1938-39 
TOTAL CURRENT 50 4213 62 ~~4 61 36-t 91 7013 96 65-t 
EXPENDITURE 
1. GENERAL GOVERN MEt JT .20 614 ~5 3e~ ~2 t31~ 36 9·16 37 730 
2. DEFENCE 1 810 ~ 048 1 442 3 63::! 3 572 
3. SOCIAL SERVICES 20 210 2-t 413 Z6 i92 33 098 41 396 
3.1 EDUCATION 13 70:3 1 7 t:SI-t 18 51-t .23 90-t .25 04.2 
3.2 HEALTH 2 236 3-1.98 3 es8 5 666 6 612 
3.3 SOCIAL SECURITY 1 080 ... ,..,.. , __ ~ 536 5 7-t6 6 63-t 
3.4 FOOD SUBSIDIES 406 476 
3.5 OTHER SOCIAL SERVICES 508 772 686 1 090 1 -tO-t 
3.6 WAR PENSIONS 2 078 1 ... ,,.. ........ 1 398 1 286 1 2.28 
4. ASSISTANCE TO FARMERS 3 092 2 334 2 934 
5. PUBLIC DEBT CHARGES 7 79~ 10 396 7 4:::6 10 r~96 11 0.22 
Source: South Africa (1944:97). 
1939-40 
102 4 1-t 
38 362 
6 062 
42 58-t 
.25 -t3~ 
6 993 
7 132 
438 
1 3~6 
1 208 
3 930 
11 476 
~?.The committee estimated that in 1938/38 the total expenditure of local authorities com-
prised about R38 million of which R23 million were recovered from fees and receipts for 
services. Thus we can say about R10 million of general government expenditure is not 
included in the estimates in the table. This comprised about 10 per cent of total general 
government expenditure. [South Africa (1944:197)]. 
I 
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r ABLE 5.9(2) 
=ut·JCTIOtJAL CLASSIFICATION OF GOVERI-JMEI·JT EXPEI·JDITURE FOR SELECTED YEARS 1922-1940 
:As A% OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT E-XPENDITURE) 
19~~-~3 18~7-~3 1~·3~-33 1937··38 1938-39 
TOTAL CURRENT 100 100 100 100 100 
EXPENDITURE 
1. GENERAL GO VERt JMENT 40.83 40.76 36.85 40.~9 39.04 
2. DEFENCE 3.59 3.29 ~.35 3.96 3.70 
3. SOCIAL SERVICES 40.03 3~12-1- 43.136 41.54 42.83 
3.1 EDUCATION 27.18 23.44 30.17 :6.07 25.91 
3.2 HEALTH 5.13~ s.e: 5.86 6.18 6.84 
3.3 SOCIAL SECURITY 2.14 1.16 4.13 6.:7 6.36 
3.4 FOOD SUBSIDIES 0.44 0.49 
3.5 OTHER SOCIAL SERVICES 1.01 1.2-1- 1.12 1.19 1.45 
3.6 WAR PENSIONS 4.12 "-o ? "0 1.40 1.27 ~.lv 
-·-v 
4. ASSISTANCE TO FARMERS 5.04 :.55 3.04 
5. PUBUC DEBT CHARGES 15.45 16.71 1:.10 11.66 11.4 
Source: South Africa (1944:97). 
1939-40 
100 
37.46 
5.92 
41.58 
24.83 
6.33 
7.01 
0.43 
1.29 
1.18 
3.84 
11.21 
I 
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rABLE 5.9(3) 
=u~-JCTIOtJAL CLASSIFICATIOI~ OF GOVERI·JMEIJT EXPErJDITLIRE FOR SELECTED YEARS 19::-1940 
:As A "to OF GROSS GEOGRAPHIC H~COME) 
19~:-:3 18~7-:3 1~(~:2-33 1837-38 1938-39 
1. GENERAL GOVERNMENT 5.51 4.97 5.13 4.93 5.01 
2. DEFENCE 0.48 0.40 0.33 0.49 0.47 
3. SOCIAL SERVICES 5.40 4.79 6.08 5.14 5.50 
3.1 EDUCATIOf-J 3.66 3A7 4.:o ') ,.,,., 
"'·--
3.33 
3.2 HEALTH 0.76 0.139 0 IJ':' .vu 0.76 0.38 
3.3 SOCIAL SECURITY 0.~9 0.14 0.53 0.77 o.ss 
3.4 FOOD SUBSIDIES 0.05 0.06 
3.5 OTHER SOCIAL SERVICES 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.19 
3.6 WAR PENSIONS 0.56 0.34 0.32 0.17 0.16 
4. ASSISTANCE TO FARMERS 0.70 0.31 0.39 
5. PUBLIC DEBT CHARGES ~.os ~.04 1.63 1.44 1.46 
TOTAL 13.43 1:.:o 13.9::! 1~.36 12.48 
1939-40 
4.78 
0.75 
5.30 
3.17 
0.87 
O.S9 
0.05 
0.17 
~ 
0.15 
0.49 
1.43 
12.75 
Source: South Africa (1944:97) and South Africa Bureau of C.::nsus and Stati~tics (1 960). t JOTE: Financial year 
gwgraphic income was ex1rapolated from calo3nder y8ar information. S~e footnote ~9 for further information. 
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During this period (1922/23 to 1933/39) total current e:.:penditure grew at a slower rate than 
total production in the economy (4.15 per cent per annum on average against 4.47 per cent 
respectively). This resulted in a slight decline in the relative importance of government 
expenditure. A clear trend can, however, not be identified because of the unstable 
fluctuation of government e~~penditure as a percentage of gross geographic income (GGI)29 
between 12 and 15 per cent of GGI. Within this relatively unchanging relative share of 
government the composition of government expenditure between the major categories also 
stayed reasonably stable, although expenditure on social services did grow faster than other 
categories, as well as GGI, at 4.58 per cent per annum on average. 
The composition of social expenditure changed slightly, with social security expenditure 
(including pensions, poor relief and social insurance) increasing more than fivefold, and 
increasing its share of social expenditures from about 5 per cent to about 15 per cent and 
also increasing as a percentage of total expenditure. Health expenditure and food subsidies 
(implemented in 1936/37) also increased rapidly, with education spending falling back in 
relative terms. 
The above figures do not indicate a dramatic shift in government involvement in the 
economy. They do, however, provide some evidence of the start of a process of expansion 
of welfare and other social services in the late 1930's as identified by Pollak and Brom-
berger.311 The steady share of social e/:penditure and the increasing share of "social 
security" expenditure should also be seen in the context of rapidly increasing defense 
expenditures in the late 1930's. Given the high average real growth rates in the two decades 
under discussion (nearly 7 per cent per annum between 1920 and 1930, and 5 per cent per 
annum between 1930 and 194031 ) the slightly increased importance of social expenditure 
can further be seen as a progressive distribution of the fruits of growth. 
::':The source of information [South Africa, Bureau of Census and Statistics (1960:S3)] refers 
to "geographical income". This value seems to be the value of total output measured through 
the production method, that is by looking at value added in the different sectors. 
30Pollak (1960:17) and Bromberger (1982:173). 
31 Nattrass (1988:25, Table 2.1). 
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Judged on McGrath's figures (fable 5.10) government expenditure during the period 
1949/50 to 1975/76 lacked the progressive aspects associated with the foregoing period. 
McGrath's estimates include expenditures of all levels of government except Namibia and 
exclude capital expenditure. Over the whole period gross government current expenditure 
relative to personal income stayed reasonably stable at just under 25 per cent. Social 
expenditures (defined as education, health, transfer payments and others), however, 
dropped as a percentage of total government expenditure from 48 per cent of total govern-
ment expenditure to 39 per cent of total government expenditure. This implied a decline in 
social expenditures relative to personal income. 32 This trend was strongest in the case of 
health and hospitals, transfers and other welfare payments33 while education maintained 
its position. The categories which gained in importance were "Justice, Police, Prisons and 
Defence" and certain economic services, especially "Income Generating Services". 
Table 5.10 
E·:PEIIuiTURE Ct..TEGO:•R"o' 
E•:PEilDITURE t:'ATE•3(•FI'r' .:.s il. PER.:.Et1Pi3E 0F 
TOTAL GRO:oS:O; •30'/EAtiMEIH (.URREIH E•PEIIDI-
TURE 11 
1. Ju:::tl(·•~. f'o~ll·:•;, Prl::·~ns, (',;,f.;,r.o:,'!. 1::! 
~ lr .• :.:.m.:t Gi·r.·r:ralln9 &;NI.: ·~3 :::3 
3. Colto.:.r :lo3rvl·:.;·~ 15 
·1. AJr~:tJilural ;3.;of\Jio:i·.~ .lfl•:l sut·~~jlo;-,; 111 
5. E.:luo:.atrvn 13 
6. Ho;r.altll an·:l 1-..:·::.pll.:rl:; !3 
7. TI'&IUJ81' ~'lYill•'lnls 9 
8. Olh.:.r wdfar.;, ~o:ofVI.:-o-s 
9. Gro:·~:; GurrHol E•·~ •'•rt•:lllur•'l a; P.;·r·:•,·r.t!lgo;. o:,f ~·1 
Pttrs-:·nal ln•X•me 
1rj, "WC~Ifaro; .;:·~-;·MIIur·>5" as a f't',r·:·~nl>~.; of Po'·r- 13 
So)nal l!loX.m.:l 
11.11,;,m~:, 6, 7 an.j 3 a!:. a P0r(•;·r.la:Jo;· .;,f po;.r;·:.nw :'.~ 
Income 
12 
11 
1~ 
7 
1:!1 
13 
10 
10 
~1 
1~4 
10.9 
21 25 
12 115 
19 14 
7 15 
19 19 
8 7 
7 7 
7 I; 
::!3 25 
11 11.2 
5.1 4.5 
The above trend is counter intuitive as well as being out of line with international experience. 
~"Personal income" here is equal to personal income as is normally defined minus social 
pensions, maintenance grants, unemployment insurance receipts and Workmen's 
Compensation benefits. See McGrath (1979:24). 
33For example, subsidies on sheltered employment, transport subsidies, welfare and 
community services and interest losses on housing loans. 
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Nattrass argued that over this period it would have been more reasonable to expect "that 
expenditures on such items as health care, education and other state social services would 
grow faster than total public expenditure, as efforts are made to e:-_tend these services into 
the deprived areas". :J4 Sirnkins compared the South African evidence to a cross-section 
estimate predicting growing importance of public welfare spending to gross national product 
in middle-income countries. He concluded that South Africa experienced "a perverse 
movement since 1949 in the proportion of GNP devoted to social security expenditure by 
comparison with a norm taken from cross-sectional study ... ". 35 
Adequate figures for the period 1975/76 to 1932/83 are not availsble and compiling them 
from the original sources could not be attempted here.36 The most complete and reliable 
figures exist for the financial years 1982/83 to 1 987/33. These figures are derived from a 
study by the Central Statistical Services which includes all types of government expenditure 
as well as all levels of government, and includes Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda and Ciskei 
(the so-called TBVC-states), as well as the self-governing territories. The summarized 
information has been analyzed further by Van der Berg. 37 Summaries of the information 
are reproduced in current rand, relative to total ezpenditure and relative to GDPr.~P as Tables 
5.11, 5. 12 and 5. 13. Table 5.14 provides a further summary according to major expenditure 
categories. 
34Nattrass (1938:239-240). 
35Simkins (1984:30). 
~Abedian (1984) attempted to use the figures from the annual Budget White Paper to find 
"a measure, no matter how crude, of the changes in the composition of Government expen-
diture". [Abedian (1984:2)] His approach is however misleading as he classifies all transfers 
to Provincial Administrations and local governments as "other expenditure". A sizeable part 
of these transfers are earmarked for health and education. His method thus results in a 
significant underestimate of government e:-:penditures allocated to these categories. 
Furthermore, his category "other e:,penditures" is such a large part of the total (in one year 
42.8 per cent) and so variable (between 27.5 per cent and 42.3 per cent) as to make the 
identification of trends impossible. 
37South Africa, Central Statistical Services, (1990b) and Van der Berg (1991a:8-9). 
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TABLE 5.11 
FUfi(;Tio:•loLAL •::L~::.SIFICATI(ltl O:·F •:J!:::IIEP.~L •:J(•VEF.IIt.1EilT E•'PEIIUITUP.E 
(O:.urr>iof'll R muu.-.n I 19'31·1~.J lo:o 1!?!37-~.'}) 
1?-3~/f}.'J 19J3r..t 
TOTAL EAPBmiTURE !::3181 2:'1::0j;' 
CUF.FiEtlT .:.u:..•:.j ·,~cc-
CAP!T.o\l ~~:_.:.,j -:;'j·.~~) 
GDP AT MARI\ET PRIGES 1:'51~1 ~:..:89::1 
1. GEIIERAL G(•VEAtiMEIH :)ER'IIC.ES ~ •• j;Z:E; ::::.-18 
1.1 E:·IHnalailair.; .:-10 tl~ 
1.~ (~.~n·:-ral r·~-~;.:-ar•:.h r-
" 
~ lt~l 
1.3 vtlooCrf 1~-0;) 1 :·.::':o 
2. DEFEtJCE 2-1 •• 07f.-1 
:), PIJBLI(. o:ORuER AND SAFET( 1~·.1:~. 1f€,J 
3.1 P,:ollo::.O CS~ toe.:: 
:J2 f'ri:;.:on;; ;::;:) ~--~~ 
3.J Law o:<·Urls 168 .::03 
3.4 Art! ~-ro1.;.~t~:.n ::-:. .~g 
4. EC•LI(ATI(•N -1-:'-"3 -1S::" 
4.1 Pr•!·promar{, j:>rlm3rv, ·:..;,o:·o:•Wl.)f)' ~.:J7 ,}:;65 
4.2 T urll.)f)' 1111 1J()} 
5. HEALTH 2J£'\ ~878 
6 ':.(J(:to\l SE(.UI11TY MID WELFARE 1511 10:05 
7. H(•U:;t~JG, o:;(oMMU~~ITt' SERVICES :1-\ ~;~r, 
7.1 H•:OIJSI(o•) 17ft 1!Ji" 
7.'1 :;. oW"'f'd•J" ;Jflo:l r,a!"oll.:tll•:ofl 8-"J 1., 
"i".J 01Mr ;::e::<~ 815 
8. P.ECP.Et..Tio:•ti.-"JID ·~ULTURE .~, ' . , ___ .... 
9. FUEL AUD EIIEF.G'r' 3:' e; 
10. WATER ::.uPPL'o' :::~s ')1':; 
11. .o\.•:OFIIO:.ULTLIRE, FO:•FIE::;TR'o', FI:~HIII•:O : ).} 1:::.(• 
11.~ ':'OJt•:;lo:llo;-;;; -"-1ri•:.UHUf.:ll ~·fO:•:IU0::1ii :::::-1 -11') 
11.2 vtr ..... 551 !): • .:: 
e t.IIIIIIIG .4ND MAtJUFACTIJI11tli; f.9: ::00:} 
12.1 Mmlro!~ 1 r::~ "193 ~-1~~ Manul!lo:;luriro•] -~ -~-: :'-!1 
12.:::.1 ~J.:-moc Enc•r•JY O:::·:·r~·:·rall·:·n 1-1:~ ::'?-1 
1 ~-~-~ L•lh~r -: .. ~; ~·57 
12.3 O:·:.ro:>tnJo:.tlon 0 0 
1.'1. TR~tJ::O:P.jRT Mm (:CoMMUIIICATto:•IJ 2-~91 :;:!~!;;. 
1 J.1 :?tJt•.!l•l!•:·~: ~.IJIJUrc·an t•U~ r'-'lt"Z•;tft~C:nl ~~~a :::7-1 
1 ::l.~ -:·UI:OSI )1•!1:: ::.ut•Urt..m train r.::.,:;.;.ng•·r& 1:3.3 R-:·:3•:U. .Jr:,.j ~(wJ 
W'o•:l ·:-m-;r r-:-ad traro.::v·rt 15(01 1•)·;:. 
1 :J.~ O:•tro-:-r 1r.:.n::;r-:·r1 .;,no :I •:·:-mrrouul·: -:.ll•:·n ~~~::! 1::::, 
1-1 O:oTHER EO::(ofK•Mt•:. SERVt•:.E::O 058 .. ~~7 
14.1 [·i<V·>I•:.r•ll'oo;.nt E' 1r.~- (I 5£• 
1-1.:; ~?t·:-ur r.;-laii•:•ro~ .;.n.j pro:-:lu·~llvlly ,-, (1 
H . ..Jvll'oo;r ~~·'3 ~·38 
15. UIJftLL(•CABLE :::s~::f. ::'5(J5 
1!':.1 1r.t"'r"-'sl J1E::3 -116~ 
15.~ Glto·:·r(ro~~allvo:- valu,: & lno:ll·:-.a1o:o .(:'1),] -f,f..7 
no:t :;a .;c vaiU•'<S) 
1~/1'5 J<;"u.;~l""' 1 :; ... ::..;;)37 1:;:.o;'jM 
:J?-1:::-1 !19:'13 -1?':'2:~ f~3'.::€A) 
::-.o1•Xl 0S:-r·(• -1:3E:17 f,2.1U~~ 
... ~J~ f .. :13 t'-~5 t::5N 
11'37~9 t::~,s~., 151210 1;'~;':'6 
.::J71 ·~17 -1~.)) ·18~13 
f.71 0::-1-1 ;]::..:! ;-:~J 
.::se~ .:..~·2 2•:,5 .\21 
21-15 , W1'1 
-1::7·- ::'-431 :~7-JJ 
.u::o3 ~?-~1 •:3. ,· ;'8::-.::! 
.::.:.:.::: ::!~fit) .:·\~.5 :]9'?~ 
1-)6f. 11:)5 ;:(.;:.:~ :::s~--1 
f,(t::! -4:~; f0') 7':-1 
.::7-1 .::~·~ -~f5 -t::.O:o 
V• ~- 71 ::05 1:::'15 
t:-157 7f(•1 :~3~7' 1 ({l·:'~· 
-15:'1 f~~·-·· ;'(105 _;_JJi 
15::··~ 1.?-:-1 ~:.::t-2 :::f·~:' 
~-l70 -3016 -\~::!4 E-1?-19 
:::.•)"7.$ :13&3 0(u35 ~~( .. ) 
7~:f 1(o13 17!:"-'3 1:X•J 
~~'J 5('-1 11!::1 131-1 
175 Wl 1-t::l 1 f.lj 
~.:3 Jl:! :,.:.~ r:'•J:: 
- 0 ;;o 
&1-t 7(•3 778 $g.\ 
7·1 1-17 1-1-'3 1-4 
.:'J::! :);"3 41~ ~00 
1E-~'3 1•:,:,.:. 1:~5 :))16 
~13 -r::t~ :::•)f. -~70 
11:~-l 1''- ., 
-v 1.:::2(1 1~-3-r) 
110:•:0 t~~2 1 '3:-t:: :::.:.o~ 
~f3 .31:0 ;~ ... :;.:! -1(12 
;~St.:. 1.::-14 10::1.:: 1•31:•1 
.)-;'(o 5~~ .:.€(• 70 
5::.) ... ,.~""\ ]~1:, ·""}) J 
I) (1 ...• o) 
:::5::~ :}J)J.l ~-::'lS -W'O 
~~;:: ::!.:,7 -tf(t e;l::: 
115 1-\:~ :~~ 1E.(t 
1~o~:j ::.:.:;-~. :::7-l"i" ')13(1 
1~-(1 -~·)f'l I!?J ;::;?•] 
f(;(l ":-.!!3 ·;141 1~-0 
18-l .~1•) ;::~-~ 2.::7 
,., 
... 97 117 -~·:·6 =~·-i E.t::•)t 1115 
..~f.E'.(• f..::2-t &?0~ f,.,,., 
··-e:.~•J 6.::11 7ll51 8-~15 
-·J-13 ·97:" -1::!19 ·1f-1-'3 
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TABLE 5.12 
FU~lCTIC•NAL Clo\·3~1Fit:'ATI(Itl (oF GEtlEFAL o:;(•VEF.tlMEtlT E•PEtlOITURE (/os .i r·:·r•:·~nla!J•:· ·:Of l~oi.JI g.;.r~:·ral g·:·v•-rrom•:·rol o!>·•r-'·Milur.;) 
TOTAL 
CUFiRENT 
o:..a..PITAL 
1. t"3ENEFlo\L o30:•VERNMEt4T 3ERVIO:.ES 
1.1 E:··t.:.rn.>J alfair.:; 
1.:2 •'='·n•:.rdl rr·:>·,ar·:.l'l 
1.3 Uth&r 
2. uEFENCE 
3. PUBLIC ORDER AND '3~FET( 
3.1 P.:olio;;l;t 
:3.2 Prls.:.n.' 
.J.,J Law .:,.:.urts 
3.-4 Are ror(•l""-llvn 
4. E[•UGATI(otl 
4.1 F'r .... pnmary, r·rlmarv. t.n0:.fooj3JV 
4.~ T ,;rt1ary 
5. HEALTH 
8. RECREATIOt~ 1-ND C.UL TUnE 
9. FUEL AtlD ENEF;u·,· 
1u. WATER SUPPLY 
11. .l>(3RI•~LIL TUF.E, F(•RE::. Tfi'(, Ft::.Hitlo::i 
11.~ SUI:•CI•11•71&: .l..~fi·'Uiiurat r·r·:·1u.:.ls 
1L2 011"1-'r 
1~. Mltlltlt:l l>JlD MAtlUF-V:,TUF;ItJo3 
12.1 Mlnlro\1 
1 :::.~ Maroufaduring 
1::!.~.1 .:.t.:.rnl·~ Ero.:·r·]V ( .:.rr·:ofall·:~l 
1 ~.:!.~ wu~ • .:.r · 
12.3 C.oroSiru·::.llon 
13. TRA.tJSP(•RT l>fl['l C•:OMMUtJIC . .1TI(•tJ 
1:?-.1 .:.ut·::.ldl.:·s: ~•Jt·urt· :.n t•IJS ~·E~·"ro~·:-m 
1 ::1.~ Sut·sl.:ii.;.;,: Sut·•Jrt· .. m tram ~·.:JG·'.;,ro,~·"fS 
0.3 R.:·.l•1G .JII•1 ·:·ll·,.;,r 1•: ~·1 lraroi.~-:-rt 
13.4 eau· •• ,r lrsn3r-:·rt .1rl•1 .:·o:ommuruoo.:lll.:·n 
14 OTHER E(,Gtl•)MIG SERVICE:> 
14.1 D.;.vo3~:·r·rnGnt !?an~: 
14.:2 L'lt ·:.•Jr rooi.JII.:·n.S alloj r•r•:.-1Uo;tlvlty 
14.3 urtoel 
15. Ut!L>LL•jo~J.BLE 
15.1 lrol.:.r.;,st 
15.~ •:•ttoH(roo?:J~IIv.:. vatu.;·3 IMI.:alt~ 
nr,t Gai"'s values) 
100 
U7.57 
1:::-. .:.J 
3.-:'-1 
l.-17 
,:._;o 
6.51 
5.7:3 
:.J.~•j 
!.;\J 
IJ,,J 
(J.I'i 
0.1•3 
1.14 
3.5~ 
1.:::1 
~.='3 
1••.:-o:: 
l.o)) 
1.~a:3 
~~..1 J 
1.::13 
1.:..1 
1.~ 
11.oj;' 
1J.•S7 
-:::.130:• 
100 
.:,0.1)6 
15.(17 
1•:0.·1~ 
~.::::; 
oj,(') 
o).-1-4 
1.14 
1.73 
o . .:-1 
1.15 
4A::! 
1.51 
.::.)1 
1.55 
1~.7j 
1~·Q} 
--..... 
1£-.':U/85 
0 _1(•;• 
.:_ll,t,(ki:, 
H..li' 
13.·1~ 
1:).63 
.t.;G 
1.73 
:JA~ 
(1,1)1~, 
~ .. ~:~ 
1.11 
1.f-3 
1.7·1 
1.15 
1-3 . .01 
16.1-t 
-.r:.--
--.... ·-
1(n) 
~r\:•.(•5 
1-l . .:.o:O 
',1.11 
1.~~ 
IJ,, r.., 
6.7:) 
E'.(oJ 
,, ::1 ... 
'-'••-1 
1 .·.r: 
·--' (t,;"-1 
•).18 
1~.1-1 
U.15 
·1.89 
r:: .. l~ 
.... c:: 
- ... v 
t:::i 
·~·.-13 
O.etJ 
1.:7 
::!.:s 
1A7 
1.J.1a 
1f..f-t 
-:::.1~ 
13.1il 
f5 •. ).':1 
.t . .:.lJ 
1 . .:5 
o),;';) 
O:o • .:.1) 
1g.:::s 
1·1.(•) 
4.67 
1.f.l1 
1 .. :~1 
1.16 
1:::.0:•5 
1..t.57 
"'~., 
--·""-
10:•) 
~3.15 
11.::! 
3.77 
:.:):~ 
f).:"~ 
o).,;L4 
1.'39 
1\.:6 
0.7!2 
::v:t5 (!,71 
~.C5 
1.~·3 
1.57 
7.~" 
•.1.81 
(• . .:.-: 
E.,:;5 
IJ.51 
1.98 
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TABLE 5.13 
FUfiCTIO:•ti.Alo:;t.A.:.SIFIC.ATI•:•tl (•F •:1Ef1Ef!)L •:.O:•VEF.fJMEtH E.'•'PEtJDITURE (f·S ~,;r•:c.nlaoJo:l Gf oJr•:•G'l •lo:·mt>.:otl.:: pro:·1•J·:I ::ll m,;r~·.,,t ~·rl•::Oo.>) 
1~J~f~.J 182-:Jf':'-1 
TOTAL ~7.::1 ~3.-~6 
.:.ur,nE~H :::J.~··] .::::.35 
CAPITAL ~ . .:s ~ . .:J 
1. GEtiERAL o:;O:oVERfJME~H SERVICES 2.2~1 2.f.3 
1.1 E:·r,:.mal '"l~lm 1),. ~ ·=- •).f-1 
1.~ t:>.;.n.;-r a1 r·?~~?-ar-:-:h ,·, .. , •J.~ 
1.3 uU\ilf' i:7:' 1.~;;; 
2. DEFEtJCE ~.c..:. .).::·<:~ 
:3. PUBLI•:: o)RDER AND !3AFETr' 1.5'3 1.:"1 
3.1 Po:.llo:.;. 1.01 t.O:ZI 
3..2 Prl.;.:.ns 1.::V 1 . .'2-5 
3.3 law •X.UrtS •J.:-t• 1) . .::.1 
3.4 Art. prc.lo;..:tlo:.n •:0.(15 fJ.I)5 
4. EDUC.ATIC.N 5.10 5.13 
-t 1 Pr•'trimary, t=ofim.:~ry, z.:n:~.n·j.lfV ::..3(1 . ).;"B 
~.2 T.:.rlaJY 1,:;.) 1 . .:5 
5. HEALTH :.:!.£1 ::::.9:' 
t) So:U:,LAl SECURilY MID WELFAEE 1.;"; 1.~·f, 
.. 
.. HO:oUSIIK:i, o::;ojr.4MUIUT( .)ERVIO:.E:;: iJ.~·J lj,65 
7.1 H·:•IJSirooJ oj,;21 •).I~ 
~:5 t~:;~~re:JI) and t-.:.nll.:~llo:.n 0.1::: •\13 
•),,)j (:,,.~\::: 
8. RECnEATiijN .AJJD CULTURE (•.£(• (1.~8 
9. FUEL Atm Et4ERG'r' 1),(1.1 1),(17 
1u. WATER SUPPLY (o.31 G.-~3 
11. .t.•:.RIO: UL TURE, FO:•F.E:nR(, FISHitJG oEo'3 1.2~ 
11.::: ·~ut·::.ldl.;&: ·'-Jrlculluril.l ~of0:•1U·~Is l!.~ 3 OA.J 
11.2 Ulto,;,r (•.•35 (•.::-J 
1::!. MltlltiG MID MMJUF,&(,TURitJo::. (•.70 (•.06 
12.1 Mlnlro~~ (1.18 1\:-r~l 
1 ~::: M.:.nuloo:lunro9 (•.5.:! 0.7~ 
1 ::: . .:!.1 t.J.~m•·~ Eroo:·rqy •::.UI']:..:.ralk·n (•.1 ~· •\-1(• 
12.~.~ vlh0r l).J:) •i-37 
12.3 o:Omstru·~llc.n 
13. TF.~Jf?.P(lRT At ID CO:•MMIJtuO: .t.TIO:•U .- -~ 
-·.:J- ,; .. 1:' 
D. 1 :~IJt•SI·ji.,s: ::.IJt•urC•:tl'l t•u:; ~·'11?'·~rt·~·•rt- (•.~f. 1),"13 
1:J.2 .;;ut•.?.io:JI•>S: :::;ut.urt.an train r.a:;.:·ri~·'·r>; l).f-1 (•.31 
1 J .. ) f:·:•'1•:1f. ,1ro•1 ·:·tl'oc·r r(•ZJd lran:pc.n 1.71) 1.7~ 
13.4 Gi·,.;,r lraros~..:·rt .;r,d ->:.mrrounl-:all·:.n (1,:;_. 0:•.1-1 
14 OTHER ECO:•ti•:•MIO:- ~:ERVIO:::ES (•.·•~ (•.-:..a 
1 o\.1 C..;-v,;,lo:.prroo;.rot l?arol\ 
1·1.::! Lai:•:.Ur f•:-l.:lll•:.fo:J .:!M ~·ro:-ju.:.llvily 
U...;~ 14.J Gll'1o:ot' u.:~ 
15. Utloi-LLO:•~BLE g:~~ :).0:1 15.1 lm.;r ... sl ·1.::.:. 
1 5.:! ulh••r(ro,;,galiV"' V.lh.ro:.-3 lnojl.:.ate -1),;'1 •IJ.& 
nal :;al&:; values) 
1~~/35 18;JGf&. 1:!«'.£;/37 1987/38 
~9.0:::3 .')~•.f6 .?.1.~<-.;1 :}~0 
;)5..1;" ~7 . .:.1 ... ,_ .:"8.83 
~.25 ~.::'5 -4:41 3.7:' 
2.0:1 ~- :-~;, 3.05 ~-8~ 
•:•.5(• (•.E~·, li.f-1 •US 
o.~J ,·,':"J (1,::!-t •:0 • .::~ 
1.2•) ::::;:a.; ~ .. ~, :::.1-1 
J.f'o:O 3Jl1 ~ -. ., ~-~ 
1.::0 .. 1.£5 ::!.( ... , 2.~ L.u 1.1:~ 1.:J-1 1 .. 1a 
1.50 1.:?5 1.25 1.:'-'3 
0:•.::: .. •).:::J (I.:::J o\:::~ 
•J.(L5 oj,o)5 (1,(-6 lj,(fi 
5.41 .: o-...•.t...l 6.17 6.:3 
.... ,-. 
.... :·1 ~.6;" 4.;"6 
1.;:1 I.E.J 1.5o) 1.47 
3.1)5 3.0:·~ J.~ 3.::15 
1.2~ 1 ::t; ::!.O:o3 :?.CoS 
•:..r:.r. 11,:'8 1.13 1:1.:"4 
·~•.21 o),;)g (l.75 (1.::£ 
•:0.15 o).n •).1(1 •J.•)d 
u . .:.~ l).:::o •).0.\ o).J1 
•:..E: 0.5-t •l51 0.51 
(1.(1] 0.11 (1,1)3 •).(aS] 
•:O.::.J 0.::!8 0.~8 1\~3 
1.:36 1.~'3 1,io1 1.15 
1),2t) •).~·~ (1,;)) (1 . .::1 
1.(•) •:0."'-4 0.131 o),,:l4 
1.(.3 t ~., 1.~·1 1.15 
.: •. ::A t).-25 (•.2-1 ·=--~3 (•.7:• 1).~-.3 1.·:·J (•.~(! 
o).~ 3 •) .. ,. ... (o,.\.1 0.-11 
•M7 •:0.5o:l (1.57 (•.:;1 
.., ~· ~.09 2-U ~-~.6 
• .:..:::f •).~3 •:..:::) IJ.::.J 
0.1(1 (1.12 •).1~ t).(•:3 
1.:"(t 1.75 t .t:::! 1 .. , .. , 
•:0.17 •).24 oj,13 .-.• ~1·a 
•\51 •· •. ea •lt:~ (• . .37 
(•.3-t IJ,45 (1.37 o:O.o'-' 
~.(•) ~..: ... 3.1:'6 3.93 
E-' ..;_2,1) ... ~ ~.]1 
-IJ,, -1 ·•i.:'S -(1.~1 -O:I.f-8 
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TABLE 5.14 
TOT.Al. (R t.11LLI0tlj 
CUF.RENT 
CAPITAL 
GOP AT MARI-ET PRICES 
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The data (used in conjunction with Van der Berg's estimate of financial year expenditure) 
confirm the increasing role of government expenditure in the economy during this period, 
resulting from government expenditure growth consistently above the inflation rate. This 
growth was reasonably evenly shared among the different categories of government so that 
all the major categories identified by Van der Berg (administration, defence, economic 
services, social expenditure and interest payments), increased relative to GDPMP· Three cat-
egories, namely interest, administration and social expenditure, grew faster than total 
expenditure, thus increasing their relative importance in total general government 
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expenditure slightly. Among social expenditures all categories (education, health, social 
security and welfare and housing and community services) increased in real terms and 
relative to GDP and total e:.:penditure. Expenditure on pre-primary, primary and secondary 
education performed the strongest, increasing by more than 20 per cent per annum on 
average. This trend in social expenditure would, however, be weakened if food subsidies 
and subsidies to commuters are included under social expenditures. These expenditures 
were reduced or phased out to a significant extent over this period. 38 
Van der Berg concludes that, in spite of the real increase in social expenditure, the mere 
marginal adjustment in the share of social spending seems contrary to expectations and that 
the still relatively modest expenditures can perhaps be seen as the result of low priority 
being given to social security measures. 39 Although the period after 1970 then exhibited 
"limited incorporation of previously disenfranchised groups" it is also true that "ideological 
and defence expenditures still remained large and even increased and poverty received little 
attention". 40 
This conclusion is bolstered by also considering some other aspects of economic policy as 
well as the revenue side of the budget. The increasing focus on the elimination of indirect 
subsidies (such as the cross-subsidization of railway commuters)4\ the phasing out of 
subsidies with leakages to the non-poor (such as the bread subsidy and the zero-rating of 
basic foodstuffs for indirect tax purposes), restrictive monetary polic/2 and a greater 
reliance on more regressive indirect ta:<es4~ all affected the poor with little being done to 
alleviate their plight. 
38Van der Berg (1991a:12). 
3-~an der Berg (1991a:10-12). 
'"Van der Berg (1991a:13). 
41Van der Berg (1991a:12). 
42Abedian (1984:20-21). 
43Abedian (1984:19) and Hendrie (1986:215-217). 
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5.4 Conclusion 
One clear conclusion from the foregoing is that the role of government in the South African 
economy has increased dramatically over the last seven decades. From the incomplete 
evidence it would seem that all functional categories shared in this growth so that 
accounting for the growth is difficult. Drawing conclusions about changing provision of 
social services and possible "nationalization" is thus complex. 
If relative share in the budget, and its change, indicates priority and changing priority there 
is some evidence that the 1920's to late 1940's saw increased attention being given to social 
security, including income support, health and education. This trend, however, was reversed 
between the early 1950's and middle 1970's with a sideways movement since the 
mid-1970's. If the size of the different categories relative to some indicator of production is 
taken, this generalization is vindicated, except that a more progressive adjustment in the 
1980's is indicated. 
What is surprising is that there has been no marked shift in the importance of welfare 
expenditures and transfers relative to other expenditures over the period and the clear 
perverse movement in social expenditures between 1950 and 1975. As indicated earlier, 
such a trend is contrary to international experience and reasonable expectations. 
Borcherding has concluded for the American case that the "growth of the share of govern-
ment in GNP is proximately 'explained' by the tremendous increase of transfer payments 
relative to that of the economy itself". 44 As has been indicated in Chapter 2, transfer 
payments and expenditures on other social services by government can explain a large part 
of the growth in government in Western Europe and is an important part of the evidence for 
the nationalisation of social security. 
In the light of the above the South African trend is remarkable. Two explanations are 
4
"
1Borcherding (1985:363). See also Von Braun (1991 :397-400) for evidence for the deve-
loping countries. He concludes that "the relative share of public spending on social security 
tends to increase drastically only when economies reach the upper middle-income level 
where spending reaches about a quarter of government expenditures" and "(h)ardly any 
developing country has failed to combine growth with massive expansion of public sector 
expenditure on social security" (Von Braun, 1991 :398). 
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possible. In the first place it can be argued that the South African development is contrary 
to the hypothesis of nationalization. In other words, in the South African case ideological 
or other factors worked against the supply and demand forces identified in Chapter 3. 
Therefore, the expected reassignment of functions from other intermediate groups to the 
state did not take place. Alternatively, it can be argued that South Africa is still at a stage of 
its economic development where it is impossible or not necessary to expand state provision 
as rapidly as normally takes place in industrializing economies. The following chapters look 
in more detail at the nature and development of social provision in South Africa after 1910 
in order to address this issue further. 
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CHAPTER 6 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE GROWTH OF STATE PROVISION 
OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA AFTER 1910 
6.1 Introduction and broad outline 
lt is not possible in this study to provide a detailed history of state intervention in the 
provision of social services between 1910 and 1990. Neither is it feasible to trace and weigh 
the forces which caused changing provision. Both endeavours would be too vast and 
require a more detailed knowledge of South African history than can be offered here. The 
objective of this chapter is more limited; it is to give a brief overview of the evolution and 
growth of certain aspects of state provision of social security in South Africa between 1910 
and 1990. This overview will then be used to provide some generalizations about the nature 
of the process of changing provision in South Africa. 
lt is necessary to outline the situation in terms of the different social services at the time of 
Union, before subsequent developments are discussed. The broad interpretation of the 
historical process, which was hinted at by Bromberger and is in line with the hypothesis of 
nationalization, is that in the modernizing economy in the twentieth century it progressively 
became more necessary to extend fiscal welfare to all groups in order to ensure growth and 
stability. The provision of social security particularly since the 1970's, but also between 1910 
and 1950 then reflects "the sustained growth of a common economic and social domain".1 
Notwithstanding this longer term trend, developments in the social sphere were not without 
contradictions. 
The paradoxical development of social provision2 can be traced in stages, each identified 
by subtle changes in policies affecting redistribution, based on an earlier analysis by 
Bromberger.3 The broad outline of the history• is that between 1910 and 1948 there were 
1Bromberger (1982:196). 
2See the quote from Pollak in Chapter 7. 
1Bromberger (1980). lt should be remembered that Bromberger dealt with all"policies affect-
ing income distribution". The focus here is on the provision by the state of services pro-
viding social security and is thus much narrower. 
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increased adjustment and efforts to adjust social policy to the needs of a developing 
economy. This can be seen in the extension of public support structures, not only to tradi-
tionally vulnerable categories of the population (the old, etc.), but also to a limited extent to 
those who become vulnerable in a changing capitalist economy. These include the 
unemployed industrial labourers, the victims of occupational accidents and those with family 
responsibilities. &1ension of expenditures focusing on promotion, rather than protection, 
such as education, health and housing, also took place and tended to become more evenly 
spread. 
After 1943 there was a clear effort to limit the state's responsibility with regard to promotion 
and protection to the white population. lt was attempted to force the burden of the care of 
the African population onto African households, especially those in the rural areas. This was 
coupled with an increased recourse to outdated methods of controlling and concealing 
poverty, such as restrictions on mobility and vagrancy. While it was endeavoured to limit 
the coverage to certain groups of the population there was also stagnation in terms of the 
risks covered. Even with regard to the "fiscally enfranchised", very limited extensions to the 
safety net took place. 
The inappropriateness of a system of provision disregarding the interdependence between 
people in a modern economy soon, however, forced adjustments. Ever since the late 
1960's, a reluctant move towards the reincorporation on an equal footing of all groups into 
the sphere of social policy, can be discerned. The hesitant incorporation of people into 
social policy increasingly came into conflict with the structures of apartheid, the implicit 
acceptance of collective interests being irreconcilable with the ideological denial of 
interdependence. This led to a persistent necessity to move away from important aspects 
of the apartheid economy, such as happened with the acceptance of black trade unions in 
the 1970's and the gradual acceptance of the failure of influx control and the homeland 
system during the 1980's. In the sphere of social provision this caused, for example, a 
realization of the need for rapid extension of educational opportunities and, later, it led to 
steps to equalize welfare payments (especially social pensions). Despite strong intentions 
to the contrary the state came to play an ever increasing role in the provision of social 
. 
4The rest of this introduction is a summary and interpretation of the information in the rest 
of this chapter. 
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services to all groups. 
In spite of this trend very little materialized in social policy which took the risks and types of 
poverty catered for beyond those covered in the late 1940's. There are, however, some 
signs that there is currently a realization of the e:·:tent and nature of the need for social 
provision. 
Two aspects can be noted about the identified historical shifts. Firstly it should be realized 
that the fiscal disenfranchisement after 1943 did not imply a more limited state role in the 
economy. On the contrary, in terms of government output as policies rather than goods and 
services, the 1950's saw a dramatic increase in state control of the economy.5 This 
increased role was concentrated not in the field of social provision, but in the control of 
individual decision making and of the production process. The importance of the state in 
guiding change was never doubted. lliffe argued that "(a)s the urban crisis deepened 
[during the 1940's], the one point on which South Africans agreed was that its solution 
required central government intervention. For Afrikaner Nationalists this conviction pointed 
towards the Apartheid programme. For liberals it necessitated the extension to Africans of 
all welfare benefits hitherto confined to other races". 6 That the "liberal alternative" reasserted 
itself without too much delay, however, owes less to ideas than to the objective requirements 
of a modern economy. The failure of the apartheid government to stem "demands" for 
increased social provision does indicate the strength of these forces and the pressures 
which can be expected in future. 
Secondly, the belated and hesitant shift to an alternative to the apartheid fiscal paradigm7 
was associated with significant rhetoric related to, and some action towards, privatization. 
This is also true for the social services. 13 Coupled with this there is a widespread view 
among economists that "unproductive" expenditures cannot be afforded. In this view 
5See, for example, the essays in Van der Horst and Reid (eds.) (1981). 
6 lliffe (1987: 140). 
7See Van der Berg (1989a:197-198 and 1989b:17-18). 
8Hendrie (1986:214-215) and various issues of South African Institute of Race Relations 
Yearbook. 
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increased social spending is only indicated if it provides investment in the future productivity 
of labour.9 On the basis of these views it can be said that a narrow economistic approach, 
although less informed by racial overtones, still predominates in the social sphere. 
6.2 State provision in 191 0 
In terms of income support measures the major activity of the state in 1910 was the 
provision of poor relief. Voluntary organisations presumably played the dominant role in 
welfare provision.10 With the formation of the Union in 1910 the responsibility for poor relief 
was assigned to the provinces, which implied a continuation of the situation before 
unification. Until the late 1920's this role of the provinces made them larger contributors to 
social welfare than the central government.11 lt is quite probable that poor relief was the 
most important state programme in the social welfare field until about 1928. Although the 
precise nature of involvement of the different provinces varied12, the general nature of 
provision was described as follows: 
" In all the Colonies at the time of Union ... distribution of poor relief was 
effected by two methods - generally throughout the rural areas and in all but 
some of the larger urban centres by the distribution through magistrates of 
small doles either in money or in kind, and in some of the larger centres by 
the subsidization of charitable societies whose operations were similar in 
character though less restricted as to the amount of cash grant and the variety 
of the supplies. In some urban centres the two methods were, and still are, 
in use side by side. Only foodstuffs or money to buy foodstuffs are ordinarily 
given, contribution towards rent or other needs being exceptional."13 
After Union this system persisted without any major change. In the 1913/14 financial year 
9See Nattrass and Roux (1991 ). 
10Hendrie (1986:87). 
11 11iffe (1987:120). 
12lliffe (1987:120) and South Africa (1944a:62-63). 
13South Africa (1937:5). 
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R94 670 was spent on poor relief14 compared to "total geographical income" of R265.8 
million in 1912.15 The largest part of this expenditure was disbursed through magistrates 
(68 per cent in 1913/14), with the rest flowing to voluntary organizations to help finance their 
poor relief efforts.16 Pollak has remarked that at this stage "the concept of social welfare 
was limited and rigid- it was confined to relief of distress".17 
With regard to education it was indicated in Chapter 4 that by 1910 the role of the state in 
White education, via the provinces which managed the education for the central government, 
was becoming more extensive. This was a result of the continuous widening of the age 
group subject to compulsory education and the acceptance by the state of the financial 
implications of this action.18 Pollak reported that at the time of unification, schooling was 
compulsory for White children up to the age of fourteen and that this education was free in 
all provinces, except the Cape.19 Expenditure by the provinces was subsidi::ed by the 
Union government through a system of grants-in-aid. The amount of the subsidy was based 
on provincial expenditure of the previous year, while allocation of funds between races was 
left to the provinces. 20 While some state money did flow to the mission schools (which 
accommodated the majority of African school-going children) this seems not to have been 
the major source of their financing.21 
The present division of labour between central government, the provinces and local 
authorities in the provision of health services had its origin with the formation of the Union. 
Environmental services became the responsibility of local authorities, with hospital services 
going to the provinces and the residual and coordinating responsibilities lying with the 
14South Africa (1937:10). 
15South Africa (1960:5-3). 
16South Africa (1937:10). 
17Pollak (1960:3). 
113See Malherbe (1925) for an overview of developments during this period. 
19Pollak (1960:2). 
20Hendrie (1986:92). 
21 See Section 5.2.5 above. 
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central government. 22 Medical services to the inclig6nt, such as the use of district surgeon 
services, were financed by the provinces out of their poor relief budgets. In some cases 
local authorities had to contribute to these costs. 23 
In the field of housing and personal welfare services, state activity seems to have been 
insignificant at the time of Union. In spite of this, control over urban settlement through 
systems to isolate African townsmen in locations dates from before 1910. While the 
elaborateness of control differed, the responsibility for housing provision lay mostly with the 
individual. 24 
6.3 1910 to 1933 
This period can be seen as one during which there was significant innovation in the field of 
state provision of social security in South Africa in the sense that many new schemes, 
previously unknown in the country, were introduced. The process, if anything, was 
piecemeal and uncoordinated. In most instances Africans and Indians were excluded from 
benefits, and the unwillingness of white parliaments to use gen6ral government revenue in 
the financing of services to Africans became clear and found its way into legislative 
provisions. The end of the period is marked by the establishment - within the Department 
of Labour - of a Department of Social Welfare which inaugurated a period of more 
coordinated, ambitious and equalizing action in the provision of social security.25 
In the field of income support this period saw the introduction of a number of assistance 
schemes related to the workplace. After 1911 compensation for phthisis and silicosis was 
granted to African miners2f'l and "compensation for injuries sustained at work" date from 
22Hendrie (1986:100). 
23South Africa (1937:6 and 11). 
24lliffe (1986:115-116). 
25lliffe (1987: 121 ). 
26lliffe (1987:141). 
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1914.:!7 Rudimentary industry-based unemployment insurance, with the printing and 
newspaper industry in the forefront, originated in 1919.28 
An early and rare example of a categorical welfare benefit in the context of South African 
welfare policy was a maternity allowance paid in terms of labour legislation from 1918. The 
Factories Act of 1918, and later the Shops and Offices Act (Act no. 41 of 1939) and the 
Factories and Works Act (Act no. 22 of 1941 ), prohibited women in the applicable jobs from 
working for four weeks before confinement and for eight weeks thereafter. Maternity 
allowances, originally administered by the Department of Labour, then served as 
compensation against loss of earnings for these women for the compulsory twelve weeks. 29 
No means test or contribution condition was enforced. The only precondition for receiving 
benefits was employment in the covered sector at the time of pregnancy. lt was then a 
good example of a categorical payment aiming at income maintenance during a particular 
phase of the life-cycle. Although there are no references to racial discrimination in access, 
coverage was limited as a result of the exclusion of large groups of women workers such 
as clerical workers, farm workers and domestic workers so that this benefit was also 
selective (not universal). In 1932, 330 of these grants worth R1.50 per week for twelve 
weeks were awarded. In later periods coverage became wider.30 
Outside the workplace assistance also grew apace. In the field of child care and provision 
for poor families, a first system_otcash_grants date to this period. Initiatives in this area 
have a long history as was noted in earlier sections. In Chapter 4 it was shown that a 
system of grants to people taking custody of orphans and to widows first appeared in South 
Africa in the late 1600's as part of the Dutch Reformed Church's welfare network. The need 
to provide for destitute children also led to the first specialized private welfare institution in 
~-
the Cape in the form of the privately funded Orphan House which was founded in 1817. 
27Meth and Piper (1984:3). No references are given on the introduction of workmen's com-
pensation and the exact origin and method of introduction could not be traced. The Social 
Security Committee of 1944 remarked that by 1923 the schemes for miner's phthisis and 
workmen's compensation were already long standing. 
28Meth and Piper (1984:4). 
29South Africa (1944a:16 and 60) 
30Meth and Piper (1984:30). 
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Other early institutions, such as the Anglican's Zonnebloem College (1856-1857) and St 
George's Orphanage (1862), also focused on the care of deprived children. In the different 
colonies and republics before Union state activity in the provision of education to the poor 
was also found.31 At the time of Union organized intervention to provide for destitute 
children and children from poor families was thus nothing new.32 
Between 1905 and 1910 there seems to have been an upsurge of activity in the field of child 
welfare, purportedly caused in part by the publicising of high infant mortality levels (above 
100 per 1000 live births accor,ding to one source) by the Cape Town Medical Officer of 
Health in 1906. The activity consisted of the introduction of child protection legislation in the 
different colonies, the founding of voluntary child welfare societies, presumably of a 
coordinating nature, and the provision by larger municipalities of preventative health care 
units.33 
In 1913 the Union Government introduced the Children's Protection Act which "formulated 
and consolidated the social measures to be applied for the protection and care of infants, 
neglected and maladjusted children". In terms of this act Children's Courts were 
established, Commissioners of Child Welfare appointed, among other things to oversee the 
care of children not living with their parents, and certain crimes against children were stipu-
lated and penalties imposed. 34 While the act thus gave the powers to refer children to 
institutions and appropriate care, no provision was made for the financial implications of 
such referral. This was especially the case where it was found preferable to leave children 
in the care of their natural parents because neglect was seen as being the result of poverty 
only. In cases where such "out relief" was needed it had to depend on the work of private 
organizations or, in the case of severe deprivation, to be effected through the poor-relief 
channels. 35 
31 See Chapter 4, above. 
:nsee Chapter 4, above, and lliffe (1987:100 and 102). 
33South Africa (1940:43). 
34South Africa (1940:44-45). 
35South Africa (1940:59). 
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An important next step was taken with the Child Protection Amendment Act of 1921 which 
authorised the payment of maintenance grants. These became payable "to mothers, 
stepmothers or grandmothers for the care and maintenance of a child in respect of whom 
an order committing him to their care has been made under the Act" and if the woman was 
a widow or if the father was unable to care for the child for reasons beyond his control. The 
system of children's allowances was originally administered by the Union Department of 
Education. 36 
As in later years, very few Africans benefited from these grants. Children's allowances were 
only paid to African children in exceptional circumstances. No grants were made to rural 
Africans and other avenues, such as the repatriation of children to relatives in the rural areas 
or the provision of day-care services so that the mother could work, had to be exhausted 
before application could be lodged for a maintenance grant in respect of an urban African 
child.37 
Military pensions which consist of payments for disablement and to survivors as a result of 
service as a non-permanent member of the defence force date from 1919.38 An important 
innovation in the sphere of social policy came with the Old Age Pensions Act of 1928 and 
the first payment of these non-contributory, means-tested pensions to White and Coloured 
pensioners in 1929. As is still the case, the pensions applied to men above the age of 65 
and women above the age of 60. In 1929 the maximum pension paid to Whites was R5 per 
month and to Coloureds, R3. 39 Also in the field of social welfare there were moves to co-
ordinate provision through the creation of the National Council for Child Welfare in 1924, and 
the National Council for the Blind and Deaf in 1929.40 Pollak has referred to these changes 
in the field of social welfare as representing a movement "from pauper relief to public assis-
36South Africa (1940:59). 
37South Africa (1944a:61). 
38South African Statistics (1990:6.14). 
a
9See Hendrie (1986:87). 
401liffe (1987:121 ). 
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tance". 41 Associated with this was the decline of the relative importance of poor relief in 
welfare provision. 
In the field of education, compulsory education became free in the Cape in 1920. The Union 
Government took over the function of financing and allocating funds to African education in 
1922. In 1925 the method initiated in 1922, to earmark a proportion of African direct taxes 
for educational spending for Africans, was e; ... tended. Henceforth a percentage of the poll 
tax on Africans plus a fixed amount from general revenue would be allocated to African 
education. This resulted in an effective link of e;.:penditure on African education to the ability 
of Africans to pay taxes. 42 
The Public Health Act of 1919 established a separate government department of Public 
Health. Service provision stayed in the hands of the different levels of government, except 
for local authorities getting responsibility for dealing with infectious diseases with assistance 
from the Union government through subsidies.43 The fragmented nature of provision and 
control also continued in spite of recommendations to the opposite effect by the government 
appointed V os Committee. 44 An analysis of statistics about hospital services in 1928 shows 
that there were 17 918 hospital beds available which were used by 325 888 patients. 
Although housing a smaller number of beds than the "public" hospitals (33 per cent of the 
total versus 42 per cent), "mine and industrial hospitals" accommodated most patients (55 
per cent against the 31 per cent of public hospitals). The majority of patients in these "mine 
and industrial hospitals" were African. Private nursing homes contained 12 per cent of 
available beds and catered for nearly ten per cent of the total patients. 45 
41 Pollak (1960:3). 
42Hendrie (1986:93). 
43Hendrie (1986: 1 00). 
44Hendrie (1986:100). 
45Calculated from Union Statistics for Fifty Years [South Africa, Bureau of Census and 
Statistics (1960:04-08)]. lt is not clear whether the mine and industrial hospitals were state 
funded and run, or whether they were operated by employers, especially the mines, with 
subsidies by the state. In later years the decline in importance of these mining and industrial 
hospitals was to an extent balanced by the rise of mission hospitals which were subsidized 
by the state. See the above statistics and Pollak (1960:4). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
164 
Part of the cause of the influen=a epidemic of 1919, which killed a large number of people, 
was attributed to the conditions in slums and African locations. 46 This prompted the 
appointment of a Housing Committee in 1919 and the passing of the Housing Act in 1920. 
This Act made provision for the state to assist the process of housing provision through the 
advancement of loans to local authorities if approached in this respect. A more radical 
proposal for complete state control of building activity in order to give priority to housing was 
not acted on. lt was also decided not to provide sub-economic loans as such loans entail, 
it was argued, a subsidy to employees. The act was amended in 1930 to provide for loans 
at sub-economic interest rates but Africans were initially excluded from these provisions. 
The Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 also had important implications for the housing of 
and the provision of services to Africans. In the first place it prohibited freehold tenure for 
Africans outside the reserves and secondly, it made provision for local authority participation, 
and, if so chosen, monopoly in the manufacturing of beer. Although expenditure on African 
areas was not limited to income from the area, legislation enforced the separate administra-
tion and approval of expenditures in these areas. lt would seem as if essential services to 
Africans were financed from revenues out of beer brewing profits and other charges on 
Africans. Pollak has described this principle, of making the provision to Africans of social 
services self-financing, as "one of our South African paradoxes - the economically most 
underprivileged . . . largely pay for their own services". 47 This principle also held sway in 
education. 
The reasons for the exclusion and differential treatment of Africans are complex. The 
motivation for this differential treatment of Africans with reference to maintenance grants was 
explained as follows: "Having regard to the fact that under Native law it is the natural duty 
of the head of the kraal or guardian-at-law to support any minor belonging to his kraal or 
under his care, and that the granting of maintenance by the state will probably lead to an 
evasion of the responsibility ... grants will not be made in the case of Native children residing 
in the rural areas." Furthermore, "it is felt that the payment of cash allowances to Natives 
residing in the towns will be an incentive to ~Jative women to flock to the urban areas and 
•
1a,nesetwo paragraphs on housing rely on Morris (1931 :23-30) and Hendrie (1986:109-110). 
47Pollak (1960:4). See also Morris (1981 :26). 
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thus aggravate a position that has already become acute". 48 This reasoning is significant 
as it was used as motivation for the exclusion of Africans, and especially rural Africans, from 
a large number of welfare benefits. In the case of social pensions the Social Security 
Committee of 1 944 explained the reasoning behind the initial e:,clusion of Africans as follow: 
"Rural natives were excluded from old-age pensions mainly on the assumption that Native 
custom makes provision for maintaining dependent persons. Urban Natives were excluded 
in consequence, regardless of their needs, owing 'to the difficulty of applying any statutory 
distinction between them and other Natives'"49 
From official documents such as those quoted above it would seem as if by the 1930's 
officials were starting to realize that the above motivation for exclusion of Africans, if ever 
validfJ), was becoming groundless51 • The 1944 committee argued that the exclusion of 
people with rural links from welfare provisions on the grounds of the possibility of support 
from the rural areas was "based on a misconception of the living standards of Reserve 
Natives and of the ability of the family group [in the rural area] or in town to care, 
unassisted, for the children of absent relatives or for old parents or invalids". 52 An earlier 
commission also realized the impact of a modernizing economy on communal support 
structures. lt argued that "the spirit of family and clan responsibilities which is ingrained in 
tribal custom has hitherto minimized appeals for provincial or national aid for Natives living 
under the tribal system save in times of general distress, but it is evident that the ability if not 
willingness of the kraal to maintain its helpless members is decreasing and that provision for 
these will have to be made on an increasing scale by the community in general. The 
number of detribalised Natives living in and around the large centres is increasing, and for 
48South Africa (1944a:61). 
4?South Africa (1944a:20). The inside quote is from an earlier commission report. 
~e important theme of this study that the state takes over welfare services from other or-
ganizations under certain circumstances and the motivation behind it could be used to argue 
the validity of the view under certain conditions. 
51 Bromberger refers to "an intense awareness of problems including malnutrition, lack of 
primary health care, and rural deprivation among some policy-makers in the 1940's" 
(1982:186). 
52South Africa (1944a:20). Further on they also argue for the extension of benefits to farm 
workers. 
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these some enlarged provision will undoubtedly have to be made". 53 
This awareness of the inadequacy of services to Africans54 among civil servants and 
advisors to the government might have been influential in leading to a shift in perspective 
on welfare services to Africans. Another important influence in these times was the 
publication of the report of the Carnegie Commission in 1932. The report not only drew 
attention to the existence of widespread poverty, but also to the flaws of the contemporary 
system of poor relief. 55 
An important criticism of the provincial system of poor relief by especially the Carnegie 
Commission, was that it failed to modernize itself, and as a result focused only on relief 
without giving attention to the important problem of rehabilitation. The system was seen as 
harmful as it led, it was believed, to pauperization through creating, with other state 
measures "a very marked tendency to dependence, especially on the state". 56 The 
preponderance of general relief work by voluntary organizations, instead of specialization 
into a specific area of care, was viewed as another outflow of this "unscientific" approach 
towards relief. 57 Lastly it was felt that the S)IStem of provision was unnecessarily complex 
and that a lack of coordination of welfare activity led to duplication, an absence of uniform 
standards and a failure to exchange relevant information. As a result it was recommended 
by the Carnegie Commission that a body falling under one of the existing government 
departments be created to increase coordination, cooperation, research and the 
53South Africa ("1937:"15-"16). Other official documents echoed these ideas. See the referen-
ces in South Africa (1944a:20) 
s.1See also lliffe (1987:121) on the inadequacy of welfare services for Africans. 
551n South Africa (1940:2) reference is made to the "Carnegie Commission's undoubted 
influence on public opinion". 
seGrosskopf, et al. (i 932:xxxi). A large number of state activities were blamed for this ten-
dency towards dependence. A number of them were "gratis provision for the board and 
education of the children, sometimes even of books and clothes; child welfare; providing the 
unemployed with work; provision of food and housing; provision of land and stock on the 
easiest terms; gratis care of the sick and aged; relief of distress due to catastrophic events 
(and) advances on farm produce". 
57lliffe (1987:121 ). 
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dissemination of information. 58 
The state responded to this recommendation by establishing a Department of Social Welfare 
within the Department of Labour in 1933. This step can be seen as the inauguration of a 
decade and a half of rapid expansion in the coverage of state social services. The next 
period is then a good example of a phase of increasing "nationalization" of welfare services. 
6.4 1934 to 1948 
This period has been termed a phase of "limited progress towards incorporation and 
equality", which showed "some evidence of government acceptance of the need for the 
provision of increased welfare for all citizens". 59 The "progressiveness" of this period can 
be seen in a number of developments. Not only was there an increasing role (administration 
and regulation) for the central government in the provision of social security but also an 
increased coverage of the risks associated with a modern economy, as well as an extension 
of the benefits of previously instituted schemes to e:<cluded groups. In some of the areas 
of provision there was also a reduction in the extent of the inequality of benefits. 
In 1940 provincial poor relief responsibilities, except for Natal, were transferred to the 
Department of Social Welfare. This department had become autonomous in 193t>O. The 
Department immediately set out to rationalize and co-ordinate the system of poor relief. 
Although the previous channels of distribution stayed largely intact, organizations were urged 
seGrosskopf, et. al. (1932:xxxiii). For a summary of the problematic aspects of the poor relief 
system see South Africa (1937:14-15). One commentator felt that the founding of the 
Department reflected more than a response to justified criticism and can be laid at the door 
of the Great Depression. He argued that "(t)he engulfment of large numbers of industrious 
and thrifty Union citizens, especially farmers, by the backwash of the world depression badly 
jarred the then current and complacent conception that the attainment of success was en-
tirely an individual matter and failure a form of personal dishonour". (South Africa, 1940:2). 
598romberger (1981: 172). 
60South Africa (1944a:2-3). The rest of this paragraph is based on South Africa (1944a:63) 
and lliffe (1987:121-122). 
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to specialize, to prevent overlapping (through the use of central registers) and to give a 
more important role to rehabilitative work. The investigation of all applications for relief was 
instituted and various principles had to be applied in the allocation of relief. Racially 
differentiated "ration scales" (minimum needs or standard rations) were drawn up by the 
department and the objective of assistance was to give the indigent command over this 
'"minimum need' pauper ration". Other principles included the almost exclusive reliance on 
benefits in kind, essentially food rations, the e:<pectation of a return service and the necessity 
to register with a labour bureau in order to qualify for benefits. Poor relief agents had to 
make sustained efforts to get relatives to fulfil their duties with regard to their kin. lt was also 
specifically stated that "(i)n no case (was) government relief funds to (be) used to 
supplement low wages". 131 "Additional poor relief", in the form of basic necessities other 
than food (eg. fuel, medical appliances, etc.) as well as, in exceptional circumstances, rent 
allowances, could be provided. Evidence for one large town indicates that the changing 
administration of poor relief led to a severe reduction (about 60 per cent) in the number of 
people receiving assistance under this heading.62 
Budgeting for poor relief, after 1940, was on the basis of submissions of annual estimates 
of their need by distributing agencies to the Department of Social Welfare. These estimates 
had to be based on an assessment of the degree of indigence of applicants according to 
the criteria laid down by the department. On the grounds of these the department then 
made allocations to the different bodies. 63 
Two trends with regard to poor relief can be identified. One is the diminishing role of poor 
relief relative to other systems of state provision. From being the major system of social 
security after Union, poor relief e:·:penditure constituted only 10 per cent of government 
expenditure on social insurance and social assistance around 1943.64 This relative decline 
was not the result of a decline in the amount spent on poor relief but the result of the rapid 
increase in other forms of state assistance. Expenditure on poor relief grew by an average 
61South Africa (1944a:63). 
62lliffe (1987:122). 
"'3South Africa (1944a:63). 
1'4South Africa (1944a:p.15, Table 3). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
169 
annual rate of 7.7 percent from R91 140 in 1909/10 to R501 194 in 1937/38.65 
Furthermore, there was an increased role for government as well as the centralization of 
decision making in the provision of relief. The relative importance of voluntary organizations 
declined as a result of the growing role of the state in the field of relief and the expansion 
of other methods of income support. In addition, as the Social Security Committee of 1944 
concluded on the basis of a survey of 81 welfare societies, voluntary organizations were at 
that stage more dependent on state subsidies than on private funds. 66 
Alongside the streamlining of poor relief, state assistance for a large number of additional 
contingencies was also introduced, implying a wider spread of the safety net. In 1936 
means-tested pensions for blind Coloured and White people above the age of 19 were 
instituted67, followed by payments to white physically disabled people in 1937 and war 
veterans' pensions in 1941. e-a During the 1940's a number of measures followed which to 
some extent implied an awareness by the authorities of family poverty and poverty among 
working people. 
In 1941 "cost-of-living allowances" were instituted to protect social pensioners and 
employees against the ravages of war-time inflation.69 According to Bromberger these 
were progressive, leading to a reduction of wage differentials. 70 A school feeding scheme 
covering all school children was instituted in 1943, partly as a result of the contemporary 
f';
5South Africa (1937:10-11). The figures represent nominal values. Inflation, using the 
consumer price index (South Africa, Central Statistical Services (1990a)), averaged just under 
1 percent per year over the period. 
613South Africa (1944a:64). 
67South Africa (1944a:57). 
e-aHendrie (1986:87) and South Africa (1944a:56). 
~9South Africa (1944a:15 and 90). Allowances for pensioners were paid by the state while 
those for employees had to be paid by employers. Miners were excluded from these 
allowances. (Bromberger, 1982: 17 4) 
70Bromberger (1982:173 and 174). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
170 
emphasis on preventative health care71 but also motivated on the grounds that it would 
promote "national well-being and per capita productivity" and in order "to prevent continued 
human deterioration". 72 Family allowances became payable to large low income White, 
Coloured and Indian families in 1947.73 
Coverage was not only extended in terms of contingencies covered, as shown above, but 
were also made less selective in terms of coverage of the population. The coverage of both 
the employment-based insurance systems, namely workmen's compensation and 
unemployment insurance, was extended. In 1934, in terms of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act, benefits became payable for work injuries outside the mining industry.74 A limited 
unemployment scheme, which none the less brought greater coverage than before, was 
legislated for in 1937. Certain sectors, namely agriculture, domestic workers and miners, 
were excluded as well as African workers earning less than a specific amount (R 156 per year 
in 1937).75 The Unemployment Insurance Act of 1947 led to a further expansion of 
coverage by removing the minimum income restriction, although domestic, agricultural and 
mine workers were still not included. 
Social assistance measures were also ex1ended to cover, in most cases, all the population 
groups. The 1921 Children's Act was replaced by the Children's Act of 1937 which made 
maintenance grants payable under wider conditions and which left more room for 
administrative discretion and rule-making. Grants could now be paid for "the maintenance 
of any child by any person in whose custody the child has been placed under this Act or 
by its parent or guardian". With the establishment of the Department of Social Welfare in 
1937 responsibility for the programme was transferred from the Education Department to 
the new department_l6 In 1942 the categories qualifying for assistance were extended fur-
71 Bromberger (1982:174). 
72South Africa (1944b:109). 
73Hendrie (1986:90). 
7411iffe (1986: 141 ). 
75Meth and Piper (1984:7). 
76South Africa (1940:59-60). 
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ther.n In 1942 the main beneficiaries of maintenance grants were still Whites with Africans 
still receiving such grants only in exceptional cases. At the end of 1942, 13 276 White 
children, 5 816 Coloured, 3 034 Indian and only 190 African children received maintenance 
grants. In spite of the limited nature of this assistance for Africans by the Department of 
Welfare this represented a step forward. As lliffe explains, "it broke the South African 
tradition that services for Africans must be provided separately and through the Native Affairs 
Department". 78 
In 1944 pensions for the blind and aged were legislatively e;,1ended to Africans and Indians 
although "non-statutory payments" had been made to the Indian "aged, infirm and blind" 
since 1935 and similarly to the African blind and war veterans. 79 Social pensions as a 
result of disability were extended to all groups in 1946 in term of the Disability Grants Act. 
In 1947/48 27 264 Africans received disability grants, 21 864 invalidity grants and 196 846 
old age pensions. 80 
In spite of increased inclusion of all groups in the welfare system and the coverage of more 
risks, benefits and means tests were still differentiated according to race and geographical 
location. Benefits were also e>.'tremely low. In the case of all social pensions the means test 
was stricter and benefits lower for the other races than for Whites. With regard to pensions 
and maintenance grants, rural inhabitants received less than inhabitants of towns who in turn 
received less than people in the metropolitan areas. 81 In 194 7 the maximum monthly social 
pension plus free income was R12 for Whites, R6.50 for Coloureds and Indians and R4 for 
Africans implying a ratio of 100:54:33.82 The maximum monthly children's grant payable 
in 1944 was R5.00 for Whites, R1.70 for Coloureds and Indians and R1.25 for Africans.83 
nsouth Africa (1944a:61) 
7811iffe (1987: 141 ). 
79South Africa (1944a:56 and 57). 
80lliffe (1987:141). 
81 Pollak (1981:154) and South Africa (1944a:61). 
82Pollak (1981:157). 
a.
3South Africa ( 1944a:61). 
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As Pollak remarked, inclusion of all groups was "always based on differentiation related to 
conventional variation in living standards". 84 
The Social Security Committee of 1944 found the level of benefits to be inadequate. As 
evidence of this deficiency they referred to the fact that voluntary welfare societies were 
obliged to supplement state grants and that a large number of applicants for municipal relief 
were found to be people who already received state pensions. 85 
Although there was thus not equality of benefits for all groups, constraints on expenditure 
on African social services were made less severe, among other things by moving away from 
the self-balancing principle in some spheres. From 1934, housing for Africans could qualify 
for sub-economic interest rates "under certain conditions relating to slum clearance". 
Another change came in 1944, after the establishment of the National Housing and Planning 
Commission in the place of the Central Housing Board, in the acceptance of the "principle 
of payment according to means". This acceptance was implicit in the fact that rents were 
allowed to vary in line with the income of tenants. 86 Between 1935 and 1942, 54 400 units 
were completed under the sub-economic schemes with another 69 600 units either under 
construction or approved. About sixteen per cent of these were built for occupation by 
Whites. 07 With regard to administration of African areas, some evidence indicates that the 
principle of self-financing, through especially municipal profits on beer, became entrench-
ed.88 
This loosening of tax constraints on spending on Africans also took place with regard to 
expenditure on African education. Throughout the early 1940's an increasing proportion of 
African taxes and increased funds from general revenue were channelled to African 
education until the link between African ta:·:able capacity and e:<penditure on African 
education was removed in 1945. There was also a movement away from the racial base in 
84Quoted by Bromberger (1982:173). 
85South Africa (1944a:26). 
86Hendrie (1986:110). 
87South Africa (1944a:65). 
88Morris (1981 :34). 
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the calculation of the provincial education subsidies. 89 As in all the other fields of social 
provision, inequalities in the level of benefits and per capita expenditures remained. 
lt is also interesting to note that although signific~mt eypansion of social security provision 
took place, the state did not go nearly as far as its advisers wished for. The National Health 
Services Commission of 1944 proposed a centralized national health service financed 
through a health tax levied on all income groups. According to the Commission this would 
have been the only way to rectify the then existing "disjointed and haphazard, provincial and 
parochial" health service and to ensure coverage of the "underprivileged sections of the 
community". lt would also have helped to give preventative health its rightful place.90 
Similarly the Social Security Committee of 1 944 proposed a comprehensive social security 
scheme, financed by contributions and initially means-tested, covering all significant 
contingencies91 • They foresaw it applying to all urbanised people and farm workers 
irrespective of race. Non-urbanised Africans would be able to join a second scheme with 
lower benefits and contributions. The suggested benefits would still have been differentiated 
in order "to follow the expenditure patterns of European and non-European families". 92 The 
following period not only saw a rejection of the spirit and principles of these proposals but 
instead an attack on many of the schemes instituted in the previous decade as well as 
increased differentiation in the level of benefits and fragmentation of service provision. 
6.5 1948 to 1961 
Bromberger classified the period 1943-61 as "an era of retrenchment" which was 
"characterized by a direct and purposeful assault on aspects of the new fragile welfare 
agBromberger (1982:173-174) and Hendrie (1986:94) 
00South Africa (1944b). The quotations are from page 2 of the summary of the report. 
91They envisaged a scheme paying old-age pensions, blindness and invalidity pensions, 
mothers' and widows' benefits, dependents' allowances, family allowances, unemployment 
benefits, sick pay, maternity benefits (to compensate for lost wages), recovery benefits, 
maternity grants, funeral grants and social assi~tance or what they called a "residual benefit". 
See South Africa (1944a:32). 
9"
2South Africa (1944a:19-34), the quote is from p. 26. 
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construction that had begun to emerge during the previous decade". 93 This retrenchment 
could, in the sphere of social assistance and insurance, be seen in the elimination of some 
types of assistance schemes, the contraction of the coverage of other schemes and 
increasing inequalities in benefit levels. Furthermore, the method of constraining expenditure 
on African social services through adhering to the self-balancing/financing principle again 
came into use. 
· Two schemes were totally abolished during this period, namely school feeding and cost of 
living allowances. School feeding was removed in stepwise fashion with additional 
registration of African schools prohibited in 1948, rural African children being excluded in 
1949 and the size of the grant for African children being systematically reduced. By 1960 
this scheme seems to have been something of the past. 94 In 1948 the progressive nature 
of the cost of living allowances was removed, with all allowances being "frozen". 95 
The coverage of two older schemes was reduced during this period. In the first place 
Indians were excluded from family allowances in December 1948. The suspension of the 
expanded Unemployment Insurance Act in 1947 was followed in 1949 by the Unemployment 
Insurance Amendment Act. This amendment, most importantly, provided for the 
reimposition of the minimum income requirement in order to qualify for benefits. lt is further 
probable that eligibility for benefits was further reduced through widening the definition of 
suitable employment for the lower categories of workers. The availability of such jobs, which 
were then deemed as suitable for unemployed worl\ers of certain categories, precluded 
people from claiming benefits.96 This minimum income level, which was set well above the 
average African wage and was kept there by regular adjustments, led to the benefits to 
Africans becoming negligible by the end of 1950.97 
With regard to social pensions and grants, increasing discrimination in means tests and level 
938romberger (1982: 175). 
94Bromberger (1982:177). 
95Bromberger (1982:178). 
96Meth and Piper (1984:18-22). 
97Meth and Piper (1984:23-25). 
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of benefits took place. In 1944 the monthly free income used for the calculation of social 
pensions for Coloureds and Indians was equal to 60 per cent of the White level of R5.00 with 
that of Africans being 40 per cent of that of Whites. By 1 966 this ratio had been reduced 
to 50 per cent for Coloureds and Indians and 12.5 per cent for Africans. While in 1947 the 
maximum social pension payable per month to Coloureds and Indians came to 50 per cent 
of that of Whites (25 per cent for Africans), it amounted to only 40 per cent for Coloureds, 
35.9 per cent for Indians and 14.9 per cent for Africans in 1960.98 Against the average 
annual old age pension paid to Whites in 1962 of R267.19, Coloureds, Indians and Africans 
were paid an average annual amount of R118.01, R102.24 and R25.57 respectively.99 
Other social pensions also reflected this relative deterioration of the position of the non-white 
groups. 
A reversion to the "self-balancing principle"100 in education and administration of African 
areas also resulted in a widening of the disparities in per capita expenditure on the different 
groups and a reduction of the extent of redistribution from general revenue. This process 
was effected through further fragmentation of service provision on a racial basis and an 
insistence on the elimination, or rather minimization, of cross-subsidi::ation in the financing 
of these segregated services. 
In the educational field, the Bantu Education Act of 1953 introduced the fragmentation of 
schooling on racial lines and increased government control over Black education. 
Missionary schools subsidized by the state were required to register and to accept greater 
state control over all aspects of educational provision such as "educational appointments, 
syllabi, examinations and school buildings" or to forgo subsidies.101 In this way most of 
the missionary schools were forced to submit to the state. This led to a reduction in the 
fi!IAII figures from Pollak (1981:156 and 158). · 
99Calculated from South African Statistics 1990. 
1~his is what Van der Berg (1939a: 1 97) calls the "apartheid fiscal paradigm", which "starts 
from the premise that every group should be regarded as a separate political and economic 
unit". In terms of this mind-set "White" taxes must not be spent on "Black" services. 
101Samuel (1990:18). 
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number of state-aided mission schools from 5 000 in 1953 to 509 by 1965.102 State control 
was now exercised through a section of the Department of Bantu Affairs, segregating it from 
the control of education of the other races by the provinces. 103 Expenditure on African 
education was after 1955 again to depend mainly on taxes paid by Africans. This was 
effected through the creation of a "Bantu Education Account" into which a fixed amount from 
general revenue, some minor amounts and SO per cent of general tax by Africans would be 
paid. 104 These different steps resulted in a strong decline in per capita expenditure on 
African education with a widening disparity between racial per capita expenditure levels. 
After rising in nominal terms from R7.78 in 1945 to R17.08 in 1953/54, per capita 
expenditure on African children decreased to R11.56 in 1962/63.105 Expenditure per White 
and Coloured pupil increased between 1953 and 1960 from R128 to R145, and from R40 
to R59, respectively.106 
In the provision of welfare services there was increased effort after 1948 to remove 
dependent Africans (the old, etc.) to the homelands and to transfer welfare institutions and 
pension provisions to homelands. There were also some efforts to reorganize welfare 
provision along ethnic and tribal lines. The lack of effective administration and financial 
constraints on homeland governments led to de facto pension coverage far below what legal 
entitlement would indicate. 107 The process of fragmentation of welfare provision gained 
further momentum after control of Coloured welfare was transferred to the Department of 
Coloured Affairs in 1958 and responsibility for Africans to the Native Affairs Department in 
1960.1(18 The involvement of other population groups in the provision of African welfare 
was also declared as "contrary to policy" in 1957, necessitating expensive and inefficient 
102Samuel (1990:18). 
103Hendrie (1986:95). 
1048romberger (1982: 177). 
11)58romberger (1982:177), 
106Auerbach and Welsh (1931 :79). 1'-Jote that the figures for1960 refer to the Cape Province 
only. 
107lliffe (1987:276). 
108lliffe (1987:264). Pollak (1960:19). 
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duplication of voluntary and state welfare structures.109 
Developments in the field of housing and administration were complex, with some 
commentators seeing progress over the period.110 The main trend, however, fitted in with 
those in other areas of social provision and resulted in increased fragmentation and 
segregation and efforts to shift the cost of social services on to Africans themselves. 
Fragmentation took place through the establishment of a separate Bantu Housing Board in 
1957. A large number of initiatives aimed at reducing the cost, as well as the cost to the 
state, of housing provision. 111 Under the first heading site and service schemes were 
allowed and loans to African owner-builders approved. Levies on employers of African 
workers, the reduction of the number of sub-economic loans to Africans and increased 
stringency in the application of income limits to qualify for sub-economic rents served to limit 
the expenditure of the state on African housing. Part of the effect of these steps can be 
seen in the reduction of the value of approved sub-economic housing to Africans from 
R4 323 456 in 1950/51 to R223 324 in 1956/57.112 
More positive action in the field of social welfare included the e:<tension of coverage under 
the Unemployment Insurance Fund to sickness (1952), maternity (1954) and to cover 
survivors of contributors ( 1957). 113 The Pension Fund Act of 1956 led to increased state 
monitoring and control of retirement funds. 
6.6 1961 to 1971 
Bromberger has described this period, with reference to distributionally relevant policies, as 
"showing signs of a thaw". The period reveals the waning of determined efforts to reduce 
expenditures on Black social services, possibly illustrating the reali=ation of the need for 
cross-subsidization between income groups and across the racial divide. Such changed 
109Pollak (1960:20). 
110Pollak (1960:21). 
111See Morris (1981 :45-49), Hendrie (1986:109-110). 
112Morris (1981 :46). 
113Meth and Piper (3,25 and 27). 
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thinking on expenditure is reflected in increased levels of absolute and per capita 
expenditure on Africans after 1962/63. From the early 19€0's social pension differentials 
- - ,.- ---
relative to White levels also started to decline; at first only for Culoureds and Indians, and 
a bit later for Africans. 1f4 
Although there was a reluctant acknowledgement of the necessity of social spending on all 
groups, this took place without deliverance from the idea that separateness and equality can 
co-exist. The belief that separateness could still be attained and combined with economic 
growth, found expression in the field of social services in the further fragmentation of 
educational provision115 and the prohibition of multi-racial welfare organizations in 
1966116• In 1968 home-ownership rights for Africans in the "white" areas were withdrawn 
and further restrictions placed on the provision of family housing.117 The widespread 
takeover of the administration of African areas by the Administration Boards also implied 
regression. lt implied an end to all direct and indirect subsidies within municipal areas and 
thus reflected a continued belief in the ideal of finsncial self-sufficiency of the different 
groups.118 
6.7 1972 to 1990 
In 1982 Bromberger characterized the period 1972 to 1980 as demonstrating "a trend 
towards re-incorporation and reduced inequality" in terms of policies affecting income 
- ·-·--· ---- --- ··----- ---- --
114Bromberger (1982:183). 
115Responsibility for education for the respective population groups passed to the 
Department of Coloured Affairs (1963) and the Department of Indian Affairs (1965). The 
Transkei also accepted responsibility for education in 1963. (Hendrie, 1986:95). 
116lliffe (1987:264). 
117Hendrie (1986:113). 
118Morris (1981 :148). Another step in the direction of"self-balancing" was the subsidi::ation 
of black transport financed by levies on employers of black labour. Bromberger (1982:148) 
describes this as a progressive adjustment. Such an interpretation is difficult to support. 
The tax on employers of blacks results in a premium or tax on the employment of black 
labour in order to finance one of the direct implications of apartheid, namely high transport 
costs. Intricate analyses of incidence would have to be made before such a tax and the 
resulting subsidization of transport can be described as "increasing the scale of benefits to 
blacks". 
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distribution.119 This trend also applied to social policy and continued after 1980. Changes 
in social provision were, however, still ambivalent in nature. Although there was a realization 
of the requirements in terms of social services, the mechanisms of provision still reflected 
the ideas of previous periods. 
The main components of the progressive trend identified by Bromberger, which led to a 
partial reversal of the regressive spending policies of the two preceding periods, were: 
increased real and per capita e:·:Qenditure on social services and infrastructure 
------· - - -------
l for blacks; 
a reduction of racial differentials in social pension benefits; and 
--
an increased awareness of poverty and the need for corrective policies. 120 
Increased expenditure was clearly visible in the field of African education and with regard to 
investments in infrastructure in Black townships and the homelands.121 The Bantu 
Education Account Abolition Act of 1972 detached educational e:-:penditure on Africans from 
their taxable capacity. Henceforth, African education would be a charge against general 
government revenue.122 The loosening of this restraint was partially responsible for a 
substantial increase in educational expenditures on Africans. Further fragmentation of service 
provision, however, continued through the devolution of powers to the homeland govern-
ments. 
Pillay's figures indicate an increase in per African pupil e:·:penditure from R25.31 per annum 
in 1971/72 to R476.95 in 1986/87, implying an average annual growth rate about 9 
percentage points above the average annual increase in the consumer price index. This 
nineteen fold increase can be compared with· a fivefold increase in White per capita expen-
diture, resulting in African per capita expenditure increasing from 5.5 per cent of the White 
level in 1971/72 to 19 per cent in 1986/87. The same narrowing took place, although from 
119Bromberger (1982:185). 
120Bromberger (1982:185-187). 
121 Bromberger (1982: 185-186). 
122Hendrie (1986:97). 
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more substantial initial levels and not that rapidly, in the case of Coloureds and lndians.123 
The narrowing of racial transfEr payment differentials was also significant. The maximum 
social pensions payable increased from R33 (Whites), R 16.50 (Coloureds and Indians) and 
R5.00 (Africans) in 19701::4 to R304.00, R263.00 and R225, respectively, in March 
1991.125 The percentage of white levels thus changed from 43 percent for Coloureds and 
Indians and 13 per cent for Blacks to 86 per cent and 74 per cent respectively.126 
The changing ideas behind these trends have been described as reflecting a (reluctant) 
acceptance of a new fiscal paradigm in the place of the previous "apartheid fiscal 
paradigm" .127 This new approach shows greater recognition of the necessity of providing 
social services not on the grounds of the ability to pay of different groups but on the 
grounds of the need of individuals and, perhaps more importantly, the requirements of the 
economy. 
In terms of expenditure objectives the acceptance of the need for greater access of all to 
social services was, and is, widely interpreted as implying an imperative to equalize racial 
per capita expenditure in the provision of social services. 
Van der Berg argued that "[o]nce it was recognized that fiscal apartheid cannot be 
legitimately retained in an integrated economy and society, the implication was that 
1
:!
3Pillay (1989:31, Table 1 ). His figures are based on those of the South African Institute for 
Race Relations and exclude the homelands. Van der Berg's estimates (1989(b):20) of per 
pupil expenditure for 1986/87, including homeland expenditure, are as follows (percentage 
of White expenditure in brackets): White, R2746 (100); Coloured, R892 (32); Indians, R1 386 
(50) and Africans, R367 (13). 
124Pollak (1981 :157). 
125Hansard (20 March 1991 :col. 3308). 
126Average annual pensions actually paid also show reduced discrimination. The seemingly 
positive trend is, however, affected by the fact that means tests are probably not adjusted 
as rapidly. The equalization of less prominent benefits also seem to be done with less 
urgency. In 1987 the average annual maintenance grant awarded to Africans was still only 
17 per cent of the average amount paid to Whites. (Calculated from South African Statistics 
1992) 
127Van der Berg (1989a:198). 
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horizontal fiscal justice across race boundaries was required". 128 The Human Sciences 
Research Council (De Lange) investigation into the provision of education, for example, set 
"equal opportunities for education" as a first principle. This they interpreted as meaning 
"equal access to educational facilities of comparable standard". They further argued that 
"from the viewpoint of financing, [this] must imply some concept of parity in the level of 
financing as between different individuals".129 This interpretation was followed in 1986 with 
a ten year plan, announced by the Minister of National Education, aimed at "equal funding 
levels for the various education departments".130 
More recently the Minister of Health reportedly said that "differences in the health status of 
the various population groups could be addressed only by way of an equitable division of 
funds". This was seen as necessitating financing of primary health care for regions on the 
grounds only of population size and health status.131 
Together with these changing expenditures and objectives of social policy, Bromberger also 
noted an increased awareness of poverty and related problems among policy makers as a 
characteristic of this period. The report of the Theron Commission on Coloured Affairs in 
1976 is viewed by him as a first clear sign of this realisation of the problem of poverty.132 
The appointment in the early 1990's of a number of committees and commissions with 
poverty-related agendas and the focus on preventative health care are signs that this 
awareness has not subsided. Examples of poverty-related research initiated by the state are 
the appointment in early 1991 of a ''Task Force on Poverty" and the earlier Commission of 
128Van der Berg (1989c:9). 
129Human Sciences Research Council (1981 :7). 
1 :.v:~Committee of Heads of Education Departments (1991 :6). 
131 South African Institute of Race Relations (1990:389).This explicit acceptance of need as 
a determinant of amount to be spent on an individual shows acceptance of substantive 
equality (or equality of outcome, which is health status in this case) and not mere formal 
equality (for example equality of inputs, equal per capita spending). Van der Berg 
(1991b:78) distinguishes in this regard between an acceptance of "horizontal fiscal justice" 
(substantive equality, that is taking account of the greater need of the poor) and an 
acceptance of "parity" (equal expenditure levels). 
1328romberger (1982:186). 
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Investigation into a Food and Nutrition Strategy for Southern Africa. 133 
lt is also clear that the changing political situation, especially the growing power of the 
disenfranchised, is making it impossible for the state to ignore the impact of policies on the 
poor. The recent ability of pressure groups to obtain concessions as a result of the impact 
of the value-added tax on the poor can serve as an example. 
As was the case in the previous period (1962-71), the concern with "equality" in social 
services did not imply an immediate abandonment of the ideal of separateness. 134 In spite 
of the acceptance by the 1980's of the permanence of urban Africans and the widespread 
appreciation of the failure of homeland policy, separate fiscal structures and service delivery 
'systems were still being implemented. The most important example of this was the change 
to the tri-cameral parliamentary system and the continued dedication to the fiscal precept 
of "own" and "general" affairs of different race groups.135 The contradictions of an 
acceptance of interdependence coupled with a refusal to abandon old ideals have thus not 
been resolved. Only in the 1990's has the need for unified provision become accepted to 
an extent. In some fields this has led to recent steps towards the reintegration of service 
delivery. Although this reintegration is not taking place at the level of administration, it is at 
least coming about in the admission and acceptance of "clients". 136 
A further development in this period was widely interpreted as conflicting with the real 
progressive changes in racial differentials and social expenditures. Particularly since the 
133Hansard (20 March 1991 :3305). 
134lt is also important to note that the slow shift did not mean that apartheid was over or that 
the majority of people could feel the benefits of changed fiscal frameworks in less repression 
and more services. Perhaps characteristically, repression and increased economic hardship 
were associated with (responsible for) this change. 
1
:]5See Simkins (1984b:17-26) for a discussion of the concepts and their envisaged 
implementation. The resilience of the process of fragmentation is shown by the transfer of 
44 hospitals in March 1989 to own affairs administrations. For a discussion of these 
transfers and the controversy surrounding it see South African Institute of Race Relations 
(1990:385-387). 
131':For a discussion of the apparent start of the integration of hospital services, see South 
African Institute of Race Relations (1990:387-388). At the end of 1990 this process was also 
initiated to a limited extent in state schools. 
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mid-1980's there has been an increased insistence from government sources on the need 
. --· - --· -- ---·---------- -.~--·-- ---
to limit and even reduce the role of the state in the economy. Privatization, in line with 
developments in the Western European democracies, came to the fore as a policy measure. 
The focus of this initiative was not only limited to activities of the state in the industrial sector 
and with regard to utilities. Privatization was also interpreted as applying to all the important 
fields of social provision. Commissions and policy documents in the fields of education, 
health, housing, transport and welfare services have all stressed privatization as a relevant 
policy option.137 
lt is difficult to assess the extent to which these policy orientations have had an impact on 
service provision and whether this has had the effect of reducing the role of the government 
in the provision of social security. A number of aspects are relevant here. Firstly, in many 
cases the policy proposals have not had any effect on the delivery of services to the poor. 
This seems to be the case in education and welfare services where the basic proposals 
regarding service provision are still under discussion.138 Secondly, in many cases the big-
ger envisaged role for the private sector is associated with a lowering of required standards 
which enables less costly provision of services. This seems to be the case especially in 
housing where the acceptance of informal housing must have some impact in terms of the 
affordability of housing. 1.39 Thirdly, privatization in the sphere of the social services has 
accompanied a move towards a lower guaranteed standard of provision of social services 
by the state, especially to its higher income, mostly White, clients. In both education and 
health there has been an effort to recover a larger share of costs from users.140 These 
steps, especially in the fields of health and education, can then be interpreted as a process 
of releasing funds in order to increase service provision to the poor.141 
137See Hendrie (1986:215), Hendler (1989:5), Lund (1986:51-52) and Eastern Province Herald 
(January 3, 1991). 
1::.1?See Eastern Province Herald (1991) and Committee of Heads of Education Departments 
(1991). 
139See Hendler (1989:5). 
1
•
1
°For health see South African Institute for Race Relations(1990:396). In education it is also 
clear that fees for White children in government schools have been increasing in real terms. 
141 A parallel case is the removal of the exemption from value added tax on basic foodstuffs. 
This can be interpreted as regressive. lt does, however, also remove indirect subsidies to 
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While privatization is thus often seen as contrary to the interests of the poor this will depend 
very much on the nature of the process. At this stage it does not seem as if privatization 
has reversed the trend towards reincorporation on an equal footing of all citizens, as 
identified from other policy directions and initiatives. The ambiguity and complexity of 
current trends and their impact on future provision are central themes of the two concluding 
chapters and these matters will be further discussed there. As a conclusion to this historical 
overview it can, however, be asserted with confidence that social policy since 1970 reflected 
a reversal of earlier regressive trends in social expenditure. 
the higher income classes and should make more accurately targeted assistance to the poor 
possible. 
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CHAPTER 7 AN APPRAISAL OF STATE PROVISION OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
7.1 Introduction 
While in Chapter 4 some early pressures for greater involvement by the state in the provision 
and coordination of social security were noted, in Chapter 5 the limited response, when 
viewed from the perspective of the composition of government expenditure, was focused on. 
With the possible exception of the period between the late 1930's and the end of the 1940's, 
transfer payments and other social expenditure relative to other government expenditures 
and total production did not increase as would be expected from, among other things, 
comparative evidence. This suggests that the South African experience might have been 
exceptional, and that the 1'1~tionaJi:~ation_hypothesis might not be applicable. Such an 
interpretation is also indicated by the lack of expansion of the risks covered after the late 
1940's. In order to address this question further, Chapter 7 examines in greater detail the 
characteristics of state provision of social security in South Africa. 
Whereas Chapter 6 provided a historical overview of the development of state institutions, 
this chapter aims at characterisation, comparison and evaluation. An attempt is also made 
to identify some of the shortcomings of present provision. The rest of this introduction 
provides some brief remarks on the general nature of South African welfare provision. 
In 1960 professor Hansi Pollak, well-known analyst of South African social policy, remarked 
. 
that in the field of social provision "(t)he development since Union reflects the paradox of 
colossal achievement and tragic failure. Throughout, there emerges a picture of 
extraordinary contradiction, bewildering in its stubborn complexity."1 These apparent 
contradictions in the field of social provision persist today. The "achievement" can be seen 
as the development and existence of "the scaffolding of a welfare system for all groups"2 
or, in other words, that "for all groups there does exist the modicum of a welfare state".3 
1Pollak (1960:22) 
2Bromberger (1980:166). 
3Hendrie (1986:218). 
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The "failure" partly lies in the fragmentation, differentiation and discrimination in provision and 
the lack of success in extending support to the most needy sections of society. 
McKendrick traces the contradiction to the fact that the "South African welfare system was 
stretched to uneasily accommodate the two conflicting influences of modern social work 
practice and apartheid policy".4 According to McKendrick, a number of tendencies reflect 
the "modernisation of social work and social welfare practices". Among those mentioned 
are a trend towards rehabilitation, the formation of coordinating structures to improve 
efficiency and the evolving distribution of functions between state and voluntary effort. 5 On 
the other hand the imperatives of apartheid led to the fragmentation of provision resulting 
in an "uneconomic and inefficient" welfare system and the entrenchment of the inferior quality 
of services to African people. 6 
Discrimination with regard to quality of and access to services is, however, not the only 
problematic aspect of social provision in South Africa. Even in the 1990's South African 
welfare policy caters mostly for poverty as a result of a lack of access to labour power (that 
is for "the old and young, the blind and disabled"), or what lliffe has termed poverty in "land-
rich societies". The "new poor", those whose poverty does not reflect scarcity of labour 
power but of land and other resources ("the propertyless and conju,ncturally unemployed"), 
were and are not provided with an adequate safety net. 7 In fact, the system of welfare 
provision in South Africa differs little today, especially in terms of the risks against which 
people are protected, from the rudimentary system that existed in the early 1940's. Only 
sporadically, such as with the special employment programmes in the 1980's, and recently 
in response to specific crises, such as the resistance surrounding the introduction of the 
value-added-tax, have there been efforts at widening the safety net in terms of risks covered. 
In addition to inefficiency and inequity resulting from racial preoccupations in social 
provision, an insufficient recognition of the changing nature of poverty in a developing 
4McKendrick (1987a:14). 
5McKendrick (1987a:15). 
6McKendrick (1987a:15-16 and 18). 
7 lliffe (1987:4-5 and 142). 
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society can thus also be seen as problematic. On the one hand, racial obsessions 
constrained the development of social security provision by restricting the coverage of the 
population and the fairness of coverage. On the other hand, views about the causes of 
poverty and the nature of poverty led to the insufficient protection of the population against 
the risks of modern life. 
7.2 Ideal types of state provision of social services 
Provision of social security by the South African state does not place it in the league of a 
welfare state. 8 lt is still useful to weigh South African state welfare policies in the light of 
certain "ideal types" or "normative models"~ of the welfare states in the developed countries. 
Such comparisons are helpful in identifying the principal characteristics and the essential 
nature of state provision of social security in South Africa. 
Different ideal types are often used as "empirical classifications" and seen as indicating 
different levels of development of social provision.10 In this vein, Mesa-Lago refers to the 
"social security stage" as being more "advanced" than the "social insurance stage". 11 
Ahmad, in his turn, identifies three stages in the maturation of social security, with provision 
moving from a "paternalistic" stage through a second "insurance" phase to a phase where 
"prevention and universality" become the prime concerns.12 
Such an interpretation of these models is problematic. Real systems consist of a mix of the 
characteristics identified as belonging to different models and often these categorizations are 
too simplistic to accommodate the intricacies of real systems. lt is also clear that different 
countries at more or less the same level of economic and social development, as measured 
by conventional indicators, use diverse systems of social provision so that no unique devel-
8A useful discussion of the essence of the welfare state and the requirements to qualify is 
by Ringen (1987:3-14). 
9Fiora (1986:XXI). 
1
°Fiora (1986:XXII). 
11 Mesa-Lago(1991 :357). 
12Ahmad (1991 :106-107). 
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opment path can be specified. 1 ·~ As a result of these intricacies these typologies are used 
merely to identify the nature of the South African system and not to place it at a stage of 
development along a continuum of phases. 
One useful typology, recently used by Mesa-Lago, is the distinction between the 
"Bismarckian" or "social insurance" model of social provision and the "Beveridge" or "social 
security" model.14 These two ideal types c:m be distinguished on the grounds of: 15 
(a) the extent of fragmentation of provision. That is whether there are separate 
programmes covering different groups (eg. occupational groups) and different 
risks. This criterion also refers to the extent of centralization or decentraliza-
tion of administration or what is sometimes called the "unity" of the system. 
Insurance type systems tend to be more fragmented, with different schemes 
being administered by separate bodies. In the social security model 
administration is centralized and unified under one controlling body. 
(b) the coverage of the population and the nature of the entitlement to benefits. 
Here the issue is whether the whole population is covered or whether the 
focus is on certain categories of the population. Mesa-Lago refers to this 
aspect as the "horizontal" reach or extension of the system. This criterion also 
refers to how access to benefits is regulated, or specifically, whether 
entitlement is based on citi=enship ("the standardi=ation of legal conditions for 
entitlement"), or instead on contributions or means testing (referred to as the 
distinction between "universality" and "selectivity"). An insurance based system 
normally covers only a proportion of the population, particularly the population 
employed in the formal sectors of the economy. A "social security" system 
covers the whole population and further does not restrict certain benefits only 
to the very poor. Everybody with certain characteristics (for example, old age) 
qualifies for assistance with a resulting absence of stigmatization of recipients. 
13For further criticism of the typologies used here, especially its interpretation as identifying 
"stages" of the development of the welfare state, see Ringen (1987:11-14) and Flora (1986:-
XXIII). 
14Mesa-Lago (1991 :356-357). 
1r.See Mesa-Lago (1991 :356-357), Flora(1986:XXIII) and Ringen (1987:11-12). 
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A greater commitment by all social groups to the scheme can also result from 
the universality of the benefit.16 
(c) the coverage of risks, or what Mesa-Lago refers to as the "vertical extension" 
or reach of the system. The major risks are referred to in Section 6.3. One 
can also talk about the "completeness" of coverage in terms of risks. 
(d) whether benefits are equal for different groups or whether there are differen-
tiated benefits related to, for example, the size of contributions. This refers to 
the importance of "equality" as a principle of the scheme. "lnsurance"-based 
schemes are normally less equal, while "security" systems typically provide flat-
rate benefits. 
(e) financing through taxation as against financing through contributions by 
employers and employees and to a limited e;._'tent the state. The method of 
financing is said to reflect the degree of "solidarity" built into the system. 
(f) whether the system is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis ("pure assessment 
financing") or through a capitalization of contributions. In the Bismarckian 
model financing through contributions and capitalization takes place, giving the 
system its insurance character and limiting the extent of redistribution between 
individuals. The Beveridge model, in upholding the principle of "solidarity" 
through financing from general revenues, leads to extensive redistribution, as 
the underlying tax system is normally progressive. 
Another common typology, also often interpreted as providing a development perspective, 
is the distinction between a "residual welfare model" and the "institutional-redistributive 
model".17 In the first case, state welfare only comes into play as a last resort, while the 
major responsibility for social welfare, if market provision fails, is seen as lying with other 
social institutions such as the family group. In contrast, Flora defines the institutional-redis-
tributive model as a situation where "social welfare institutions are an integral part of society, 
providing universalist services outside the market on the principle of need".18 This distinc-
16See Mesa-Lago (1991 :356-357). 
17Fiora (1986:XXI) and also McKendrick (1987b:36). The classification is based on the work 
of Titmuss. 
18Fiora (1986:XXI). See also McKendrick (1987b:36). 
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tion also provides a number of key differentiating characteristics of different welfare systems 
such as: 
the "stateness"19 of welfare provision; 
the extent of fragmentation of provision; and 
the nature of entitlements, espscially whether provision is universal or selective. 
A further aspect of the distinction between the residual (or "marginal")20 model and the 
institutional model has to do with the objective of social policy. While in the first case it is 
endeavoured to provide the minimum or basic means of subsistence ("minimal security")21 , 
in the second model the aim is to prevent destitution and reduce inequality. The aim with 
the institutional model is thus more ambitious, implying a goal of "modifying the structure of 
inequality and .. to integrate everybody into the mainstream". 22 
7.3 An outline of state provision of social security in South Africa 
State provision of social security can be classified according to a number of criteria. 
Attention is given here to the type of benefit, the nature of the entitlement and the objective 
with the benefit. The South African state provides two types of social security benefits to its 
citizens, namely cash benefits and benefits in kind. 
7 .3.1 Cash benefits 
Cash benefits are normally divided into three groups, namely: 
categorical transfers or universal benefits23 : 
19See Section 7.9 for a definition. 
rorhis is Ringen's (1987:11) term. 
21 Ringen (1987:12). 
22Ringen (1987:12). 
23According to the definition of Kanbur (1987:115), categorical transfers, or contingent bene-
fits, "are those which depend on socio-demographic characteristics such as retirement, mari-
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
191 
insurance benefits (which are dependent on a contribution record); and 
social assistance which provides means tested benefits. 
No purely categorical cash benefits exist in South Africa. In the South African case the most 
important cash benefits are means tested payments to protect against certain phases of the 
life-cycle and specific contingencies. These are means-tested pensions for the old, the 
disabled, the blind, war veterans and military pensions and are referred to as social 
pensions. Means-tested allowances, referred to as maintenance grants, are paid to children. 
parents and foster parents under certain conditions. A system of family allowances, targeted 
at the working poor with large families, is in the process of being phased out. 
Insurance based benefits are paid in terms of the Unemployment Insurance Act and the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. The Unemployment Insurance Act provides for the payment 
of benefits in the eventuality of unemployment, illness and maternity, while the Workmen's 
Compensation Act regulates payments for loss of income and medical care consequent to 
injuries sustained or industrial illnesses contracted while in the workplace. Both systems 
also provide for benefits to the dependants of the insured. 
7 .3.2 Benefits in kind 
Social security services providing benefits in kind will be discussed under the headings of 
housing, health, education and personal social services. Government provision and 
financing in the field of housing are complex and have been subject to various revisions over 
the years. 24 In principle the state seems to accept responsibility to assist certain groups 
of people with housing and accommodation. The following groups have been mentioned: 
"people . . . who cannot house themselves for reasons beyond their control" 
such as "indigent senior citizens, children in need of care, physically and 
tal status, whether there are children in the family, whether an individual is unemployed, 
etc.". Categorical benefits are also sometimes referred to as universal benefits. Ringen 
(1987:12) defines these as benefits for which purpose "all citizens with the same need are 
treated equally, irrespective of 'irrelevant' differences between them, as, for example, in 
income". 
24See Handler (1989) for a recent overview. 
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mentally disabled people of all ages, victims of natural disasters, welfare cases 
and people who are resettled" 
"those sections of the population who cannot afford to buy or build their own 
homes or cannot obtain the required finance from private sources". 25 
In order to assist the first category, there are numerous schemes. These include the 
granting of building loans to local authorities to house aged people, loans to welfare 
organizations to provide accommodation for seriously disabled people26, and state 
subsidies to children's homes. Various schemes also exist to assist low income groups and 
those who cannot obtain financing at market related rates. The acceptance of the 
permanence of African urban dwellers led to the fact that in 1979 loans for African housing 
could again be obtained through the National Housing Commission at sub-economic rates 
as was the case for other races since the 1930's.27 Budgeted e:<penditure of the different 
government departments involved with housing primarily goes towards additions to the 
National Housing Fund to enable construction programmes. Significant amounts are also 
spent on subsidizing home loans and purchasing land for residential development. 28 In 
addition money has been made available on an irregular basis for private initiatives in the 
field of housing. An example is the recent transfer of funds to the Independent Development 
Trust, partly in order to address the housing problem. 29 
In spite of the state accepting responsibilities for the provision of low income housing, it has 
also been trying to limit its role in the sphere of housing. This has been done through: 
the selling of state housing stock to occupiers; 
more austere criteria for the provision of housing to low income people; 
25South Africa, Bureau for Information {1990:548). 
26McKendrick and Dudas (1987:19-l) and South Africa, Bureau for Information (1990:542 and 
543). 
27Hendrie (1986:110 and 113). 
28See South African Institute of Race Relations (1990:103 to 105). For the nature of the 
different subsidy schemes see South Africa, Bureau for Information (1990:548). 
:Bsouth African Institute of Race Relations (1990:108), Hansard (20 March 1991 :3304). 
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market orientated rentals for those peopla who can afford it; 
a shift towards lower quality housing, self help schemes and informal housing; 
and 
an increased effort to solicit more private sector participation in the provision 
of housing30. 
Some commentators have seen in the above changes an important shift in policy orientation, 
one which Glover and Watson summarized as follows: 
''This reorientation has taken the form, firstly, of a partial withdrawal of state 
responsibility for low income housing and a shift in the burden to the private 
sector and the low income group itself. Secondly, in those areas of housing 
provision for which the state will continue to take responsibility, there is to be 
a cutback in financial commitment through the dropping of housing stan-
dards."31 
Although education is not yet compulsory for all population groups, there has been an 
acceptance by the state of the principle of equal expenditure per child or "equal funding 
levels for the various education departments".32 Until recently Whites received state 
financed and produced primary and secondary education (compulsory for 10 years, or to 
the age of 16), almost free of direct charge. The high level of educational expenditure per 
White child, the constraint on state resources and a multitude of other factors have frustrated 
the attainment of equalizing per capita expenditure within the envisaged time period.33 The 
cost implications of parity at White levels have consequently led to the tabling of alternative 
plans aimed at universal provision of education. A general conclusion seems to be that 
White expenditure cannot be taken as a norm, and that the state can only commit itself to 
30See Hendrie (1986:114), Human Awarenass Programme(1984:53-55) and South African 
Research Service (1983:270-277). See also Hendler (1989:5 and 12-15). 
31 Giover and Watson quoted by Hendrie (1986:114). 
32South Africa, Department of National Education (1991 :6). 
33South Africa, Department of National Education (1991 :6-7). 
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the provision of fr6e education to a level below whst it currently is for Whites. 34 
A process that is already taking place is the reduction of the real benefits of privileged 
groups coupled with an increase in spending on other groups. This has taken place 
through the introduction of increased school fees at "White" schools as a result of the 
gradual reduction of the state's responsibility for certain expenditures at schools (for 
example, sports fields, te:-:tbooks and stationery). This process is probably indicative of what 
will happen on a wider basis in future. While the privileged will thus see a decline in 
educational entitlements, this will be balanced by increased benefits for the previously 
disadvantaged. 
This adjustment will probably take place through making compulsory and providing free of 
charge seven to eight years of education, with further education entailing increased private 
costs. In addition, if present trends in White schooling are continued, schooling of a basic 
standard will in all likelihood be made available, witl1 education in excess of the national 
standard financed by parents and other non-government sources. 35 The fact that state 
expenditure on education in South Africa is high in international perspective, absorbing 
around six percent of gross domestic product in recent years, also indicates that such a 
reallocation of educational entitlement is required. 36 
The same situation as in education, namely relatively high government commitment of 
resources combined with extreme inequalities in access, exists in the field of health 
provision. Government expenditure on health totalled around three per cent of gross 
domestic product at the end of the 1980's. Although the state provides a large percentage 
of medical services, these services are free of charge only to the indigent, while low income 
groups pay small fees for a wide range of treatments such as physician services, 
hospitalisation and dental services. Local authorities and similar bodies provide family and 
~For discussions of this issue see Human Sciences Research Council (1981: 42-44) and 
South Africa, Department of National Education (1991 ). 
351n White education it is planned to do this through per student subsidy allocations by the 
state, based on a particular teacher-student ratio. 
36Van der Berg (1991a:17-18) and (1991b:34-85). 
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community health care, mostly free of charge. 37 Other categories of expenditure include 
environmental health (protection against pollution, among other things), mental health, family 
planning and population development, nutrition services and school health services. In the 
1990/91 financial year R350 000 was spent on supplying enriched milk-powder mixtures to 
prevent malnourishment among children under the age of five. This assistance is given 
through local authorities. 38 
In the case of personal welfare services the state takes responsibility for statutory services, 
that is those required by legislation. These include services to the old, families and children, 
and the disabled. In most cases personal social services provided by the voluntary sector 
are subsidized to a significant extent by the state. 39 
7.4 The extent of fragmentation of service provision 
One clear characteristic .of the South African system of provision of social security is its 
fragmented nature. There are different programmes which cater for different contingencies, 
each of these programmes being administered by different branches of the state. An 
example is the provision of workmen's compensation and unemployment insurance through 
separate schemes managed by separate bodies under the control of the Department of 
Labour. Responsibility for other transfer payments lies with the different departments of 
health and welfare. 
The most important type of fragmentation of service provision in the South African case 
occurs, however, as a result of the racial differentiation built into all government structures. 
This resulted in separate departments having responsibility for the administration of matters 
relating to different race groups. One example of this policy is the fact that health services 
in the early 1990's were administered by 18 separate departments of health. As the South 
African Institute for Race Relations explains: "African health services in the white designated 
areas were administered by the four provincial health departments .. . . Health services in 
37South Africa, Bureau for Information (1990:527). 
38South African Institute of Race Relations (1992:137). 
39See Mckendrick and Dudas (1987:194-195 and 203-204). 
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the ten homelands were administered by the health or health and welfare departments of 
the homeland administrations. Coloured, Indian and White health services were adminis-
tered by the own affairs departments of health services of the different . . . [houses of 
parliament]".40 Basic community health services are further provided by about 500 local 
authorities through 1 600 clinics. 41 
A similar extent of fragmentation exists in other areas of social provision such as 
education42, income support and housing. The fragmentation tends to conflict with efforts 
at coordination. Coordination has been attempted through the establishment of national 
norms and national, interdepartmental, advisory and regional boards and councils.43 The 
resulting complexity is difficult to characterize but the final structure is a system decentralized 
(or fragmented) by race, but centralized in terms of provision to the different race groups 
and in terms of the setting of objectives. McKendrick argues that the South African system 
reflects a combination of a national and a local approach, "flawed by the racism of the 
welfare system". In the field of welfare services overall goals seem to be set nationally with 
decentrali=ation taking place via regional welfare boards and the use of "autonomous 
community-based welfare organizations" for service delivery. 44 
7.5 The coverage of the population 
The concept "coverage" is used to refer to the share of the population, or relevant parts of 
the population, that is protected or assisted in terms of the different programmes and the 
nature of the entitlement mechanism. Because of the fragmentation of the services with 
regard to race and contingencies it is also impossible to provide a concise characterization 
in this section. 
4(1South African Institute of Race Relations (1990:385). 
41 South Africa, Bureau for Information (1990:520). 
42See Pillay (1990:30-31). 
-1:~For an example of the coordinating network see South Africa, Department of National 
Health and Population Development (1988:11-15). 
44McKendrick (1987b:37). 
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There are no categorical or universal benefits available to South African citizens except for 
primary and secondary education. Even in the case of education, the lack of availability of 
facilities in certain areas and the failure to make education compulsory for all races have led 
to incomplete coverage of the population. The education available to some is also of an 
inferior quality. The inferior quality of teaching can be seen in, among other things, the high 
pupil-teacher ratios in African schools. Incomplete coverage is clear from enrolment ratios 
for Africans which are significantly lower than those for other races. 45 As in all other as-
pects of state welfare provision, an urban bias is present. 
Income support is today either means-tested or conditional on contributions (social 
insurance), implying that South African welfare provision falls very much within the residual 
model. To qualify for social pensions (old age, blindness, war veterans and disability), 
maintenance grants and family allowances, income must be below a certain level. As a 
result only the very poor qualify for benefits. Maintenance grants, which are paid in terms 
of the Children's Act, do not provide a general system of relief for poor families. Such 
grants are only paid under special circumstances, for example when one parent is absent 
and where custody has been awarded by the courts. An additional programme of family 
allowances, catering for large families with very low incomes, was introduced in 1947 and 
initially applied to Coloureds, Asians and wr1ites. 46 Asians were excluded from this pro-
gramme in 1943.47 This programme, which was never e:,tended to blacks, still exists today, 
but few people (only Whites) receive benefits. This limited access is the result of the 
stringency of eligibility conditions. The system of family allowances is apparently in the 
process of being phased out. 48 The number of allowances paid to Whites went down from 
434 in the 1978/79 financial year to 54 in 1988/89.49 These different means tested and 
conditional grants can be contrasted with family allowances in the United Kingdom which 
4f;See Samuel (1990:20) and Pillay (1990:32-33). 
46Hendrie (1986:90). 
47Pollak (1960:17). 
4~South Africa, Department of Health Services and Welfare (1989:-15). 
49For the reasons for the decline see South Africa, Department of Health and Welfare (1984:-
61) and South Africa, Department of Health Services and Welfare, House of Assembly (1986-
:20). Figures for 1978/79 and 1988/89 are from the relevant annual reports. 
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are paid regardless of income level or contribution record. 
Most categories of formally employed workers below a certain level of income are entitled 
to claim benefits in terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Such claims can be made 
in the event of disablement as a result of an injury sustained in the course of employment, 
or as a result of the contraction of an industrial disease. The Act also makes provision for 
the payment of compensation to dependents in the case of death resulting from the above 
causes. Compensation is paid from a fund financed for this purpose from risk-rated levies 
on employers. 50 The system is not universal in the light of the fact that people above a 
certain level of income are excluded51 • As a result of the inclusion of agricultural workers ' 
the coverage of this benefit is wider than that of other labour legislation. Important 
categories which are excluded are casual labourers, domestic servants in private households 
and small institutions (employing less than 5 domestic servants), and certain categories of 
workers in the defence forces. 
Only contributors can claim benefits in terms of the Unemployment Insurance Act. Important 
sectors of the labour force, such as agricultural workers, domestic workers in private 
household, certain employees in the public sector, seasonal workers and those with an 
income above a certain level52 are excluded. There is no minimum income requirement in 
order to be allowed as a contributor, as was earlier the case53• These exclusions, as well 
as the fact that the South African employment problem consists of a significant number of 
people in informal employment and a large number of unemployed who have never been 
in formal employment, illustrate the inadequacy of South African unemployment insurance 
50For general discussions see Van Jaarsveld, et al. (1983:410-424), Slabbert, et. al. (1990:1-
4.5-14.7) and Official South African Trade Unions Directory and Industrial Relations 
Handbook (1990:78-91). 
51 R36 000 in 1990-91, although such people can be included if special arrangements are 
made with the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner (Official South African Trade Unions 
Directory and Industrial Relations Handbook, 1990:78). 
52R40 248 in 1990 (Official South African Trade Unions Directory and Industrial Relations 
Handbook (1990:67). 
53See Meth and Piper (1984). 
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as a safety net in the case of unemployment, illness, maternity and adoption.54 In 1989 
there were 5 564 134 employees who contributed to the Unemployment Insurance Fund, 
compared to an estimated economically active population of 10 856 000.55 In 1989, 
342 971 contributors received benefits for unemployment while official estimates of 
unemployment (Current Population Survey or CPS) in June 1989 among Coloureds, Indians 
and Africans came to 870 ooo.~ To this must be added White unemployment. lt is gen-
erally accepted that the CPS estimates of unemployment are conservative. Some 
"guesstimates" put unemployment at 2.3 million in 1989 with another 4.2 million "underem-
ployed andfor substantially involved in the informal sector".57 
In the case of health provision, access to government services is also means-tested in the 
sense that only the indigent can receive services free of charge and that those in the lower 
income groups are expected to pay a "nominal" amount. 58 lt was estimated in 1990 that 
25 per cent of patients in Natal received free medical treatment, while 71 per cent paid only 
a "small amount" with a mere four per cent paying the full tariff. The situation in other prov-
inces was thought to be comparable. 59 As with other services, the unavailability of facilities 
and personnel, especially in the rural areas, also discriminates against some groups. 60 
Housing benefits are also imperfectly means-tested in that rent and repayments on state 
54There has of course been substantial controversy about the exact nature and extent of 
unemployment in South Africa. Important contributions to the debate were Gerson (1981), 
Knight (1982) and Bell (1985). 
55South Africa, Central Statistical Services (1990a:7.5 and 6.8). 
sesouth Africa, Central Statistical Services (1990a: 7.41 and 6.8-6.9.). lliffe alleges that "only 
an estimated 0,3 per cent of unemployed Africans drew their main support from unemploy-
ment benefits"(1987:264). 
57Thomas (1990:252). 
58South Africa, Bureau for Information (1990:527). See also South African Institute of Race 
Relations (1990:396). 
5~South African Institute of Race Relations (1990:394). 
~see McKendrick and Dudas (1937:211 ). One estimate put per capita expenditure on 
homeland Africans at R52 in 1987, with per capita expenditure of R138 on Africans as a 
group and R597 on Whites (South African Institute of Race Relations, 1990:394). See also 
Van der Berg (1989a:24) and Savage and Benatar (1990:152-153 and 157-159). 
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financed housing units in Black areas are sometimes determined according to income level, 
although communities can apparently decide whether such flat rates or income-graded 
payments are to be made. Although it is difficult to find a useful measure of sufficiency of 
housing availability, it is generally agreed that there is a deficiency of appropriate housing 
and that the state has failed to ensure adequate access to housing. The insufficient 
coverage through state provision of housing, normally by making available funds at sub-
economic rates, can be seen in the extent of overcrowding of formal housing and the vast-
ness of informal settlements. 
With regard to existing schemes it is thus clear that, in spite of the early introduction of many 
of the schemes in South Africa, coverage is very selective and that universality is still far off. 
Even with such limited benefits as means-tested social pensions many people who are 
entitled to benefits, especially in the homelands, do not receive these as a result of 
inefficiency, corruption, urban bias and a lack of information.61 
An additional aspect limiting access and leading to further selectivity is the differentiated 
means tests for different racial groups. Although the differentials have narrowed over the 
last decade, the amount of income and assets allowed before people lose their entitlement 
to allowances and social pensions are much higher in the case of Whites than in the case 
of the other races. In the case of old age pensions the income levels at which a person was 
disqualified from receiving a pension in 1990 was as indicated in Table 7.1.62 
61 See Le Roux (1990:91), Moller (1986:56-59) and South Africa (1937:56). lliffe quotes 
estimates indicating that up to 100 000 eligible pensioners in Kwazulu and one-third of those 
entitled in Qwaqwa do not receive pensions (1937:276). 
e:see Pollak (1931: 156) for information on free assets and m3Ximum assets. 
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TABLE 7.1 
ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR SOCIAL PENSIONS 1990 
CLASSIFICATION PRIVATE INCOME (IN RAND) AT 
WHICH PENSION IS CUT OFF (PER-
CENTAGE OF WHITE LEVELS IN PAR-
ENTHESES) 
AFRICANS 141 (51) 
INDIANS 252 (91) 
COLOUREDS 205 (74) 
WHITES 276 (100) 
SOURCE: LE ROUX (1990:90) 
All these factors have led to a lower percentage of Africans receiving social pensions than 
is the case for other groups. This is counter to reasonable expectations, as Africans are 
clearly the poorest group in society. The percentage of the group qualifying for benefits 
should exceed those of other groups. This differentiated coverage is of course the result 
of differential means tests and the other discriminating factors mentioned above. lt is difficult 
to give accurate estimates of the result of such discrimination (that is, coverage by race) 
because of the lack of systematic evidence on homeland pension payments and population 
figures. One comparison which does illustrate the limited coverage of Africans is presented 
in Table 7.2. 
TABLE 7.2 
COVERAGE OF OLD AGE PEf·ISIOI~S BY RACIAL GROUPS, 19::.o 
GROUP POPULATION NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE 
ABOVE PENSIONERS OF ELIGIBLE 
60(WOMEN) AGE GROUP 
AND 65 (MEN)~ RECEIVING BE-
NE FITS~ 
WHITES 367 785 141 9~6 38.6 
INDIANS ~7 32-t 18 ~33 66.6 
COLOUREDS 133 182 93 441 82.5 
AFRICAtJS 7~5 031 .t22 351~ 53.2 
SOURCE: SOUTH AFRICA (1987:55) 
Notes: 
The qualit]'ing ago::s fur men and women pensioners. 
The means tast was not taken into account. 
Includes self-goveming and TBVC-states. 
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Table 7.2 shows that a smaller percentage of aged Africans receive old age benefits than 
of Coloureds and Indians, which is surprising taking into account the socio-economic profile 
of the groups. Other estimates for later years and for other pensions also tend to show this 
differential coverage and differential backlog in the provision of social pensions and 
grants.e-3 One clear example of discriminatory access to state benefits is the fact that fewer 
Africans (13 389 in 1987) receive maintenance grants and foster-parent grants than Whites 
(22 126 in 1987), Coloureds (64 718) or Indians (16 586). 64 Again, it would be expected 
that the number of grants be positively related to the poverty of the specific group. 
South Africa's welfare system, looking at programmes and coverage, is not predominantly 
insurance based, although certain benefits are administered in this way (unemployment 
insurance and workmen's compensation). In the case of all other benefits and state 
services means-testing is the factor leading to exclusion. Discriminatory means-testing and 
other factors, such as corruption and administrative delays, however, ensure that the actual 
coverage of the population is not impressive. 
7.6 The coverage of risks 
Keeping in mind the commonly identified branches of social security65, six types of 
contingencies or rish:s can be identified. These contingencies are usually formally covered 
in the industrial countries. These eventualities are: 
(1) Occupational accidents and diseases or employment injury. Here provision 
needs to be made for medical care, loss of income and for dependents. 
(2) Illness, need for medical care and maternity. Two types of provision are 
relevant here. In the first place, there is a need for medical care and, in the 
second place, a need for reimbursem~nt for loss of income. 
e.3See Van der Berg (1987a:22). Calculation of useful ratios here are extremely difficult 
because information with regard to pensions and grants payable in the self-governing terri-
tories are excluded as they become independent while their population figures are still 
included. 
64South Africa, Central Statistical Services (1990a:6.4). 
155See, for example, I.L.O. (1988:2) and Mesa-Lago (1991 :367). 
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(3) Old age, disability and survivors' benefits. Benefits for these categories are 
referred to as social pensions. 
(4) Unemployment. 
(5) Family responsibilities. These benefits are normally referred to as family 
allowances. 
(6) Destitution not related to any of the above factors or where people do not 
qualify for other benefits because contribution conditions have not been 
fulfilled. 
As was noted, in most of these cases there are some state provisions in South Africa. 
Coverage is, however, e:·jremely selective as a result of (discriminatory) means-testing, the 
exclusion of sections of the labour force from coverage in the case of insurance, and as a 
result of the unavailability of facilities. 
Work injury and unemployment is catered for through the respective insurance schemes but 
coverage of the population is limited as indicated above. State health services provide for 
medical care, the first aspect under (2). Although the unemployment insurance fund covers 
contributors in the case of illness and maternity, there is no general scheme of assistance 
in these circumstances. The social pension system is well established. 
Assistance regarding normal family responsibilities (for example, assistance with child rearing 
through cash subsidies) does not exist and there is no well-defined programme to help 
destitute people who are not covered by any of the other features of the social safety net. 
Current nutritional programmes are extremely limited although there have been efforts to 
extend this type of assistance in the aftermath of the introduction of the value added tax. 
7. 7 The commitment to equality 
A basic commitment to equality is usually seen as resulting in flat-rate benefits (fixed at one 
level for anybody who is eligible), as is true of the British national insurance scheme. In the 
South African case there is not such a basic commitment to equality. Benefits in terms of 
the unemployment and workmen's compensation schemes are proportional to previous 
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earningse./3, while pensions and allowances are reduced on a rand-for-rand basis if income 
exceeds a specified "free income". These factors result in different levels of benefits received 
by different individuals. 
Furthermore, the levels of free incomes specified are determined on a racial basis, as is the 
maximum amount of pensions payable. Historically, the amount of free income was much 
lower for Africans than for other races, with Whites doing better than Indians and Coloureds, 
whose level of benefits st3yed on par with each other for most of the time. As a result of 
the differential free incomes and maximums, unequal benefits payable to the different groups 
were brought about. 
Inequality with regard to per capita social expenditure is shown in the average amount per 
beneficiary received in the case of maintenance grants and old age pensions as indicated 
in Table 7.3 and Table 7.4.67 A fairly standard pattern, vi::. extreme differentiation with the 
improvement of the position of the other races relative to Whites since the 1960's68, can 
· be identified with regard to average benefits, levels of free income and maximum benefits 
payable. 
These steps towards equalization reflect what Van der Berg has called a shift of fiscal 
paradigm towards acceptance of the need to remove disparities in per capita expenditure 
between the different population groups.159 This acknowledgement, as well as the process 
of rectifying the situation can be seen in figures for racial per capita expenditure in other 
spheres of social provision, especially education. Quite often this process of equalization 
e.t:ln 1990 unemployment insurance benefits were equal to "45 per cent of the worker's 
earnings when he was last employed as a contributor". Pensions in terms of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act are "calculated at 75 per cent of the worker's monthly earnings up to 
R2 000 per month". See Official South African Trade Unions Directory and Industrial 
Relations Handbook (1990:70 and 83). 
~For a detailed overview of the differentiation in free incomes, free assets, maximum 
pensions and other aspects, see Pollak (1980: 154-170). 
e.sone trend not clearly reflected in these figures is the weakening of the position of 
Coloured, Indian and African people between the middle 1940's and the early 1960's. This 
trend will be looked at later in this section. 
~an der Berg (1989a:198-199). 
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is accompanied by a lowering of the real benefits of White recipients, especially since the 
late 1970's. 
TABLE 7.3 
MAINTENANCE GRANTS AND FOSTER PARENT GRANTS (Average 
annual amount in Rand per beneficiary I percentage of White level in 
parentheses /various years) 
YEAR WHITES COLOUREDS INDIANS AFRICANS 
1941/42 30.00 12.04 8.57 5.48 
(100) (40) (29) (18) 
1962 374.07 146.98 113.28 58.46 
(100) (39) (30) (16) 
1972 764.47 265.16 287.38 133.80 
(100) (35) (37) (17) 
1982 2117.46 1271.35 1 283.78 344.22 
(100) (60) (61) (16) 
1987 2809.95 1874.22 2231.70 470.31 
(100) (67) (79) (17) 
1989 3456.68 N.A. 3065.46 N.A. 
(100) (85) 
Sources: South Africa (1944:61) and South Africa, Central Statistical 
Services (1990a:6.4). 
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TABLE 7.4 
OLD AGE PENSIONS 
(average annual amount in Rand per beneficiary I percentage of 
White level in parentheses/ various years). 
YEAR WHITE COLOURED ASIAN AFRICAN 
1932 54.00 19.00 N.A. N.A. 
(100) (35) 
1942 66.60 22.20 N.A. N.A. 
(100) (33) 
1962 267.19 118.01 102.24 25.27 
(100) (44) (38) (9) 
1972 472.9 207.87 211.35 57.18 
(100) (44) (45) (12) 
1982 1637.45 852.16 833.60 429.26 
(100) (52) (51) (26) 
1987 2356.50 1541.28 1541.55 952.75 
(100) (65) (65) (40) 
1988 2788.87 N.A. 2440.22 N.A. 
(100) (87) 
Source: South Africa (1944:56) and South Africa (1990a: 6.2). 
7 .a The financing of social provision 
Expenditure on social security in South Africa is, with the exception of unemployment 
insurance and workmen's compensation, financed from general government revenue.70 
Workmen's compensation is financed from employer contributions which are risk and 
experience rated. Unemployment benefits are paid from a fund financed jointly from 
employee and employer contributions and a contribution from the state. The real value of 
the contribution of the state to the unemployment insurance fund has declined significantly 
since its inception.71 
7
'-The nature of the South African tax system cannot be discussed here. For a recent 
overview, see Loots (1991). 
71 See Meth and Piper (1984:42-43). 
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7.9 The stateness of welfare provision 
Flora defines the "stateness" of welfare provision, which he views as being negatively related 
to the scope for market and voluntary provision, as "the degree to which the state has 
'penetrated' the welfare institutions". 72 Increasing stateness is thus closely related to what 
was termed "nationalization" of the services providing social security. Questions about the 
appropriate role of the state in the economy are complex and controversial. These issues 
are relevant in the light of the fact that the present South African government has expressed 
its intention to shift functions relating to social security onto other institutions to a greater 
extent.n In some fields (notably housing) this process has already been initiated. 
The intricacies of the interaction between state and voluntary action cannot be anafyzed in 
any detail in this paper. Because of the importance of the issue and to illustrate some of 
the relevant aspects it is, however, necessary to mah:e some remarks about the relative role 
of the state. General remarks will be made about the extent of state provision in education 
and health, whereafter some issues related to income support, especially retirement 
provision, are taken up. These are areas where significant and formalized private action 
occurs, making a rough comparison of roles possible. In areas like personal social services, 
the extensive role of households and informal voluntary organizations, and in housing the 
complexity of market provision and government intervention, mah:e comparisons even more 
daunting. 
7 .9.1 Education 
In the field of education, state expenditure on education is often used as the indicator of the 
cost of education to South Africa. Recent estimates by Trotter have indicated how 
misleading this can be and, in the context of this dissertation, how this can lead to a 
misunderstanding of the complexity of the production of services providing social security. 74 
72Fiora (1986:XIX). 
73See Hendrie (1986:214-215), South Africa, Department of National Health and Population 
Development (1988) and South African Institute of Race Relations (various years). 
74Trotter (1988), especially p.85, where the point above is made. 
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In the specific case of education, focusing on state expenditure figures, which are more 
readily available than other aspects of the cost of education, might lead to a disregard of the 
costs which the individual, community and other institutions carry. Trotter's estimates, while 
confirming the state's dominance in the provision of education, also highlight important other 
contributions. 
His estimates for 1985 indicate that 63.8 per cent of the total cost of education of R10 292 
million, which include "opportunity costs"75 based on earnings forgone, is financed by the 
state. Private direct cost made up 12.1 per cent of total cost with "opportunity costs" making 
up 19.1 per cent of total cost. Private schools, church schools, contributions by foreign 
governments, etcetera, make up the rest with each of these categories being relatively 
insignificant. While the dominance of the state cannot be questioned, the realization of the 
private costs of education could perhaps have important policy consequences. 
One implication is that increased state expenditure is not all that is needed in order to 
equalize educational opportunities and outcomes between the races in South Africa. The 
fact that the state may be willing to equalize spending does not imply that the effective 
demand for that equal education will materialize, or materialize in the short run. A lack of 
"effective demand" might be the result of the fact that poor communities might not be able 
to finance the hidden private costs of investing in higher levels of education. 76 This impact 
of private costs is one of the reasons why using parity in racial levels of expenditure as an 
objective and as a norm to focus policy can lead to a simplistic overestimate of demand and 
7srrotter's use of the concept "opportunity cost" is problematical. The accepted usage of 
the term is not to refer to a specific type of cost but to indicate the "real" value/price or cost 
of an activity. See, for example, Friedman (1990:43). What Trotter is actually referring to 
is the implicit/hidden or indirect cost of education which together with the visible/direct costs 
of education determine the opportunity cost of education. The opportunity cost of education 
is not only the loss of income concomitant on studying, but the total value of the lost 
alternative, including the lost alternative consumption as a result of the direct cost of 
education. 
7&-nle early struggle of platteland teachers against the farming communities to enforce 
compulsory schooling has often been interpreted as reflecting the lack of understanding of 
the community. The economic reasoning behind such "obstinacy" is that the state, by 
making certain levels of schooling compulsory, is forcing the community to finance the 
private costs of such education while benefits might only accrue to the society (externalities) 
or the next generation. In this context the state then has to finance more than just the cost 
of production of education in order to allow required rates of return for the individual. 
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the required levels of state expenditure. 
While some cost factors might imply an overestimate of demand for education, other aspects 
might work in the opposite direction. Two factors in particular might result in the parity norm 
providing an underestimate of state expenditure required. Firstly, the neglect of the implicit 
private costs of education may lead to a misjudgment (underestimate) of the real cost of 
equalizing opportunities and democratizing the economy. This is of course the important 
complaint against the establishment of mere formal equality of opportunity (that is without 
affirmative action) when trying to equalize levels of living. Secondly, Donaldson has argued 
that an absence of alternatives to education, that is employment opportunities, might lead 
to such low opportunity costs of education that the quantity of education demanded might 
outstrip the ability to supply. n lt could then be e:-:pected that the state will have to spend 
more per capita on the education of disadvantaged groups because they will stay in the 
educational system longer as the result of the lack of other openings. This reasoning might, 
on the other hand, lead to a different perspective on the real costs of producing employment 
opportunities through public works schemes. 
The above aspects can serve to reinforce the point made earlier in this dissertation that 
"goods are goods" and further that a complex analysis of the costs of provision and how 
they differ between institutions is necessary in order to be able to evaluate the rationality of 
and constraints on state provision. Delving deeper into the "market" for social services might 
be necessary to predict changes and warn against constraints. A similar point is made by 
Donaldson when remarking on the "comple:{ity of the social demand for services and ... the 
interconnected problems which confront governments in the planning and coordination of 
social services" and warning ''that a simple set of rules governing provision or subsidisation 
will (not) suffice".78 
noonaldson (1991 :13). This factor is taken account of in Trotter's estimate of implicit costs 
by including the probability of finding employment and the wage elasticity of labour demand 
in the estimate of "opportunity cost". See Trotter (1988:75-81). 
78Donaldson (1991 :7). 
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7 .9.2 Health 
Estimates of the social costs of health, constructed as systematically as in Trotter's analysis 
of education, are not available. What is available does, however, throw some light on the 
relative role of the state in this sphere. Total South African state expenditure on health 
(including the homelands) has been estimated at about 3 per cent of gross domestic 
product at market prices in the late 1980's (R5.489 billion or 3.35 per cent in 1987 /88). 
Figures for the years between 1975/76 and 1984/85 indicate that the private consumption 
expenditure on health averaged just less than 80 per cent of expenditure by general 
government. In these years total health e:<penditure, defined as general government 
expenditure plus private consumption expenditure on medical and pharmaceutical products 
and medical services, comprised between 4.8 and 5.9 per cent of gross domestic product. 
General government expenditure contributed in all the years about 55 per cent of the total 
expenditure with private consumption expenditure making up the balance. 79 
lt can be noted that this measured level of health expenditure relative to gross domestic 
product, which probably excludes a number of private costs, compares well with those in 
other countries and is in line with World Health Organization recommendations. 80 With 
regard to the private/public mix the South African position is also not extreme, lying between 
among others Australia (with 36 per cent of health costs financed privately) and the United 
States (57 per cent privately provided).81 
7 .9.3 Income support 
State income support in South Africa provides assistance in the case of: 
vulnerable stages during a person's life cycle (old age, youth and maternity 
through old age pensions, war veterans' pensions, maintenance grants, 
unemployment insurance); 
7~he estimates of expenditure are from Taylor and Klopper (1987:802-804). See also South 
Africa (1986). 
~aylor and Klopper (1987:802). See also Van der Berg (1991b:78, Table 4). Cost of 
services can of course be extremely misleading as an indicator of value. 
81 South Africa (1986). 
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inability to earn an income as a result of disability or accidents (through blind, 
disability and military pensions and workmen's compensation); 
death of a breadwinner (workmen's compensation, unemployment insurance 
and maintenance grants); and 
unemployment and illness (unemployment insurance). 
These are of course all eventualities which are fairly common and for which many people 
prepare privately to some or other extent. Five mechanisms through which income support 
can be provided can be identified. These methods, which can act as substitutes for each 
other, are: 
(1) Provision through individual saving and contractual saving (personal insurance) 
and through supportive household and family structures. 
(2) Community provision through institutions other than the state, market and 
pension funds, especially by religious bodies and voluntary welfare organiz-
ations. 
(3) Private provision of benefits through retirement funds which are in many 
instances related to the employment relationship (for example by trade unions 
and employers). Although these are referred to as retirement funds they are 
frequently used by employees to cope with other hazards, such as disability 
and unemployment. 
(4) State provision of retirement and disability benefits to state employees, 
including local authorities and other parastatal organisations. These are 
normally referred to as civil pensions and are payments to former employees 
of the state in terms of a contributory pension fund set up by the state for this 
purpose. Such civil pensions are identical in nature to pension and other 
retirement provision for their employees by private sector employers. 
(5) State provision of social pensions. Social pensions can be defined as 
payments by the state to individuals, normally in terms of a non-contributory 
assistance scheme, but can also refer to a state-run compulsory contributory 
insurance scheme such as the system found in the United Kingdom. Such a 
system may be means-tested (as in South Africa) or universal (as in the United 
Kingdom). Such payments are normally related to old age and disability. 
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These different categories are distinguished by referring to social pensions, civil pensions, 
retirement funds, community provision and individual/household provision. Substantial 
evidence is available on the extent of retirement and other pension provision but calculating 
accurate ratios of coverage is difficult as a result of the exclusion of self-governing territories 
and the TBVC-states from the Central Statistical Services data for social security. 
During 1978, 259 915 pensioners received benefits from occupational retirement 
schemes."'2 Total benefits from these funds in this year comprised nearly R922 million. Of 
this amount just more than R737 million represented benefits on retirement and death and 
other benefits offered by the funds. The rest, R184.7 million, represented payments to 
employees leaving the firms. Of the total number of pensioners belonging to occupational 
schemes, just more than 45 per cent belonged to schemes for civil servants, with a further 
three per cent belonging to state controlled funds (which consist largely of local authority 
funds). 83 
For a long time it has been a cause of concern that nearly twenty per cent of the payments 
by these funds represented drainage. Drainage comprises payments for reasons strictly 
other than those for which these funds were. established. This outflow of funds tended to 
grow sharply over some periods in the 1980's. Such a situation is seen as detracting from 
"the efficacy of funds as purveyors of social security and indicates how necessary it is for 
effective arrangements to be made for the compulsory preservation of pension benefits". 84 
Attempts to enforce such preservation met with fierce resistance in the early 1980's. Two 
reasons, both pointing to problematic aspects of state social pensions and social insurance, 
have been advanced for this response. Firstly, "premature" benefits from retirement funds 
might serve to tide workers over periods of unemployment in the absence of a broadly 
based and adequate unemployment insurance system. Resistance to the confiscation of 
such an important safety net, especially in the economic climate of the mid 1980's, was then 
82Unless otherwise mentioned, figures on occupational pensions and social pensions in this 
section were calculated from South Africa . (1980) and South Africa, Central Statistical 
Services (1990a). 
83For definitions of the different types of funds, see South Africa (1980:4). 
84South Africa (1980:6). 
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perfectly understandable.es Secondly, as Le Rou:< has explained, the means-tested nature 
of the state social pension scheme and especially the low level of free income could place 
somebody with a small occupational pension squarely in a classical "poverty trap". Because 
of access to an occupational pension a person might be deprived of a state pension and 
end up with a retirement income below the level of the state social pension. 86 These 
aspects again illustrate the complex interaction between state and private provision. 
Compared to the occupational pensions, social pensions in 1978 were also highly significant 
and from some perspectives more critical than occupational pensions. If social pensions 
paid outside the homelands are considered, and maintenance grants and contributory 
benefits excluded, more than double the number of pensioners benefited from social 
pensions than benefitted from occupational pensions (623 523 against 259 915 in 1978). 
A similar situation existed in 1986 and 1987. The overall situation is even more skewed in 
favour of social pensions, because adding social pensions paid in the homelands may push 
up the number of beneficiaries by about one third. 87 Adding other means-tested benefits, 
such as maintenance grants and compulsory social insurance, pushes the number of people 
relying on state income support to more than 1.27 million people in 1978 (1.64 million in 
1987). This was equal to about 15 per cent of the economically active population and nearly 
six per cent of the total population, excluding the TBVC countries, in both years. 88 
In spite of the limited coverage of social pensions (see the section on coverage), the large 
number of people receiving these payments as well as their dependence on this income 
highlight the crucial role of these social pensions. In summarizing the available evidence 
lliffe reiterates the well-known points that elderly pensioners are often the breadwinners for 
households and that, in many rural areas, especially among the very poor without access 
85See Mouton Committee (1990:35). 
86Le Roux (1990:90) and Human Awareness Programme (1984:70-71). 
1371t seems to be clearly established that more Africans receive pensions in the homelands 
than in the rest of South Africa. Van der Berg(1989a:22) estimated that in 1986, 575 000 
people received pension payments in the homelands. An earlier figure indicated that 44 7 373 
Africans received old age, disability or blind pension in the homelands in 1980, with 291 228 
receiving these benefits outside the homelands. See Simkins (1984a:3). 
eePopulation figures are mid-year estimates, 1985 boundaries. See South Africa, Central 
Statistical Services (1990a). 
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to migrant earnings, pensions are indispensable. 89 
In terms of benefits paid, the occupational pension schemes are more significant than the 
social pension schemes. Total payments from social pensions, grants, unemployment 
insurance and workmen's compensation outside the homelands in 1986 came to R1722 
million, or just more than one per cent of gross domestic product at market prices(GDPMP). 
Including Van der Berg's estimate of 1986 homeland eY.penditure on social pensions 
provides total expenditure of R2239 million or nearly 1.6 per cent of GDP MP· Disbursements 
from the occupational schemes in 1986 totalled R4505 million (3 per cent of GDPMP). 
Total benefits received from the different funds are, however, a misleading indicator of the 
role of the state in retirement provision. In the first place there is extensive regulation of 
occupational retirement funds through legislation. The objective of this legislation is to 
protect the interests of fund members by monitoring the rules, administration and financial 
health of the scheme. The state also influences retirement funds through investment regula-
tions, referred to as "prudent investment guidelines". Although the situation changed 
markedly in 1 989 with the movement away from extremely restrictive prescribed investments 
in government stock and other financial paper funding the state, the early history gives a 
good indication of the state's power to influence and use retirement provision.90 
A further notable way in which the state influences retirement provision is via tax incentives 
to invest in retirement funds. With respect to pension funds (distinguished from provident 
funds), employer and employee contributions up to a certain income are deductible from 
taxable income. Furthermore, the investment income of pension funds is not taxable, 
although pension payments (annuities) are ta:-:ed as income of the recipient while lump sum 
payments are partly taxable and partly tax free.91 
lt is impossible to monetize or calculate the opportunity cost of these pension interventions 
in order to come to a reasonable estimate of the role of the state relative to the occupational 
89lliffe (1987:272). See also Wilson and Ramphele (1989:63-64). 
90See Sephton (1990:1-3; 17-19 and 32-37) for a discussion of the regulatory framework. 
91 See Sephton (1 990:21-30) for a discussion of the ta:.: regime pertaining to retirement funds. 
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funds. Estimates of the cost of these incentives to the state as a result of tax income 
foregone ranges between R4 billion and RS billion in 1990.92 This amounted to between 
55 to 90 per cent of the yearly inflow of contributions and by far exceeded the direct outlay 
of the state on social pensions, which was estimated at R2837 million in 1990.93 
The Mouton Committee has estimated that membership of retirement funds was just below 
six million people in 1 988 and that in 1986, 82 per cent of formally employed persons were 
members of private retirement funds. Two things can be noted about this very high ratio 
compared to some of the more developed countries. 94 Firstly, although the coverage of 
the formally employed by occupational pensions seems high, eJ..1ensive unemployment and 
informal sector activity means that only forty per cent or less of the population of working 
age is covered and that the absolute number of uncovered people has been increasing. 
About 1. 75 million employed persons, most probably active in the agricultural sector, were 
not covered by occupational pensions. 95 
Secondly, the relatively high membership of occupational retirement funds among South 
Africans is, as the Mouton Committee argues, partly to be explained by the absence of a 
state social pension scheme providing significant benefits. 96 These comparative figures 
then once again provide an illustration of the extent to which state and private action act as 
substitutes for each other. 
Market and employer provision is of course not the only substitute for state action in the field 
of provision for retirement and other contingencies. The lack of state provision for the 
~Mouton Committee (1990:26) and Le Roux (1990:94). 
~his is the amount given by Le Roux for "state old age pensions" but these figures almost 
certainly refer to all social pensions, excluding the homelands. 
94The ratios for some other countries are as follows: Switzerland, 68 per cent; U.S.A., 45 
per cent; Japan, 36 per cent; and the United Kingdom 30 per cent . (Mouton Committee, 
1990:14). 
95Mouton Committee (1990:13 and 15). 
96Mouton Committee (1990:14). 
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indigent, aged and disabled Africans97, and also the extreme neglect of institutional care, 
would imply growing communal mechanisms dealing with adversity and deprivation in 
African communities. These communal responses were, none the less, also threatened and 
put under severe pressure by certain aspects of government policies in the 1970's and 
1980's, such as forced removals under the Group Areas Act. Pinnock has described some 
facets of this "breaking of the web" of communal and family support systems.98 Voluntary 
organizations also came under increased pressure as a result of government insistence on 
racially segregated welfare organizations and opposition to White involvement in welfare 
services to Africans. 99 
lt is unclear to what extent collective action in communities and extended families could 
regroup in the face of these assaults and not enough evidence is available to say to what 
extent these in fact substituted for the lack of state action. Some commentators are not too 
pessimistic. lliffe, for example, argues that "networks of kinship and neighbourhood which 
helped the urban poor survive" could be re-established ("re-woven") and that "(t)he 
proliferation of small urban self-help groups matched the inadequacy of formal welfare 
institutions".100 As confirmation he refers to survey evidence of kin and "homeboy" support 
and the existence and widespread membership of rotating credit societies, burial societies 
and "the hundreds of independent churches". These varied mechanisms provide a range 
of "benefits", such as support of the unemployed, the chronically sick and the old.101 
Information is also scarce regarding the macroeconomic importance, and impact on poverty, 
of an increasing number of non-governmental development and aid organizations which 
sprang up during the 1980's. Some of the organi::ers of these initiatives claim success. 
Perlman refers to "the multiplicity of large-scale child feeding schemes that have been set 
97See Table 7.2 above which indicate the percentage of the relevant age groups of the 
different races receiving old age pensions. The same imbalance probably holds for other 
pensions although it is more difficult to get appropriate figures for comparison. 
98Pinnock (1984). 
99lliffe (1987:264) and Pollak (1980:171-174). 
100lliffe (1987:263-264 ). 
101 lliffe (1987:263-264). 
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up since 1984, and the measured success they have had in combating malnutrition".102 
A more conclusive study of these systems of provision needs to be made. 
7.1 0 Conclusion 
The diversity of systems of social provision in South Africa makes a definitive categorization 
in terms of stylized ideal types impossible. The multitude of programmes with widely 
diverging coverage and underlying principles present a first case for a systematic overhaul 
of social provision. 
In terms of the typologies derived from the experience in industriali::ed countries it is clear 
that the South African system of income support and personal welfare services is residual. 
Provision by the state is a last resort conditional on destitution. The contrast is perhaps 
sharpest with the Beveridge system of social security as outlined above. In fact the 
widespread use of means-testing, also in the domain of health care, places these program-
mes close to the poor relief systems of nineteenth century Europe, although the targeting 
mechanisms are perhaps less harsh. The existing social insurance schemes, in spite of 
having much in common with those in the industrialized countries, are of such limited 
coverage, that they cannot impart a "modern" character to welfare provision in South Africa. 
Even in education, universal access to primary and secondary education is still an ideal. 
From a different perspective the fact that all groups have some access to a system of 
welfare services, and the fact that state provision is dominant in many of these spheres, is 
perhaps surprising and the phenomenon that should be explained.103 While the rudimen-
tary nature of social provision tends to discredit, for the South African case, the hypothesis 
of increased nationalization of welfare services over the development process, the alternative 
perspective can be used to argue in favour of the strength of this trend. The fact that black 
people do receive significant welfare benefits from the state reinforces the belief in the 
102Perlman (1989:80). 
10This echoes Bromberger's questions in the context of income distribution. He argued that 
an important issue is why we found any redistribution to the poorer groups, or state welfare 
services accessible to them in the light of the government's expressed objectives over the 
last four decades. 
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primacy of objective economic factors over ideology. 
With regards to future trends, and the question whether the future will see increased 
nationalization, it is necessary to be clear about the shortcomings of state social provision 
in South Africa. The holes in the safety net (protection) are indeed big and the ladder 
(promotion) has many missing rungs. These failures are related to many factors. 
The South African system of social provision is extremely fragmented. Although fragmenta-
tion is not necessarily negative - the successful German system is notably fragmented - it 
seems to be so in the South African case. In addition to different programmes for different 
social risks which are closely related, the different racial bureaucracies provide grounds for 
urgent rationalization. 
With regard to coverage it can be said that welfare provision in South Africa is incomplete, 
residual and selective. lt is incomplete and selective because certain social risks or 
conditions are not addressed. Destitution and malnutrition are not confronted in any 
systematic way. Formal insurance systems furthermore do not scratch the surface of the 
problem of joblessness and there is no assistance in the case of normal family respon-
sibilities. Even in the case of services where universal access is an accepted goal (such as 
education and health) unavailability of services and administrative problems preclude the 
attainment of this objective. With regard to selectivity racial discrimination remains a 
problem. 
Coverage is residual in the sense that the majority of programmes are a last resort and that 
the benefits provide a very low level of support. Means-tested benefits do not reach many 
of the poorest. Hendrie's analysis of the income sources and levels of three urban samples 
is of relevance here. Of the 666 households sampled, 258 had household incomes below 
the minimum living level (MLL, as defined by the Bureau of Market Research). Of these 258, 
only 84 received cash benefits from the state. One tenth of households received cash 
benefits but still remained under the MLL.104 
1
o.
1Hendrie (1986:142 and 210-211). Le Roux shows that for White pensioners the maximum 
old age pension barely allows them to reach the supplementary living level. (Le Roux, 
1990:91). 
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These two aspects then call for a significant widening of the South African social safety net. 
An expansion of current means-tested and insurance systems will not do. Insurance 
systems cannot make an impact where a major part of the population is not in formal 
employment. The present means-tested benefits also provide only for those who cannot 
labour because of old age, disabilities or their youth. lt is clear that relevant measures in 
South Africa must also include the working poor and those that cannot find remunerative 
employment in order to confront the major sources of insecurity. 
The urgency of reform is given further justification when taking into account the earlier 
argumentation and evidence that increased state provision of social security is a normal, and 
perhaps economically rational, adjustment, and that South Africa is a laggard in this respect. 
The introduction of a system modelled on the "Bismarckian" or "Beveridge" model can thus 
provide the country with the opportunity to implement a more efficient and comprehensive 
system of social security. In terms of the nationalization hypothesis it can be argued that 
although South Africa fell behind over the last four decades, it can now catch up. 
Contrary to the above arguments, only piecemeal changes seem to be on the agenda and 
most economists seem to agree that the role of the state in the South African economy 
should not be increased much further. 105 This once again throws doubt on the reliability 
of the generalization that economic development seems to be associated with a growing 
relative role of state provision in the economy. This is particularly so for the South African 
economy. Most of the doubts about the growth of state provision of social services centre 
around the belief that such provision is not affordable under current South African 
conditions. Arguments about affordability are taken up in the next chapter which will also 
look at the usefulness of the generalizations of Chapters 2 and 3 in thinking about the South 
African situation. 
105See, for example, Maasdorp (1990) and the different contributions in P. Moll, et al. (eds.) 
(1991). 
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CHAPTER 8 CONSTRAINTS, TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 
8.1 Introduction 
The unaffordability of increased social provision by the state is seen by most economists as 
the reason why a rapid equalization of social expenditures and an expansion of the safety-
net in terms of risks covered are not possible. As a result of the widespread agreement, this 
conclusion, and certain related points, can be seen as representing a consensus on the 
matter. There is, furthermore, a remarkable degree of correspondence between this 
consensus view and actual adjustments in the economy with regard to social expenditures. 
These adjustments can be described as reallocation within existing expenditure frontiers. 
Both the theoretical consensus and actual shifts are to an extent in contrast to the view, 
proposed in Part I, that a growing relative role of the state in social provision in a developing 
economy should be expected, and welcomed. This chapter summarizes the consensus on 
social provisioning in the future as well as current trends with regard to social expenditure. 
These considerations will then be used to critically discuss the implications of Part I in the 
South African context. 
8.2 The consensus on adjusting social expenditures 
Two points about the expansion, delivery and financing of social services seem to be 
generally accepted policy conclusions. Firstly, it is widely believed that rapid expansion of 
social provision to the previously disadvantaged groups must take place. This broad 
objective is normally interpreted as implying rapid equalization of racial per capita 
expenditure in the social services.1 Secondly, it is accepted that equalization cannot take 
place at current levels of per capita expenditure on Whites. 
The reason behind these conclusions are complex. Increasing and equitable social 
expenditure can be justified on two grounds. Firstly, there is the need for stability through 
1 See Chapter 6. 
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legitimacy. 2 lt is believed that such legitimacy can be promoted through the extension of 
social services and the equity of such provision. Legislative enfranchisement, it can be 
argued, must be accompanied by fiscal enfranchisement. Secondly, increased social 
provision can be seen as indispensable for future growth. This is because certain types of 
social expenditures consist of investment in human capital and sl\illed labour. This is related 
to the fact that the stagnation of the South African economy since at least the early 1980's 
has often been blamed partly on earlier inadequate expenditure on especially education. 3 
On the other hand it is argued that equalization of expenditure at White levels is impossible 
because it would make excessive demands on the economic resources of the country. 
South Africa is seen as too poor a country, with too many other demands on scarce 
resources, to be able to afford provision of social services at the levels that Whites have 
become accustomed to. 4 
A rough indication of the problem involved in equalization at White levels can be constructed 
by calculating the total cost of spending on each beneficiary in the field of the social services 
the same amount as the average amount spent on each White beneficiary. 5 Van der Berg 
did this calculation for four fields in the social services, namely education, housing, health 
and social pensions, using actual expenditure figures for 1986. He concluded that to finance 
such equality of expenditure, social expenditure on these four fields would have had to 
increase from the actual level of 10.7 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1986 to 
between 27 and 35 per cent of GDP. This level of expenditure was described as "clearly not 
attainable". 6 
2See Van der Berg (1989c), Simkins (193~b) and Yudelman (198~:286-287) for discussions 
of this imperative. 
3See Knight (1989) and Bromberger (1982:18~ to 185) for some of the links between earlier 
regressive social policies and the constraints on growth of the late 1970's to 1990's. 
4See Human Sciences Research Council (1981 :37 44), Simkins (1984b:35-37 and the 
annexure which quotes Brand e:,1ensively) and Van der Berg (1991 b:78). 
5Because only the current number of beneficiaries are taken into account, the impact of 
removing discriminatory access and means-tests is not included. From this perspective the 
estimate can be seen as conservative. 
SVan der Berg (1989b:25). 
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Using an alternative method Simkins7 came to a parallel conclusion. He estimated the 
average level of likely per capita expenditure on social services, given different scenarios 
about population growth, per capita personal income growth and the ratio between public 
and social expenditure and personal income. These estimated levels of per capita 
expenditure were then compared with actual levels of per capita social expenditure as 
measured by McGrath8 for 1975/76. Simkins' astimates indicated that under the 
assumption of high per capita income growth (53 per cent between 1976 and 2000) and a 
large welfare budget (51. 75 per cent of government expenditure with government 
expenditure equal to 32.5 per cent of personal income) equalisation by 2000 would require 
a 28 per cent drop in per capita expenditure on Whites. A "medium" welfare budget 
combined with "medium" growth implied equalisation at the average 1975/76 level of 
expenditures on Coloureds and Indians. He concluded that these exercises show ''that it 
is possible for the state to provide without specific charge only a very basic level of social 
services". 9 
Inherent in the above two analyses are two constraints on increased social expenditure. 
There is, firstly, the belief that there is little room for reorganizing or redirecting state 
expenditure in order to attain higher levels of social expenditure within current levels of total 
public expenditure. In this regard Van der Berg10 as well as Peter Moll11 argue that social 
expenditure relative to the size of the economy in South Africa is already high when seen 
in comparative and historical perspective. South African social spending, according to Moll, 
is currently relatively higher than that attained in the presently developed countries at 
comparable levels of per capita income, as well as being high relative to countries presently 
at comparable levels of development and expenditure. Thus increasing social expenditure 
further at the expense of other categories of expenditure, in order to equalize social 
expenditures at White levels, would seem to be unwarranted. 
7Simkins (1984b:31-36). 
8McGrath (1979). 
9Simkins (198-lb:35). See also Hendrie (1986:212-213). 
10Van der Berg (1991 b:76) 
11 P. Moll (1991 :122). 
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The evidence then shows that relative to the size of the economy social expenditure in South 
Africa is surprisingly high when compared to expenditure levels in comparable countries. 
This reality also casts doubt on the widespread belief that the abolition of apartheid will lead 
to significant savings which can be used to increase social expenditures. In this regard Van 
der Berg provides further evidence. He argues that equalization of educational, pension and 
health expenditure at White levels combined with significant advances in the provision of 
housing would cost, in 1986 terms, an additional15 to 21 per cent of GDP.12 The possible 
savings from apartheid, on the other hand, would set free only about 1 per cent of GDP from 
administrative savings, 0.4 per cent from abandoning industrial decentralisation incentives 
and another 2.0 per cent from further constraining defence expenditure. This saving, of at 
most 3 to 4 per cent of GDP, does not go far towards removing inequalities.13 
Van der Berg also makes the important point that cutting non-social expenditures might have 
serious socio-economic repercussions. The livelihood of a large number of people, 
especially through salaries lost, might be affected by such adjustments.14 Making the 
adjustment in this way would as a result also be very costly. 
If expenditure priorities cannot be adjusted in order to provide rapid "fiscal justice", 
increasing the level of total government expenditure might provide room for equalization. 
On this matter most economic commentators are also fairly pessimistic. lt is normally 
argued that, relative to GDP, total government expenditure in South Africa is high compared 
to that in developed as well as comparable developing countries.15 This is then a second 
constraint limiting the expansion of social services. The historical and comparative 
experience seems to warn against a further expansion of the role of the South African gov-
ernment. The overall tax rate is viewed as a constraint because very high levels of taxation 
may discourage investment16 or lead to capital flight and increased emigration of skilled 
labour. Financing increased social expenditure through increased deficits also leads to well-
12yan der Berg (1991b:79, Table 5.3). 
13Van der Berg (1991b:80-82) and Nattrass (1991:31). 
14Van der Berg (1991b:83). 
15Nattrass (1991 :30), Loots (1 991 :41-42). 
16P. Moll (1991 :122), for example. 
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known problems. The macroeconomic imbalances which might result from such 
expansionary policy can cause, among other things excessive inflation and currency 
depreciation. These, in turn, can destroy the gains of the poor in terms of increased govern-
ment expenditure.17 
lt could be argued that increased social provision can be obtained by using an insurance 
system, with users then actually being "charged" for these benefits in a more direct way. 
A major problem of such an option is that social insurance systems depend on a stable 
wage relationship. Such a framework allows administrative efficiency with regard to 
contributions and the payment of benefits. The large number of South Africans in informal 
employment and unemployment stands in the way of an insurance based system becoming 
an adequate system of protection. This implies that, to a significant extent any adequate 
system would have to provide non-contributory benefits. This focuses attention on general 
revenues.18 The constraints on such financing have been described above. 
If it is not possible to ensure horizontal fiscal justice through spending more on social 
services, as most economists seem to believe, an alternative way has to be found in the light 
of the seeming consensus that such equalization is of prime importance. Two ways have 
been suggested. One way would be by equalizing expenditure at levels below current White 
levels, probably meaning in practise an increased level of services for Africans, constant 
levels for Coloureds, and a reduction in benefits for Whites and lndians.19 As Simkins and 
Van der Berg have indicated this will imply drastic drops in the value of White benefits. Van 
der Berg's estimates of the implications of parity in 1986/87, taking actual total government 
expenditure for the year as the constraint, show a required drop in per capita expenditures 
on Whites from an actual value of R879 to R307, a drop of nearly 65 per cent. This can also 
be interpreted as implying the need for additional taxes of R3 billion on the White population 
group.20 In spite of the severity of the adjustment it is apparently felt that this is a 
necessary way of dealing with the problem in the light of South Africa's status as a middle-
17See T. Moll (1991b:28). 
18See 7.5 above for a discussion of the numbers involved. 
H'See Simkins (1984b:35) and Van der Berg (1991b:76-77). 
WVan der Berg (1991b:76-77). 
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income country. Apartheid has caused "white standards to be raised to unrealistic levels for 
a middle-income country" and in order to bring standards back to realistic levels, White 
standards will have to decline.21 The practicality of such a reduction would probably work 
through the state committing itself to a certain affordable level of provision with levels above 
this having to be purchased directly on the open market or from the state. The emphasis 
on privatization by the present government can be interpreted, in this context, as a way of 
bringing about this adjustment. 
A second way of dealing with the fiscal dilemma follows from the inappropriateness and 
inefficient delivery of many social services provided and the possibility of targeting services 
more accurately at the poor. lt has also been argued that funds will have to be used where 
it presents an investment in future productivity. 
This last point has recently been argued by Donaldson in the case of health care, and more 
generally by Nattrass and Roux. Donaldson argues that "curative services must favour the 
young" and that "it may be necessary to discriminate against the desperately ill or dying". 
This is justified by the fact that state expenditure on the health care of the old may remove 
responsibility for such care from households and that technological advance in the care of 
the dying might increase the congestion of medical services. 22 
Nattrass and Roux argue that spending should be targeted to areas where it represents 
investment in human capital. For them this also implies a concentration on the young, 
"(u)nless it can be shown that consumption transfers to older people are efficient and 
important ways of contributing to the survival and education of children". 23 
The appropriateness of services is also important. As was shown in Chapter 3, the cost of 
production of a service need not be a good indicator of its value, or impact on well-being. 
Examples were also given. This is a very general problem in the evaluation of the adequacy 
of social services. Development economists have often drawn attention to this phenomenon 
21Van der Berg (1991b:77). 
22Donaldson ( 1991 : 17). 
23Nattrass and Roux (1991 :88-89). 
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in the context of Third World countries. Specifically, it has been illustrated that a strong 
commitment to the widespread provision of basic services in the social sphere often results 
in the attainment of quality of life indicators far superior to the result of programmes 
providing expensive and advanced services. As a result of the high returns to relatively 
cheap services, such as primary education and basic health care, countries like China and 
Sri Lanka could manage high levels of well-being24 for their citizens despite low levels of 
income. South Africa provides a good example of the opposite case. High levels of health 
and educational expenditure and relatively high per capita income co-exist with low 
attainments in terms of longevity and literacy. 25 
Given this evidence it is possible that a reorientation to providing basic services (especially 
access to preventative health care and primary education) might not only be fiscally more 
viable but might also give higher returns, especially in terms of indicators of basic needs. 
The above focus on the constraints to state social expenditure and the search for avenues 
to "escape" this South African "fiscal dilemma" thus open up two related options in the field 
of services providing social security. On the one hand, a basic level of services must be 
made available to all, according to what the economy can afford. Service requirements in 
excess of these norms will have to be financed privately. Secondly, the constraints can be 
significantly alleviated or circumvented by concentrating on appropriate services which offer 
the highest returns and by focusing on investments. 
8.3 Recent and current shifts in social provision 
lt is clear from earlier discussions of trends in social provision since the 1970's (6. 7) and the 
current system of provision (7 .3) that developments in social provision were parallel to those 
suggested or envisaged by economists. Therefore the identification of constraints on 
increased state expenditure and the seriousness of these constraints seems to have been 
accurate. 
24Measured in terms of social indicators. 
:!
5See Dreze and Sen (1989:179-187) and Nattrass and Rou:< (1991). 
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While equalization of benefits at levels below former White levels is clearly illustrated by 
developments in education and social pensions, the spheres of housing and health reflect 
the adjustment in standards and the shift towards more appropriate services. 
Tables 8.1 to 8.3 illustrate this movement towards equalization and reduced White levels in 
the cases of educational expenditure and pensions26• The much faster growth over the 15 
year period in the benefits of the other races than that of Whites provides evidence of the 
narrowing of the gap between Whites and Blacks. The fact that White benefits grew at 
below the inflation rate implies a reduction in real levels and, as a result, a downward ad-
justment of the most likely figure for comparison and demands. Present trends do, however, 
diverge from the policy consensus in that the real levels of expenditure on Coloureds and 
Indians are increasing. In terms of affordability, it is generally believed that Coloured levels 
in the mid 1970's and early 1980's should provide the level for equalization. 
In terms of more appropriate services and a reduction of standards, Bromberger has 
remarked that "in housing, health services and the creation of employment there is now a 
readiness to consider 'informal', 'self-help' approaches, to re-examine whether existing 
zoning, health and a host of other regulations are appropriate to the small-scale, 
impoverished business environments of the poor, and to experiment with arrangements for 
economising on scarce and expensive resources (such as doctors) by utilising more 
available but less highly trained resources (such as nurses)".27 While such tendencies 
were still tentative in the 1970's, as indicated by Bromberger, they grew stronger in the 
1980's. This can be seen in the increased focus on preventative health28 and the 
increasing acceptance of informal settlements and self-help housing. 29 
Although equalization at too high levels is perhaps taking place, the economy is adjusting 
well to the realities of resource availability as perceived in the consensus outlined above. 
26lt is clear from Tables 8.2 and 8.3 that the shifts in actual average pension payments and 
maximum amounts payable were very much alike. 
27Bromberger (1982:187). 
28See South African Institute of Race Relations (1990:389). 
29See Hendler (1989:5). See also the discussions in 6.7 and 7.3 above. 
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Although government involvement in the economy is still growing, partly as a result of social 
expenditure growth, there seems to be a willingness to contain government expenditure, 
bolstered by some very real constraints forcing adjustments. 
TABLE 8.1 
PER CAPITA ANNUAL E<PENDITURE OH SCHOOL PUPILS Ar-ID CONSUMER 
PRICE INDEX 
CURRENT RAND AVERAGE ANNUAL 
CLASSIFICATION CHANGE 1971/72 TO 
1971/1972 1£186/18:37 1986/87 (percentage) 
AFRICAN ~5.31 476.95 21.62 
COLOURED 94.41 1021.41 17.20 
ASIAN 1N..t0 1094.~0 15.60 
WHITE 461.00 2508.00 11.95 
CONSUMER PRICE 19.9 118.6 
INDEX (BASE YEAR (1971) (1986) 12.64 
1985) 
Sources: Pill ay (1990:31, Table 1) and Sm1th Africa, Central Statistical Services 
(1990a:8.20) 
TABLE 8.2 
MA.'<IMUM MONTHLY OLD AGE PENSIOf-J A~JD COI·JSUMER PRICE I~JDEX 
CLASSIFICATION CURREI'JT RAND AVERAGE AI'JNUAL 
CHANGE 1972 TO 
1972 1997 1987 (percentage) 
AFRICAN 6.50 117.00 21.25 
COLOURED 20.50 167.00 15.01 
ASIAN 20.50 167.00 15.01 
WHITE 41.00 218.00 11.78 
CONSUMER PRICE 21.2 137.7 13.29 
INDEX (BASE YEAR (1972) (1987) 
1985) 
Sources: Pollal\ (1981 :157) and Hansard (1991). 
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TABLE 8.3 
AVERAGE ArH JUAL OLD AGE PEt lSIOtJ At lD GOtlSUMER PRICE ltlDEX 
CLASSIFICATIOt J CURREt JT RAt JD AVERAGE ANNUAL 
CHANGE 1972 TO 
1972 1987 1987 (percentage) 
AFRICAN 57.18 952.75 20.63 
COLOURED 207.87 1541.28 14.29 
ASIAN 211.35 1541.55 14.16 
WHITE 470.44 2356.50 11.34 
CONSUMER PRICE 21.2 137.7 13.29 
INDEX (BASE YEAR (1972) (1937) 
1985) 
Sources: South Africa, Ce-ntral Statistical S.:.rvices (1990:t:6.2 and 3.20) 
8.4 Remarks about prospects 
In the light of the seeming correspondence between prescriptions (see 8.2) and real 
changes (summarized in 8.3), the relevance of the conclusions of Part 1 and the notion of 
nationalization seems to be limited. The implications of the agreement on constraints is that 
social policy will have to be a holding operation in the foreseeable future. The core needs 
and equalizing access to services providing these, such as primary education, preventative 
health care and the availability of sites for self-help housing will have to be concentrated on. 
A prominent feature will thus be the reduction of the benefits available to the privileged 
sector of society. In aggregate the role of the state should only grow marginally. 
In contrast, Part 1 of this study, interpreted in conjunction with the limited nature of the 
South African welfare system, implies an increased role for the state. The South African 
economy has developed little in terms of social provision since the end of the 1940's and 
the absence of formalized support from the state can be seen as out of line with its level of 
economic development. A constant reassignment of functions from other institutions would 
be expected, especially in the field of family support and child-rearing and also with regard 
to protection against the ravages of joblessness and poverty in general. From a 
comparative perspective the low levels of transfers to households relative to developed 
countries, which can be related to the absence of a general system of social assistance, 
make an increase in this category distinctly plausible. The theoretical analysis of Chapter 
3 also suggested that expansion of the role of the state in providing security should be 
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affordable because it merely consists of a reallocation of functions to the institution with the 
comparative advantage. 
The implications of the theoretical and comparative perspective can be reconciled with the 
scepticism about the possibilities of the e:-:pansion of the role of the state in a number of 
ways. Two of these would allow agreement with the consensus opinions on affordability 
while an alternative would be to question some of the assumptions underlying this 
consensus. 
A first method of bringing the two sets of conclusions in agreement would be by arguing that 
current trends represent a short term movement or readjustment within a longer term 
tendency. The peculiarities of the South African growth experience and especially the 
ideological and resulting external influences can be seen as responsible for stagnation and 
therefore also a lull in the development of social policy. Once renewed growth takes place 
within a new political and structural environment resources will become available for state 
provision of expanded social security. This avenue is, however, less than satisfactory 
because it necessitates the acceptance of the starting point of the current notions on 
affordability, which is that expanded state provision of social security is a luxury. These 
underlying assumptions will be discussed shortly. 
A second way in which the conflict between the two sets of predictions can be resolved is 
by arguing that in spite of the insufficiency of the South African state social support system 
other institutions such as families, communities, unions, employers and the market can 
adequately substitute for the state. Thus, the alternatives to state mediated social security, 
such as family support and community support and "occupational welfare"30, might be ade-
quate. There is, according to this line of argument, not a need for more functions to be 
reassigned to the state. One place where this reasoning is underlying is found in 
Donaldson's argument that "(w)hen ... the state provides generously for the health of the 
aged, then households are encouraged to curtail care of the elderly". 31 Some of these 
substitutes were discussed under the stateness of welfare provision (7.9). The ability of 
30Atkinson and Hills (1991 :90). 
31 Donaldson (1991 :17). 
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these institutions to substitute for the state is to an extent an empirical question which 
cannot be resolved here. The question is, however, not only about the ability of these 
institutions. lt has been clearly illustrated that a large number of institutions can provide the 
different services providing social security. The question is concerned, rather, with which 
institution can provide these services more efficiently. 
Following from the above, it is clear that there are important points on which the current 
consensus on what levels of social expenditure are sustainable conflicts with the theoretical 
precepts of Part 1. Most importantly, there is the underlying assumption that a more 
complete social safety net is a lu:-:ury which can only receive attention after some unspecified 
level of production has been attained. This perspective also assumes that expanded state 
provision must involve additional claims on scarce resources. This need not be the case 
if provision by the state involves a "mere" reallocation from one supply source to another. 
In this sense, a focus on the cost of equalization at current levels of White per capita 
expenditures represents an overestimate of the resources necessary to establish equality. 
The consensus view thus disregards the fact that protection might be a priority in poor 
communities which already claims a large share of resources. The possibility exists that 
state provision might improve efficiency, and in so doing can release resources, as was 
argued in Chapter 3. 
In addition to overestimating the cost of e:<panded state provision, current notions about the 
direction in which social provision should adjust (basic services and more accurate targeting 
to the needy) might be underestimating the cost of changing over to such provision. Firstly, 
withdrawing state support from advanced services, such as academic secondary schooling 
and academic hospitals, might imply a destruction of costly human and other capital through 
loss of jobs, closure of departments, etcetera. Secondly, such privatization will often tend 
merely to shift responsibility for costs to different authorities. Current reform of White 
education might be seen in this light. With government giving more management 
responsibility to individual schools a number of tasks that were centralized are now merely 
being duplicated at a lower level. Whereas increased ability to monitor costs might be a 
benefit of such decentralization, decentralization also implies, in this context, less 
specialization. 
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In addition to the costs of drastically chsnging current 3ystems of provision, there are also 
significant costs involved in targeting benefits more accurately.32 tlote must be taken of 
the administrative costs of targeting, disincentive effects of means tests and other mesns of 
targeting, and the loss of public support for programmes as a result of very specific 
targeting. 
The final balance of these diff.srent costs and benefits cannot be established here. Perhaps 
the only proximate indication of this will be the eventual nature of social provision in South 
Africa, which must be assumed to be a response to different force$ on the demand and 
supply side, and therefore also a response to the structure of costs. 
Although current trends seem to indicate that the costs of increased government intervention 
are becoming excessive there are also other signs of pressure to expand the role of the 
state and of increasing reassignment of functions to the state. Two instances from the field 
of retirement provision can serve as examples. 
Drainage of funds from occupational pension funds has been seen for a long time as a 
serious problem33• Such drainage results in people retiring without adequate provision for 
retirement and with resulting greater dependence on social pensions. Drainage is also 
onerous from the perspective of the individual, who does not only sacrifice the contribution 
of the employer but would have been able to earn higher returns with other forms of saving. 
The most likely solution to the problem is compulsory preservation of benefits, which has 
been proposed by most of the commissions reporting on the matter since the 1960's. An 
effort at implementation of such preservation in the early 1880's led to widespread 
opposition which resulted in withdrawal of the proposed legislation. Most prominent in this 
opposition were trade unions and African workers. Commentators see an important reason 
for this opposition in the fact that many workers need pension money in order to bail them 
over temporary crises such as unemployment. 34 This example illustrates two points which 
3~For general discussions of the problems of targeting and leakages of benefits see Kanbur 
(1987), Glewwe and Van der Gaag (1988) and World Banh: (1990). 
~For discussions see Actuarial Society of South Africa (1890:23), Mouton Committee 
(1990:34-36), South Africa (1980) and 7.9 above. 
34Mouton Committee (1990:34-36). 
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support a view that increased government intervention in the field of social security is likely. 
In the first place it illustrates that some problems of security provision cannot be resolved 
without central intervention. Secondly, it illustrates that trying to judge individual parts of the 
social security system in isolation is inadequate. The different components of social provision 
are closely related and adjustment of one part of the system must depend on its ability to 
combine with other components. Reform of the system of retirement pensions will require 
an adjustment of other mechanisms of social support. 
A second example from the field of retirement provision also provides signs of approaching 
expanded state intervention. The Mouton Committee, investigating retirement provision in 
South Africa, recently recommended that social pensions in South Africa should be made 
universal in the sense that the means test should be abolished. This recommendation 
apparently flowed from their belief that the means test as targeting mechanism so distorts 
economic activity that it should rather be done away with. The implication is also that it is 
not possible to adjust the means test in order to improve its working. 35 Once again it 
seems as if the anomalies of limited and targeted schemes result in these being too costly 
if a wider notion of cost than just monetary cost or share of gross domestic product is 
considered. lt is probably these considerations which prompted the executive director of 
an important firm in the pensions industry to inform the 1991 convention of the Institute for 
Ufe and Pension Associations that 
"the present dispensation may continue subject to legislation regarding 
compulsory membership and preservation, but I feel this is unlikely. The two 
likeliest scenarios are: 
1. Nationalisation or state schemes. 
2. State regulated schemes for the common good of all."36 
~e interim report of the committee which was submitted to the Minister of Finance at the 
end of 1990 is not available to the public and the final report has not been submitted. 
Information on the recommendations is as provided by the Minister of Finance in his 1991 
budget speech (see Hansard, 20 March 1991, cols. 3306-3307). 
~omsett (1991 :2-3). 
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The above two examples cannot settle the matter on the lih:ely and rational direction of future 
state provision of social security in South Africa. Building on the comparative and theoretical 
perspective of Part 1 they do, however, suggest that current notions of affordability of state 
provision of social services might be misleading. Complex considerations of costs and 
benefits are not tah:en into consideration in these judgements. The opposite argument is not 
that there are no significant constraints on the role of the state and social expenditure. What 
is asserted is that the complexity of considerations necessitates a more disaggregated view 
of state provision and a more careful analysis of costs. Such an analysis might indicate a 
rapid expansion of the system of social support as a rational response to the current 
situation. This indicates the necessity of e:c:ploring the possibilities of a radical adjustment 
of the pension system and reconsidering the viability of a comprehensive system of social 
security for South Africa. 
The lack of legitimacy of the South African economic system and the extent of inequality and 
deprivation requires creative solutions. The time might indeed now be ripe to implement 
programmes with the coverage suggested in the early 1940's by the government appointed 
Social Security Committee and National Health Services Commission. 37 Official realization 
of poverty and the number of initiatives in the policy field38 also suggest that a coordinated 
effort is politically feasible. The political demands for a more equitable distribution of income 
and wealth provide further motivation for thinking about thorough policy reform. 
37South Africa (1944a) and South Africa (194-tb). See also the historical discussion of 
Chapter 6. 
38See Section 6. 7, above. 
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CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION 
This study has attempted to establish some relationships between economic development 
and state provision of social security. Generalizations made regarding this relationship have 
been used to analyze social provision by the state in South Africa. The conclusion provides 
a summary of the central arguments of the study, remarks on more general implications and 
makes some research suggestions. 
9.1 A summary of the argument 
In the first conceptual chapter it is argued that for the purposes of this study it is necessary 
to define social security more broadly than is usually the case. Social security is thus 
defined as the objective of providing, through collective mechanisms or collective choice, 
protection against deprivation and vulnerability. Social measures to promote security in the 
longer run (education, housing, health) can be seen as substitutes and complements for the 
measures with more direct effect (cash assistance and insurance schemes). Social security 
is distinguished from other possible ways of attaining security by arguing that the relevant 
mechanisms lead to entitlements which are not production or trade based. This means that 
benefits are normally in the form of transfer payments or "transfer goods". 
Moreover, the point is made that collective provision need not refer only to state provision, 
and that the state should not be seen as having a monopoly over the provision of social 
services. Both empirical generalizations and theoretical welfare economics, as conclusive 
arguments to justify government provision of social services, are found wanting. Many 
different institutions do in fact provide similar services, and a whole range of intermediary 
institutions can deal with public goods and externalities. Furthermore, the publicness of cer-
tain goods are related to concrete historical circumstances and not to the inherent nature 
of the goods themselves. 
The implications of these first definitional and theoretical considerations are important. lt 
makes it possible to view the state as one of a number of producers vying to provide certain 
goods. The outcome with regard to source of supply must accordingly be seen as the 
result of competitive costing and be explained with regard to considerations of cost of 
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production and comparative advantage. The analysis implies that the growth of state 
provision of social security need not imply the satisfaction of "new" needs, but a different 
way of providing - under certain conditions - for the clear societal need of protection against 
deprivation and vulnerability. lt is hypothesized in the conclusion to Chapter 1 that the 
growth of state provision of social security can be explained as a reassignment of the 
function of providing social security from other institutions to the state. 
Chapter 2 provides available empirical information on the growth of state provision of social 
security. Three sets of evidence are used. In the first place it is shown that in two currently 
developed countries social provision by the state has e:.:panded significantly over the last 
century with the state currently being the dominant supplier of these services. Some 
indication is also given of how this state provision evolved from self-help, informal and 
voluntary efforts. Secondly, time-series and cross-section data show a positive relationship 
between economic development (measured in output terms) and the relative role of the state 
in the economy (measured by government expenditure relative to gross domestic product). 
This growing relative role of the state can partly be explained with reference to growing state 
social expenditures and transfers during the development process which lead to a growing 
share for social expenditure in the government budget. The third and most direct way of 
testing the central hypothesis of increased nationalisation of social security provision, looking 
at the changing sources of transfers, is inconclusive because of the limited studies available 
on this issue. The three sets of evidence together do, however, indicate increasing state 
involvement in these services, and the contrasting decline in the involvement of other 
institutions. 
Chapter 3 explains this trend towards increased state provision in economic terms. lt is 
argued that modern economic development affects the cost of production of social services 
by different institutions differently. In particular, three aspects of costs which are seldom 
explicitly taken into account lead to the state attaining a comparative advantage in social 
provision. These are transaction costs or the costs of controlling the free-rider, deadweight 
costs and the costs of taxation. The cause of government growth in the field of social 
security can then be ascribed to changing supply factors which affect the comparative 
advantage of institutions. As this adjustment, which reduces the role of intermediate 
organizations, is in line with underlying economic factors it is efficiency-enhancing. Greater 
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social provision therefore need not detract from future growth. This approach also allows 
a new outlook on the question of the affordability of social security provision in poor 
countries. 
Part 11 of the study deals with state provision of social security in South Africa. Chapter 4 
recounts some aspects of the early history of social security in South Africa. lt provides 
evidence of: formalized social security in a poor, pre-industrial society; a variety of 
institutions active in the field of social provision, complex interaction between these insti-
tutions and, at least initially, an absence of domination by any one type of institution; and 
increasing pressures towards the coordination of services by a central body as the scale 
and nature of the society change. 
Chapter 5 studies the changing level and composition of government expenditure between 
1910 and 1990 in order to provide an indication of changing state priorities and a 
background against which to discuss the development of South African social policy. A 
number of tentative conclusions were formulated. Although the period up to 1949 saw 
progressive adjustments in the field of social policy this trend was reversed between 1949 
and 1976. This reversal and the mere marginal changes in social expenditures in the 1980's 
are unexpected in the light of trends in other countries and the extent of poverty in South 
Africa. One clear illustration of the nature of social policy in South Africa and its failure to 
adjust, compared to that in the rich countries, is provided by focusing on government 
transfers to households as a percentage of personal income. In addition to being 
significantly below the percentage in rich countries, the South African level also stayed 
constant over the last 4 decades. 
The focus on the historical evolution of social security measures discussed in Chapter 6 
provides further generalizations about the development of social security in South Africa. 
lt underscores the fact that the period before 1949 saw important e:,tensions of support, not 
only in terms of risks covered but also of the population, especially of previously excluded 
"race" groups. The reversal of policy after 19-l9 is illustrated by data showing increasing 
racial discrimination and examples of certain benefits which were withdrawn. The strength 
of the forces generating increased state intervention in the social sphere is, however, also 
evident. The fact that a rudimentary system of benefits was developed for all groups and 
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that these benefits became more equal after the 1970's, contrary to expressed state policy 
of excluding Africans from the "White" economy, shows how greater interdependence of 
individuals in an industrializing society makes e:·:panding state provision unavoidable. 
Chapter 7 surveys the important state programmes providing security and considers these 
in terms of conventional criteria. lt was concluded that the system is fragmented in a way 
that is harmful, lacking in terms of both coverage of the population and coverage of risks, 
and that benefits are unequal. In terms of coverage of population, the shortcomings relate 
to the fact that some benefits only apply to members of the labour force employed in the 
formal sector and to the existence of discriminatory eligibility conditions, strict means tests 
and inefficiencies of the delivery system. Unavailability of facilities, especially in the case of 
benefits in kind, leads to further problems of access. In terms of risks covered, deficiencies 
relate to the fact that there is no general system of assistance for people who fail to qualify 
for any of the insurance benefits or the benefits applying to those without access to labour 
power. There is thus no income support for the working poor, the labour force outside the 
formal sector of the economy or in the case of normal family responsibilities (for example, 
cash payments to families with children). The deficiencies of the South African mechanisms 
therefore not only show the effect of racial discrimination but also the failure to cater for 
those who become vulnerable in a rapidly changing economy and to adjust to the demands 
of a modern economy. The analysis of the relative role of the state in selected spheres and 
the interaction between state and other provision provided evidence of the dominance of the 
role of the state in the field of health, education and income support. The interaction 
between different programmes lent further justification for the argument that all relevant 
interventions must be considered together, also for policy purposes. 
All of the chapters on social security in South Africa provide evidence of shortcomings and 
a failure of social policy to adjust sufficiently to changing circumstances. The final chapter 
addresses limits on a shift towards a more equitable and complete safety net, specifically 
the affordability of equal and expanded coverage. The focus on resource and fiscal 
constraints is useful because it provides some guide to the changes that are necessary. A 
need to focus to a greater e:-.:tent on the poor and on more appropriate services providing 
higher returns flows from this perspective. In addition, this consensus on affordability also 
explains some of the adjustments that are currently taking place with regard to social 
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provision in South Africa. This study, however, concludes by noting some pressures 
towards greater state intervention and less accurate targeting of benefits and suggesting that 
such options might be the economically correct ones to take. Nationalization of the services 
providing social security is, to a greater eztent than is presently the case in South Africa's, 
on the grounds of the reasoning and evidence in this study, economically feasible. 
9.2 General implications of the study 
Early development theories are alleged to have suffered from a certain (physical) capital 
fundamentalism and were subsequently countered by a focus on the significant, and 
perhaps superior, returns to investment in human resources. Although this perspective is 
clearly important this study argued that social services can also be analyzed fruitfully by 
viewing them as less sui generis, and analyzing their provision together with other goods 
and services contending for people's income. This then provides an alternative way of 
analyzing the efficiency of the production and financing of these services. The "goods are 
goods" perspective, based on the analysis of Breton (see Chapter 1), serves to integrate 
important "public goods" back into the mainstream of microeconomics. This is so especially 
with regard to the theory of supply. 
By analyzing these services within the domain of markets or quasi-markets it also enables 
their discussion without focusing principally on issues of justice, merit goods and market 
failure. While both the Ricardian tradition and that of theoretical welfare economics 
acknowledged the primality of the question of distribution, the tradition of viewing efficiency 
and distribution as separate analytical issues is firmly established. By focusing on the 
efficiency enhancing effect of the provision of social services by the state, activities usually 
entailing progressive redistribution, some of the contradictions and trade-efts can be 
resolved. Both Melck and Donaldson have recently commented that it is credible that 
redistribution is a precondition for growth but that economic theory provides little guidance 
on why this should be so, especially in the short run.1 Although the assertion must be 
tentative, viewing state provision as the best that can be done in the face of stable demand 
and given resources provides a possible way. in which greater equality can be squared with 
improved efficiency and hence greater well-being for all. 
1Melck (1991 :190) and Donaldson (1991 :1). 
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These first two perspectives also make possible a view of the state as less monolithic, and 
as a "tool" which people utilize to advance the well-being of all. This contrasts with the 
dominant public choice approach which sees state action as leading, in most cases, to 
unproductive activity and private rents. lt also, however, diverges from the tradition in 
modern welfare economics which simply assumed the benevolent intervention of the state 
without rooting such outcomes in individual motivations. 
9.3 Research suggestions 
Two broad areas of research corresponding to the two parts of this study can be identified, 
namely general theoretical/comparative concerns and South African issues. 
With regard to theoretical issues the notion that state intervention represents a response to 
changing supply conditions clearly needs to be evaluated in the context of specific state 
interventions. The different suppliers of similar (social) services must be identified and their 
dominance over time explained in terms of concrete demand and supply factors. Most of 
what is available is quite general and mainly suggestive, or focuses on too limited a set of 
costs. An especially challenging area is that of measuring the magnitudes of transfers 
provided by different institutions, currently and over time, and to investigate the changes in 
and incentives behind these transfers. 
The study has also highlighted a number of gaps in the study of the South African economy. 
Both in the fields of history and economic history much work can be done on the early 
institutions and collective mechanisms through which people escaped insecurity and 
deprivation. Not enough is known about the role of the multitude of intermediate and less 
formal institutions in protection and promotion. Very little work has also been done on the 
development of the major components of the South African welfare system and the changing 
role of the state as a supplier. Why did the early system of non-contributory maternity 
benefits disappear? What led to the institution of workmen's compensation and unemploy-
ment insurance and what was behind the radical proposals of the Social Security 
Commission and Health Services Commission in the 1940's? Why did old age pensions for 
Africans survive the Nationalist onslaught? While this study offered some general responses 
to some of these questions, the challenge lies in exploring the detail. 
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This study is rooted partly, as explained in the introduction, in the lack of knowledge about, 
but clear importance of, institutional change in the process of economic development. lt 
was attempted to formulate an outline of the changing role of the state in the provision of 
services providing social security and to suggest how this changing role relates to and 
affects the process of economic growth. The South African application clearly indicated the 
complexity of the issues and how little can be said, and predicted, with certainty. Clearly a 
lot of work needs to be done in this field. 
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